Opinion
No. 1-19-2356
05-13-2021
LEASE FINANCE GROUP, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MENG QIN DONG, Defendant-Appellant.
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois No. 18 M1 119331 Honorable Dennis Michael McGuire, Judge, presiding. JUSTICE MARTIN delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Lampkin and Reyes concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: Where defendant waived objection to jurisdiction by filing several responsive pleadings and proceeding to trial by agreement, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. ¶ 2 Lease Finance Group, LLC ("LFG") filed a verified complaint against Meng Qin Dong, a resident of the State of Mississippi, in the circuit court of Cook County. In its small claims compliant, LFG alleged Dong defaulted under the terms of a Personal Guaranty on a Commercial Finance Lease Agreement ("Agreement"). Following a hearing at which Dong was absent, the trial court entered a default judgment for LFG and barred Dong from testifying at any future trial for failing to comply with a served notice pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 237 (eff. July 1, 2005). Dong filed a motion to reconsider, which the trial court denied. In the sole issue raised on appeal, Dong contends the trial court erred where it lacked in personam jurisdiction over her, as a resident of Mississippi who had no minimum contacts with Illinois. We affirm.
In adherence with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 352(a) (eff. July 1, 2018), this appeal has been resolved without oral argument upon the entry of a separate written order. --------
¶ 3 I. JURISDICTION
¶ 4 The trial court entered a default judgment against Dong on August 22, 2019. On October 17, 2019, the court denied Dong's motion to reconsider. On November 18, 2019, Dong filed a timely notice of appeal. Accordingly, this court has jurisdiction pursuant to article VI, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1980, art. VI, § 6) and Illinois Supreme Court Rules 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994) and 303 (a) (eff. July 1, 2017), governing appeals from a final judgment of a circuit court in a civil case.
¶ 5 II. BACKGROUND
¶ 6 Meng Qin Dong, who owned and operated King Buffet restaurant, entered into an agreement with FBN Retriever in September 2011. The parties signed a "non-cancellable lease," whereby King Buffet was to pay $198.00 for a period of 48 months in exchange for the lease of point-of-sale equipment. Dong signed as the personal guarantor of King Buffet's financial obligation pursuant to the lease, which was not subject to cancellation. In October 2011, FBN Retriever sold the lease to plaintiff LFG, a company engaged in the commercial lease financing business. ¶ 7 Shortly thereafter, King Buffet defaulted by failing to make the required monthly lease payments pursuant to the Agreement. On May 25, 2018, LFG filed a complaint against Dong in the circuit court of Cook County. Therewithin, LFG alleged it was a Delaware Limited Liability Company with a registered office in Cook County, Illinois. LFG further alleged Dong consented to the court's jurisdiction when she signed the Agreement which provided Cook County would be the proper forum for any disputes arising under the lease. ¶ 8 On June 18, 2018, LFG served summons on Dong in Jackson, Mississippi. Thereafter, on July 26, 2018, Attorney Lori Quist filed an appearance on behalf of Dong. The trial court entered a default judgment for LFG on December 6, 2018, due to Dong's failure to file an answer to LFG's complaint. The matter was set for a prove-up hearing to be held on January 24, 2019. ¶ 9 On January 4, 2019, defense counsel filed a motion to vacate the default judgment and filed an answer, containing various affirmative defenses. The court, on January 24, 2019, entered an agreed order granting Dong leave to file an amended answer and setting the matter for status on February 28, 2019. ¶ 10 On February 28, 2019, after defense counsel did not appear in court, the court entered an order setting a prove-up hearing for March 7, 2019. Subsequently, on March 6, 2019, Attorney Quist filed an amended motion to vacate default judgment and filed an amended answer on behalf of Dong. On March 7, 2019, the court entered an agreed order vacating technical defaults and setting the case for status. On March 26, 2019, LFG filed an answer to Dong's affirmative defenses. Attorney Quist, on April 29, 2019, filed a second amended answer on behalf of Dong. On May 9, 2019, a trial date was set—by agreed order—for August 22, 2019. LFG, through counsel, issued a Rule 237 notice to defense counsel requesting Dong appear for testimony on the August 22, 2019 trial date. ¶ 11 On August 22, 2019, Attorney Quist appeared in court with David Chen, Dong's son. Despite the issuance of the Rule 237 notice, Dong failed to appear. While Quist explained to the court that Dong's son "does all of the business dealings" for King Buffet, plaintiff's counsel argued that the son could not testify on behalf of Dong. Counsel further explained that King Buffet was not being sued, but rather, Dong was being sued individually as the personal guarantor under the Agreement. Upon counsel's continued objections to Dong's son testifying, Attorney Quist argued that LFG should have sued Dong in Mississippi. The trial court responded: "[t]here's no motion before me. This is here on a contract action." Attorney Quist then requested a "SOJ without cause." Plaintiff's counsel strenuously objected, and the court denied the motion, finding that Quist could not request a substitution of judge on behalf of a client who was not present in court. Quist then announced that Dong's son no longer wished to testify, and they would "take the default." ¶ 12 As a result, the trial court entered a default judgment in favor of the plaintiff and issued sanctions barring Dong from testifying at any future trial, should she successfully move to vacate the judgment. ¶ 13 On October 17, 2019, the court held a hearing on Dong's "Motion for Reconsideration or in the Alternative, Motion to Vacate Order and Set for a New Trial." Within the motion, Dong argued that the trial court allowed its feelings toward Attorney Quist to influence its ruling in the instant case. Dong further contended that the court misapplied the law and that barring Dong from testifying in the future would be a clear miscarriage of justice. Plaintiff's attorney argued the discretionary relief granted was appropriate and allowable pursuant to Supreme Court Rules. The court denied the motion, and Dong timely appealed.
