Moreover, it is โthe duty of the Court to harmonize and reconcile all parts of a statute so that effect may be given to each and every part: conflicting intentions in the same statute are never to be supposed or so regarded unless forced on the Court by unambiguous language.โ Leath v. Wilson, 238 Ala. 577, 579, 192 So. 417, 419 (1939). When construing the language of a statute, this court must presume โ โ โthat every word, sentence, or provision was intended for some useful purpose, has some force and effect, and that some effect is to be given to each, and also that no superfluous words or provisions were used.โ โ
In ascertaining legislative intent, we must look to the entire act instead of isolated phrases or clauses. Lambert v. Wilcox County Comm'n, 623 So. 2d 727, 729 (Ala. 1993). Moreover, it is 'the duty of the Court to harmonize and reconcile all parts of a statute so that effect may be given to each and every part: conflicting intentions in the same statute are never to be supposed or so regarded unless forced on the Court by unambiguous language.' Leath v. Wilson, 238 Ala. 577, 579, 192 So. 417, 419 (1939). When construing the language of a statute, this court must presume '"'that every word, sentence, or provision was intended for some useful purpose, has some force and effect, and that some effect is to be given to each, and also that no superfluous words or provisions were used.'"' Ex parte Uniroyal Tire Co., 779 So. 2d 227, 236 (Ala. 2000) (quoting Sheffield v. State, 708 So. 2d 899, 909 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997)).
Neutering the last sentence of ยง 40-10-82 runs contrary to "the duty of the Court to harmonize and reconcile all parts of a statute so that effect may be given to each and every part: conflicting intentions in the same statute are never to be supposed or so regarded unless forced on the Court by unambiguous language." Leath v. Wilson, 238 Ala. 577, 579, 192 So. 417, 419 (1939). "[W]e must presume โ "that every word, sentence, or provision was intended for some useful purpose, has some force and effect, and that some effect is to be given to each, and also that no superfluous words or provisions were used.
Such a construction of the two provisions is supported by the language used in the statutes, and it also meets our duty โ "to harmonize and reconcile all parts of a statute so that effect may be given to each and every part." โ Hays [v. Hays] , 946 So.2d [867] at 877 [ (Ala.Civ.App.2006) ] (quoting Leath v. Wilson , 238 Ala. 577, 579, 192 So. 417, 419 (1939) )."Because we have concluded that the juvenile court's July 22, 2014, order transferring the adoption proceeding to the juvenile court is not proper under either ยง 26โ10Aโ24(e) or ยง 26โ10Aโ3, we grant the petition for the writ of mandamus and order the probate court to rescind its July 22, 2014, order transferring the adoption proceeding to the juvenile court and to comply with ยง 26โ10Aโ24(d) and ยง 26โ10Aโ24(h)."
Section 16โ33Cโ7, Ala.Code 1975, lists various items each PACT contract must include, but it does not prescribe the exact terms, conditions, and provisions of those contracts, leaving that โto the sole discretionโ of the PACT board. ยง 16โ33Cโ7(a)(11), Ala.Code 1975. โ[C]onflicting intentions in the same statute are never to be supposed or so regarded unless forced on the Court by unambiguous language.โ Leath v. Wilson, 238 Ala. 577, 579, 192 So. 417, 419 (1939). The last clause of the first sentence of ยง 16โ33Cโ19 unambiguously limits the power of the PACT board to make unilateral changes to its โrules, procedures, or policiesโ; it does not unambiguously limit the power of the PACT board to perform any other authorized act, including the power to make bilateral contracts with PACT contract holders under either ยง 16โ33Cโ5(4) or ยง 16โ33Cโ7.
"[C]conflicting intentions in the same statute are never to be supposed or so regarded unless forced on the Court by unambiguous language." Leath v. Wilson, 238 Ala. 577, 579, 192 So. 417 , 419 (1939). The last clause of the first sentence of ยง 16-33C-19 unambiguously limits the power of the PACT board to make unilateral changes to its "rules, procedures, or policies"; it does not unambiguously limit the power of the PACT board to perform any other authorized act, including the power to make bilateral contracts with PACT contract holders under either ยง 16-33C-5(4) or ยง 16-33C-7.
We do not read ยง 12-2-7(1) as unambiguously imposing on us a duty to weigh the evidence even when doing so would reach an unjust result. See Leath v. Wilson, 238 Ala. 577, 579, 192 So. 417, 419 (1939) ("The rule for interpreting an act of the legislature in this respect makes it the duty of the Court to harmonize and reconcile all parts of a statute so that effect may be given to each and every part: conflicting intentions in the same statute are never to be supposed or so regarded unless forced on the Court by unambiguous language."). IV. The Complaint (Intergraph Corporation v. Bentley Systems) โ Calculation of the Principal Amount of the NoteA.
Ala. Pub. Service Comm. v. Redwing Carriers, Inc., 199 So.2d 653. Effect and meaning must be given every word and phrase of a statute whenever possible. Ex parte Miles, 248 Ala. 386, 27 So.2d 777; Leath v. Wilson, 238 Ala. 577, 192 So. 417; Downing v. City of Russellville, 241 Ala. 494, 3 So.2d 34; 82 C.J.S. Statutes ยง 346. The failure of the Commission to meet and act as a body in the issuance of an order constitutes "misconduct" authorizing the introduction of evidence thereof in the Circuit Court on an appeal from such order.
In construing statutes the court should look to the entire statute to determine the intent of the Legislature, and each part of the statute should be given effect and meaning, if possible, without doing violence to some other portion of the law. Ex parte State ex rel. King, 233 Ala. 318, 171 So. 892; Leath v. Wilson, 238 Ala. 577, 192 So. 417. SIMPSON, Justice.
Street v. Cloe, 207 Ala. 631, 93 So. 591; State ex rel. Wilkinson v. Lane, 181 Ala. 646, 62 So. 31. And in determining the intent, the rule as laid down by this Court in Mooring v. State ex rel. Braswell, 207 Ala. 34, 91 So. 869, 871, and followed in Ex parte Miles, 248 Ala. 386, 27 So.2d 777, is: "In construing laws it is the judicial disposition, as well as duty, to consider all related parts and provisions thereof that may contribute to disclose the legislative intent, and in so doing to give operation and effect to every provision, if fairly possible." See, also, Leath v. Wilson, 238 Ala. 577, 192 So. 417. The purpose of a statute will be illustrated by its origin, contemporaneous history, the prior condition of the law, as well as the general powers and course of legislation.