I. IntroductionThis case, which comes before us for consideration of Plaintiffs' motion that this Court recuse itself in this case, inspires "a profound sense a tragedy", Lease v. Fishel, 712 F.Supp.2d 359,386 (M.D.Pa. 2010), compels us, once again, to consider the unfortunate professional trajectory of plaintiffs' counsel, and requires us to reflect upon the recurring, and wholly regrettable, themes that now mark his practice in this and other litigation before this Court. At the outset, this motion reveals the apparent inability of counsel to take to heart the Court's prior admonition to consider, "the wisdom of Albert Einstein, who once stated that doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results is the highest form of folly."

Lease v. Fishel, 712 F.Supp.2d 359, 378-79 (M.D. Pa. 2010), aff'd, No. 1:07-CV-0003, 2010 WL 4318833 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 22, 2010). Moreover, in all instances we should be cognizant of the fact that the leading Third Circuit case regarding Rule 11 sanctions, Doering v. Union County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191(3d Cir.1988), also cautions that such sanctions should be used sparingly, should be no greater than is necessary to deter misconduct, and “should be guided by equitable considerations”, including the parties' resources and ability to pay.

Sadly, these shortcomings were not an isolated incident, but were just the latest in a series of procedural defaults by counsel, who has in the past year repeatedly failed to comply with a series of litigation deadlines to the prejudice of his clients' interests. See e.g., Lease v. Fishel, 712 F.Supp.2d 359 (M.D.Pa. 2010) (failure to comply with sanctions motion response deadline); Snyder v. Bender, No. 09-927, 2010 WL 5110556 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 9, 2010) (failure to comply with briefing deadline);Snyder v. Bender, No. 09-927, 2011 WL 1085692 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2011) (failure to timely file amended complaint). While the Plaintiffs' counsel chose not to contest this discovery motion when it was filed, and had previously attested to the affability, fairness and integrity of the Court, on May 6, 2011, counsel moved to recuse this Court, now claiming that the Court was unfair and biased.

This curious decision to ignore the very Court deadlines which Plaintiffs' counsel previously urged us to impose is just the latest in a series of procedural defaults by counsel, who has in the past year repeatedly failed to comply with a series of litigation deadlines to the prejudice of his clients' interests.See e.g., Lease v. Fishel, 712 F.Supp.2d 359 (M.D.Pa. 2010) (failure to comply with sanctions motion response deadline);Snyder v. Bender, No. 09-927, 2010 WL 5110556 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 9, 2010) (failure to comply with briefing deadline); Snyder v. Bender, No. 09-927, 2011 WL 1085692 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2011) (failure to timely file amended complaint). For the sake of his clients, counsel is urged to be more attentive to these litigation deadlines and responsibilities.

" Sandy, 2017 WL 3749749, at *2 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 144). "[A] party's disappointment with what the party anticipates may be the court's rulings cannot form the basis for recusal." Id. (quoting Lease v. Fishel, 712 F. Supp. 2d 359, 373 (M.D. Pa. 2010)). Almost universally, courts have found that the time requirement laid out in § 144 requires a party to raise the issue of disqualification "at the earliest moment after acquiring knowledge of the facts providing a basis for disqualification.

However, justice also requires that the merits of a particular dispute be placed before the court in a timely fashion ....” Lease v. Fishel, 712 F. supp. 2d 359, 371 (M.D. pa. 2010) (quoting McCurdy v. American Bd. of Plastic Surgery, 157 F.3d 191, 197 (3d Cir. 1998).

First, to ensure that motions for recusal are not being used purely to avoid adverse outcomes, 28 U.S.C. § 144 requires recusal motions to be "timely." § 144. "[A] party's disappointment with what the party anticipates may be the court's rulings cannot form the basis for recusal." Lease v. Fishel, 712 F.Supp.2d 359, 373 (M.D. Pa. 2010); see Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom, Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2000) ("[A] party's displeasure with legal rulings does not form an adequate basis for recusal."). Rather, "[s]ubsections 455(a) and (b)(1) require the source of bias to be extrajudicial, that is stemming from a source outside of the proceeding, or of such an intensity as to make a fair trial impossible."

First, to ensure that motions for recusal are not being used purely to avoid adverse outcomes, 28 U.S.C. § 144 requires recusal motions to be “timely.” § 144. “[A] party's disappointment with what the party anticipates may be the court's rulings cannot form the basis for recusal.” Lease v. Fishel, 712 F.Supp.2d 359, 373 (M.D. Pa. 2010); see Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom, Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[A] party's displeasure with legal rulings does not form an adequate basis for recusal.”).

However, justice also requires that the merits of a particular dispute be placed before the court in a timely fashion ....” Lease v. Fishel, 712 F. supp. 2d 359, 371 (M.D. pa. 2010) (quoting McCurdy v. American Bd. of Plastic Surgery, 157 F.3d 191, 197 (3d Cir. 1998).

Edelstein v. Wilentz 812 F.2d 128, 131 (3d Cir.1987).Lease v. Fishel, 712 F. Supp. 2d 359, 374 (M.D. Pa. 2010), aff'd, No. 1:07-CV-0003, 2010 WL 4318833 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 22, 2010). B. Boldrini's Recusal Motion Will be Denied.