Opinion
Civ. No. 97-1811, SECTION: E/5.
March 14, 2000.
ORDER AND REASONS
Defendants harry Lee, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Jefferson Parish, and Deputy Sheriffs Daniel Wright, Steve Kolb, and Keith Conley, have filed a motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff's § 1983 claim against them for denial of access to the courts. Plaintiff Jennifer LeBlanc opposes the motion.
LeBlanc has sued Sheriff Lee, in his official capacity, the Deputies, Wayde Dubroc, a reserve deputy, and Dubroc's insurer, State Farm, for damages she alleges she sustained when Dubroc knocked her to the ground on Mardi Gras Day in Metairie, as the Deputies were arresting her husband and his friend. She suffered a ruptured cervical disc and underwent fusion surgery. The access to the courts claim arises from the fact that the Sheriff Deputies, who knew Dubroc's identity, prepared a police report of the incident which states that an "unknown male" struck LeBlanc, causing her to fall, preventing her for a number of months from discovering who he was. She also claims that they failed to identify the eyewitnesses at the scene who saw Dubroc knock her down, which hinders her ability to obtain corroborating testimony and to impeach Dubroc's story that she "ran into" his arm. She learned of Dubroc's identity only after she filed suit against the Deputies and the Sheriff, and propounded discovery.
She alleges that she was prevented from filing suit against Dubroc for eight months. She claims that she suffered actual injuries, i.e., a lengthy delay in access to the courts, loss of the opportunity to collect prejudgment interest, which could amount to several thousand dollars, loss of the opportunity to call witnesses whose testimony would support plaintiff's claim regarding the use of excessive force, and emotional distress resulting from the consciousness of government abuse and the unnecessary prolongation of the litigation. She asserts that Sheriff Lee ratified the acts of the deputies and Dubroc by failing to discipline them and even to record the incident in their personnel files. She notes that Dubroc remains an active reserve officer, having been reinstated after a suspension unrelated to this incident. Defendants Sheriff Lee and the Deputies contend that, accepting as undisputed for purposes of this motion the fact that the three deputies intentionally concealed Dubroc's identity, essentially preparing a false police report in this aspect of the incident, that plaintiff cannot establish a claim for denial of access to the courts because she eventually learned of Dubroc's identity through defense counsel's responses to discovery.
Courts have long recognized that there is a fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts, founded both in the First Amendment guarantee of right to petition for redress of grievances and in the due process clause which assures that no person will be denied the opportunity to present to the courts their claims concerning violations of fundamental constitutional rights. Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967, 972 (5th Cir. 1983). To establish a civil rights claim for violation of this constitutional right of access to the courts, a litigant must show not only that he was denied access to the courts, but that he suffered "actual injury", meaning that the actions of the defendants hindered his efforts to pursue his claim. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 2180 (1996).
Defendants construe the "actual injury" prong as one which requires that the plaintiff be totally denied the opportunity to present the claim, not one broad enough to encompass actions which delay or hinder a claimant's access. They argue that plaintiff did ultimately learn of Dubroc's identity within the prescriptive period, filed suit timely, and have prosecuted the suit vigorously. Plaintiff contends that although she was not totally denied access, she has suffered actual injury, as recounted above, and that her claim of denial of access to the courts should proceed to trial.
The Court has carefully studied the authorities cited by the defendants and by the plaintiff. With respect to the defendants' position, the jurisprudence does not support a finding that plaintiff must actually be denied access to the courts totally in order to have a viable access to the courts claim. In Ryland, the Fifth Circuit observed:
Applying these principles to our case, we cannot say with certainty that there is no possibility that any set of facts which might be proved in support of the allegations would entitle the Rylands to some relief. . . . First, the complaint alleges that the defendants successfully covered up Lavona's murder for a period of eleven months. Thus, a fact finder could conclude that the alleged conspiracy to obstruct justice and/or deny the Rylands their constitutional rights was actually carried out. We reject the argument by the defendants that they are not liable because they did not intend to harm the Rylands by their actions. It is will settled that there is no requirement of specific intent in actions under section 1983. [citations omitted]. The defendants could have prejudiced the Rylands' chances of recovery in state court because the resulting delay would cause stale evidence and the fading of material facts in the minds of potential witnesses. Moreover, it could well prove more expensive to litigate such action. Finally, any interference with a substantive constitutional right, such as the right of access to the courts, may be itself amount to a constitutional deprivation (unless reasonably justified by a countervailing state interest).
708 P.2d at 975 (emphasis added). The Fifth Circuit in Crowder v. Sinyard, 884 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1989), summarized Ryland's holding, as follows:
On its facts, therefore, Ryland stands for the proposition that if state officials wrongfully and intentionally conceal information crucial to a person's ability to obtain redress through the courts, and do so for the purpose of frustrating that right, and that concealment and the delay engendered by it substantially reduce the likelihood of one's obtaining the relief to which one is otherwise entitled, they may have committed a constitutional violation.
882 F.2d at 812.
Clearly, the court in Ryland considered the fact that the plaintiffs, who ultimately did learn of the facts which allowed them to file a wrongful death claim against their daughter's murderer, despite a cover-up by state officials to conceal his identity, were delayed in learning of this information to be sufficient injury to allow the claim to proceed to trial. The possible injuries recounted by the Ryland court include contributing to stale evidence and the fading of material facts in the minds of potential witnesses. This reading of Ryland is supported by the Fifth Circuit's decision in Crowder, which concedes that concealing information crucial to a person's ability to seek redress through the courts, and the delay caused by such concealment, may be a constitutional violation if it substantially reduces plaintiff's chances of obtaining the relief to which they would have been entitled had the concealment and delay not occurred. In the present case, the Deputies entered false information in a police report by failing to report the identity of Dubroc, and although they spoke to a number of witnesses who said they saw Dubroc strike the plaintiff, failed to record their identities. This hindered plaintiff's efforts to determine her "attacker's" identity and to obtain discovery of the relevant facts, which might well increase the costs to plaintiff to litigate and potentially decrease her chances of prevailing against Dubroc, as he now claims she "ran into" his arm. While defendants' arguments that any concealment and delay did not prejudice the plaintiff and did not cause her injury are disputed-fact based arguments upon which a proper summary judgment motion may not be granted.
Defendants Sheriff Lee and Deputies next argue that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for their actions. The Ryland case was decided by the Fifth Circuit in 1983 and the events which transpired here occurred in 1997. This Court finds that, at the time of the event in question, the right of access to the courts was "clearly established" such that reasonable state actors would have understood that their conduct would violate constitutional rights. While the Sheriff may have been unaware of his Deputies' transgressions at the time they occurred, there is some evidence, although slight, that he may have ratified their acts by failing to institute an investigation or appropriate disciplinary proceedings against the three deputies involved for filing a false police report and failing to obtain the names of witnesses to the alleged battery, or against Reserve Deputy Dubroc, who, although alleged to have struck and knocked down a citizen, causing severe injury, while in a state of intoxication, is now back on the roster as an active reserve officer. While this may or may not be sufficient to place Monell liability on Sheriff Lee, it is a question of fact sufficient to survive summary judgment.
Accordingly, for the above and foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that the motion of Harry Lee, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Jefferson Parish, and Deputy Sheriffs Daniel Wright, Steve Kolb, and Keith Conley for summary judgment on plaintiff's claim for denial of access to the courts be and is hereby DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, March 14, 2000.