¶ 14 III. ANALYSIS
¶ 15 On this direct appeal, Dong raises only one issue, claiming the trial court erred in entering judgment for LFG where it lacked in personam jurisdiction over her—a resident of the state of Mississippi who had no minimum contacts with Illinois. Specifically, Dong emphasizes she was a resident of Madison, Mississippi, at all relevant times—both when she signed the Agreement and when LFG filed suit against her over seven years later. Furthermore, Dong's business, King Buffet, was located in Jackson, Mississippi. While Dong concedes that there is a "consent to jurisdiction and venue" clause in the Agreement, she argues it was buried in boilerplate language and, for various reasons, is unenforceable as it relates to her. Dong therefore argues the default judgment and sanctions entered against her should be reversed. ¶ 16 LFG responds that the court did not err where Dong waived objection to jurisdiction. LFG further argues Dong consented to both jurisdiction and venue of the circuit court of Cook County where she executed a contract containing a choice of venue and jurisdictional consent clause. We need not address LFG's second contention as it is clear Dong did not object to the court's jurisdiction. Rather, Dong submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the court when she filed, not one, but three different answers to the complaint and proceeded to trial by agreement. ¶ 17 Subsection (a) of Section 2-301 of the Code of Civil Procedure governs objections to jurisdiction over the person and it states, in relevant part:
"Prior to the filing of any other pleading or motion other than as set forth in subsection (a-6), a party may object to the court's jurisdiction over the party's person, either on the ground that the party is not amenable to process of a court of this State or on the ground of insufficiency of process or insufficiency of service of process, by filing a motion to dismiss the entire proceeding or any cause of action involved in the proceeding or by filing a motion to quash service of process."735 ILCS 5/2-301(a) (West 2018). If an objecting party, prior to making such a request, files a responsive pleading or a motion, unless that motion is for an extension of a time or is filed under Section 2-1301, 2-1401, or 2-1401.1, then the party thereby waives all objections to the court's jurisdiction over the party's person. 735 ILCS 5/2-301(a-6) (West 2018). ¶ 18 In the instant case, on January 4, 2019, Dong filed a motion to vacate default judgment and filed an answer to LFG's verified complaint. Within her answer, Dong included the affirmative defense of "wrong jurisdiction/wrong venue." Thereafter, on March 6, 2019, Dong filed an amended answer. On April 29, 2019, Dong filed a second amended answer. On May 9, 2019, a trial date was set—by agreed order—for August 22, 2019. Furthermore, on August 22, 2019, defense counsel appeared in court with Dong's son, prepared to present a defense at trial. After the trial court expressed its frustration with Dong's failure to comply with the Rule 237 notice, only then did defense counsel raise the issue of jurisdiction, arguing that LFG should have sued Dong in Mississippi. In response to defense counsel's claim, the trial court stated that there was no motion before the court. Once it became clear to defense counsel that she was unlikely to prevail on her jurisdictional argument at trial, counsel requested a substitution of judge without cause. Upon denial of the motion, defense counsel announced Dong's son no longer wished to testify and they would "take the default." ¶ 19 As evidenced by Dong's repeated responsive pleadings and interactions with the court, it is clear she waived any objection to the court's jurisdiction over her person. Despite Dong's inclusion of jurisdiction and venue in her affirmative defenses, Dong submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the court when she failed to properly raise the issue before the court in a timely manner. See 735 ILCS 5/2-301 (West 2018).
¶ 20 IV. CONCLUSION
¶ 21 Based on the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. ¶ 22 Affirmed.