By contrast, the legislature specifically addressed sovereign immunity, providing that it "shall not apply to the contractor." Miss. Code. Ann. § 47-5-1219(b); see also Leavitt v. Carter, 178 So. 3d 334, 338-39 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that private prison and its employees "are not eligible for immunity under the MTCA"). And the legislature further insulated the state from the contractors' acts by providing that "[a]ny suit brought or claim made arising out of any act or omission in the operation of a private facility shall be made or brought against the contractor and not the State of Mississippi."

¶ 13. "A due[-]process violation occurs where a party is not allowed a full and complete hearing before being deprived of life, liberty [,] or property." Leavitt v. Carter , 178 So.3d 334, 339 (¶ 17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (citation omitted). Thus, for either a procedural or substantive due-process claim, the initial requirement "is proving that the plaintiff has been deprived by the government of a liberty or property interest; otherwise, ‘no right to due process can accrue.

Unfortunately for MTC, it is not an individual state official as in Bogard, and it is not otherwise entitled to immunity. Miss. Code Ann. § 47-5-1219(b) (establishing that sovereign immunity does not extend to private-prison contractors); Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 405-06, 412 (1997) (finding "no evidence" that pre-section 1983 common law "gave purely private companies or their employees any special immunity from suits"); see also Leavitt v. Carter, 178 So. 3d 334, 339 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that "the immunity conferred under the MTCA does not apply to private prisons operated under a contract with the State"). Absent an argument that MTC enjoys immunity from suit, Bogard is inapplicable. Aside from Bogard, MTC offers no legal authority suggesting that the size of an entity shields it from the duty of reasonable care.

Defendants do not explain how a private prison qualifies as an official or employee under § 47-5-803. To support their position, Defendants rely on a Mississippi Court of Appeals decision Leavitt v. Carter, 178 So. 3d 334 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012). In Leavitt, three inmates received rule violation reports ("RVRs") while incarcerated at East Mississippi Correctional Facility, a private prison, for trading their food trays for canteen items.

II. STATE LAWGEO, however, is also sued under state law under an apparent theory of respondeat superior for the alleged assault and battery in 2012, and negligence and denials of medical treatment, recreation and water occurring prior to July 1, 2012. GEO, as a private contractor operating a prison for the State, is not subject to the limitations period found in the Mississippi Tort Claim Act. See, Leavitt v. Carter, 178 So. 3d 334, 339 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012). Rather, the assault and battery claims are subject to a one year statute of limitations found in Mississippi Code Annotated § 15-1-35 and therefore should have been filed by 2013.

Unfortunately for MTC, it is not an individual state official as in Bogard, and it is not otherwise entitled to immunity. Miss. Code Ann. § 47-5-1219(b) (establishing that sovereign immunity does not extend to private-prison contractors); Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 405-06, 412 (1997) (finding "no evidence" that pre-section 1983 common law "gave purely private companies or their employees any special immunity from suits"); see also Leavitt v. Carter, 178 So. 3d 334, 339 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that "the immunity conferred under the MTCA does not apply to private prisons operated under a contract with the State"). Absent an argument that MTC enjoys immunity from suit, Bogard is inapplicable.

Mississippi authorized the construction of private prisons in 1994 Miss. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. Ch. 26, which established that the sovereign immunity provisions under Miss. Code Ann. §§ 11-46-1 et. seq. "shall not apply" to prison contractors. See also Leavitt v. Carter, 178 So. 3d 334, 338-39 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (finding that "the immunity conferred under the MTCA does not apply to private prisons operated under a contract with the State"). Miss. Code Ann. § 47-5-1219.

The GEO Group, Inc. and its employees, therefore, are "not eligible for immunity under the MTCA." Leavitt v. Carter, _ So.3d _, 2012 WL 3932761, at *4 (Miss.App. September 11, 2012). Additionally, the Fifth Circuit has found that Mississippi's post-deprivation remedies for civil in forma pauperis litigants satisfy due process.

Furthermore, "[a] Due Process violation occurs where a party is not allowed a full and complete hearing before being deprived of life, liberty or property." Leavitt v. Carter, 178 So.3d 334, 339 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012). "Thus, the initial requirement for either a procedural or substantive due process claim is proving that the plaintiff has been deprived by the government of a liberty or property interest; otherwise, 'no right to due process can accrue.'"

[3–5] ¶10. "A due process violation occurs where a party is not allowed a full and complete hearing before being deprived of life, liberty or property." Leavitt v. Carter, 178 So. 3d 334, 339 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Vaughn v. Vaughn, 56 So. 3d 1283, 1287 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011)). "Thus, ‘the initial requirement for either a procedural or substantive due process claim is proving that the plaintiff has been deprived by the government of a liberty or property interest; otherwise, no right to due process can accrue.’