Therefore, such evidence cannot be considered on appeal. See Leathers v. Timex Corp. , 174 Ga. App. 430, 431 (2), 330 S.E.2d 102 (1985) ("The burden is on the party alleging error to show it affirmatively by the record. A brief cannot be used in lieu of the record for adding evidence to the record.") (citations and punctuation omitted); see also Moss v. State , 194 Ga. App. 181, 390 S.E.2d 268 (1990) ("[W]e cannot consider factual allegations in the brief that are not supported by the record.") (citation omitted).
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Jankowski v. Taylor, 246 Ga. 804, 805, 273 S.E.2d 16 (1980); see also Kueffer Crane & Hoist Serv. v. Passarella, 247 Ga.App. 327, 329(2), 543 S.E.2d 113 (2000); Leathers v. Timex Corp., 174 Ga.App. 430, 431(2), 330 S.E.2d 102 (1985) (suit by former employee who alleged entitlement to certain retirement benefits under oral agreement barred by statute of limitation). In Kueffer Crane, a former employee sought a declaratory judgment that he was a five percent owner of his former employer, contending that the company had induced him to come work for it seven years earlier by promising him the ownership.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Jankowski v. Taylor, Bishop & Lee, 246 Ga. 804, 805, 273 S.E.2d 16 (1980) ; see also Kueffer Crane & Hoist Serv. v. Passarella, 247 Ga.App. 327, 329(2), 543 S.E.2d 113 (2000) ; Leathers v. Timex Corp., 174 Ga.App. 430, 431(2), 330 S.E.2d 102 (1985) (suit by former employee who alleged entitlement to certain retirement benefits under oral agreement barred by statute of limitation).In Kueffer Crane, a former employee sought a declaratory judgment that he was a five percent owner of his former employer, contending that the company had induced him to come work for it seven years earlier by promising him the ownership.
In light of these admissions, even if the City of Atlanta had misinformed Bradshaw about his retirement benefits in 1994, such actions did not prevent Bradshaw from filing suit in a timely manner. See Leathers v. Timex Corp., 174 Ga. App. 430, 431-432 (2) ( 330 SE2d 102) (1985) (alleged fraud did not toll statute of limitation where retiree knew over five years before filing lawsuit that retirement benefits had been inappropriately calculated). Since Bradshaw did not file his lawsuit within the applicable statutes of limitation, the trial court properly dismissed his suit.
Passarella, on the other hand, filed suit within months after the first actions by Kueffer Crane which could be considered a breach. 174 Ga. App. 430 ( 330 S.E.2d 102) (1985). 602 F. Supp. 882 (N.D.Ga. 1984).
The trial was not transcribed and, while a transcript of evidence from recollection pursuant to OCGA ยง 5-6-41 (g) may have been prepared, that transcript was not provided with the record submitted to this court. Further, Moss' brief cannot be used to add evidence to the record ( Leathers v. Timex Corp., 174 Ga. App. 430, 431 ( 330 S.E.2d 102); see Patterson v. State, 256 Ga. 740 (2) ( 353 S.E.2d 338)), and we cannot consider factual allegations in the brief that are not supported by the record. Behar v. Aero Med Intl., 185 Ga. App. 845 ( 366 S.E.2d 223). Accordingly, Moss has failed to satisfy his burden by showing error affirmatively in the record.
Exhibits contained in an appellate brief which do not appear in the record or transcript cannot be considered by this court and afford no basis for reversal. Taylor v. Bentley, 166 Ga. App. 887 ( 305 S.E.2d 617) (1983). Coweta Bonding Co. v. Carter, 230 Ga. 585 ( 198 S.E.2d 281) (1973); Leathers v. Timex Corp., 174 Ga. App. 430 ( 330 S.E.2d 102) (1985). Under the circumstances, the trial court's finding that the costs had already been paid at the time the order was entered must be presumed correct.
OCGA ยง 9-3-96; Gerald v. Doran, 169 Ga. App. 22 ( 311 S.E.2d 225) (1983); Sears, Roebuck Co. v. Green, 142 Ga. App. 770 ( 237 S.E.2d 10) (1977). Accord Leathers v. Timex Corp., 174 Ga. App. 430 (2) ( 330 S.E.2d 102) (1985). Since appellant's suit was not filed until November 14, 1985, it was not initiated within four years of his discovery of the alleged fraud and appellees' motion for directed verdict was properly granted.
Since we are required to base appellate review upon the evidence of record and not from the brief of either party, the affidavit of appellee's counsel has not been considered in rendering this decision. Leathers v. Timex Corp., 174 Ga. App. 430 (1) ( 330 S.E.2d 102) (1985). Judgment reversed. Banke, P. J., and Carley, J., concur.
Mere ignorance of existence of facts constituting a cause of action does not prevent the running of the statute of limitations. Leathers v. Timex Corp., 174 Ga. App. 430, 432 ( 330 S.E.2d 102). Fleming's acceptance of Southern Bell's statements cannot be charged to Lee Engineering so as to prevent the statute from running as to Lee. Judgment affirmed. Deen, P. J., and Pope, J., concur.