Opinion
A-14026 0404
12-18-2024
ROBERTO LEAL JR., Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Elizabeth D. Friedman, Law Office of Elizabeth D. Friedman, Prineville, Oregon, under contract with the Office of Public Advocacy, Anchorage, for the Appellant. RuthAnne Beach, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d)
Appeal from the Superior Court, Fourth Judicial District, Fairbanks, Michael A. MacDonald, Judge. Trial Court No. 4FA-17-01499 CR
Elizabeth D. Friedman, Law Office of Elizabeth D. Friedman, Prineville, Oregon, under contract with the Office of Public Advocacy, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
RuthAnne Beach, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Harbison and Terrell, Judges.
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
Roberto Leal Jr. was convicted, following a jury trial, of second-degree murder after he strangled and killed his girlfriend, Robyn Gray. Leal was sentenced to 70 years with 20 years suspended (50 years to serve). Leal raises four arguments on appeal.
AS 11.41.110(a)(1).
First, Leal argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. Leal was convicted of second-degree murder under AS 11.41.110(a)(1), which provides that a person commits second-degree murder if they cause the death of any person "with intent to cause serious physical injury to another person or knowing that the conduct is substantially certain to cause death or serious physical injury to another person."
When we review the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we view the evidence, and all reasonable inferences from that evidence, in the light most favorable to upholding the jury's verdict. We then ask whether a reasonable juror could have concluded that the State had proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt.
Johnson v. State, 188 P.3d 700, 702 (Alaska App. 2008); see also Iyapana v. State, 284 P.3d 841, 848-49 (Alaska App. 2012).
Johnson, 188 P.3d at 702.
At trial, Leal testified that, on the night of the murder, he had strangled Gray during sex by placing his forearm across her throat. The doctor who performed Gray's autopsy testified that the cause of her death was asphyxiation and that the manner of her death was homicide. Additionally, the doctor testified that approximately eight minutes of sustained pressure to Gray's neck was necessary in order to cause her death. Considered in the light most favorable to the verdict, this evidence was sufficient to establish that Leal caused Gray's death "with intent to cause serious physical injury to another person or knowing that the conduct is substantially certain to cause death or serious physical injury to another person."
Second, Leal argues the superior court erred by imposing a sentence that exceeded the benchmark range for second-degree murder set out in Page v. State. We have previously held the court may depart from the benchmark range if it has articulated a sound reason for determining that a higher sentence is warranted.
Page v. State, 657 P.2d 850, 855 (Alaska App. 1983) (adopting a 20-30 year benchmark sentencing range for first-felony offenders convicted of second-degree murder, in order to ensure that typical cases receive a typical sentence and that those defendants receiving atypical sentences are sentenced on the basis of objective aggravating factors, not factors idiosyncratic to a specific judge); see also David v. State, 123 P.3d 1099, 1105 (Alaska App. 2005) (recognizing that the Page benchmark applies to "a typical first offender convicted of a typical second-degree murder").
See Brown v. State, 4 P.3d 961, 963-64 (Alaska App. 2000) (explaining that a judge "must have sound reasons" if they impose a sentence that varies from the benchmark).
At sentencing, the superior court made several findings reflecting the seriousness of Leal's crime: the offense was a crime of domestic violence; Gray's children were in the room when Leal killed her; the offense was fueled by alcohol and rage; Leal was on probation at the time of the offense and had failed to comply with his probation condition requiring him to take anger management classes; Leal staged the scene to try to cover up his crime, and in doing this he demonstrated "indifference to [] Gray's body laying there in the room and an indifference to his crime"; and Leal misled investigators by lying to them about what had happened. Given these findings, which are supported by the record, we find that the court was justified in imposing a sentence that exceeded the Page benchmark.
Third, Leal argues that his sentence is clearly mistaken and excessive. As an appellate court, our review of an excessive sentence claim is limited to whether the sentence fits within a "permissible range of reasonable sentences" given the record before us. We will affirm a sentence as not clearly mistaken even if we believe that a lower sentence would also have been reasonable.
Morrissette v. State, 524 P.3d 803, 807 (Alaska App. 2023) (quoting Erickson v. State, 950 P.2d 580, 586 (Alaska App. 1997)).
Id.
Leal contends that his sentence is clearly mistaken for three reasons: (1) the court focused its sentencing remarks on the issue of domestic violence in Alaska and the murders of Alaska Native women and did not consider Leal as an individual; (2) the court relied on the State's "exaggerated" account of his criminal record; and (3) the court failed to take into account the testimonials from Leal's family and friends attesting to his nonviolent character.
We find no merit to these contentions. The statements about domestic violence that Leal attributes to the superior court were made by the prosecutor, not by the court. Furthermore, the State's description of Leal's criminal record was accurate, and the court acknowledged Leal's limited criminal history in its sentencing remarks. Lastly, the superior court specifically mentioned the letters from Leal's family and friends during the sentencing hearing. Although the court gave the letters less weight than Leal would have liked, a sentencing judge has substantial discretion when evaluating the priority of the various sentencing goals and assessing the weight they should receive under the facts of a particular case. Having independently reviewed the record and the superior court's findings in this case, we conclude that the sentence imposed is not clearly mistaken.
Evan v. State, 899 P.2d 926, 931 (Alaska App. 1995).
Finally, Leal argues that Special Condition of Probation No. 9 violates his constitutional right to family association. This condition prohibits Leal from having contact with Gray's family members without their permission. Leal notes that his children are living with Gray's family who do not want contact with him, and thus, he has no means of contacting his children. The State concedes that this condition should be remanded to the superior court to amend this condition by specifying a method by which Leal can contact his biological children while they are residing with Gray's family. We find this concession to be well-taken.
Marks v. State, 496 P.2d 66, 67-68 (Alaska 1972) (requiring the appellate court to independently assess whether the State's concession of error in a criminal case "is supported by the record and has legal foundation").
Accordingly, we REMAND this case to the superior court for reconsideration of Special Condition of Probation No. 9. In all other respects, we AFFIRM the judgment of the superior court.