Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. No. NC039731 Joseph E. DiLoreto, Judge.
David Kyle; Robert Scott Shtofman for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Strickroth & Parker and Bryan C. Zaverl for Defendant and Respondent.
DOI TODD J.
Plaintiffs and appellants Maria Leal, Elizabeth Leal and Martha Orozco were tenants in a building owned by defendant and respondent Tony Aguiar. They lost personal property items and suffered injury following a fire at the building. At the conclusion of a jury trial, the jury returned a special verdict which found that Aguiar was not a substantial factor causing injury, yet apportioned 15 percent fault to him. Upon realizing that the special verdict drafted by appellants’ counsel failed to direct the jury to stop answering questions if it found Aguiar was not a substantial factor, the trial court polled the jury and learned that each member would have not apportioned liability if the verdict form had been structured properly. It thereafter entered judgment in favor of Aguiar and denied appellants’ motion for a new trial.
We affirm. The doctrine of invited error bars appellants’ claim. But even if we considered the merits of appellants’ argument that the trial court should have required further deliberations in light of the verdict’s inconsistency, we would conclude that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in correcting the verdict and denying the new trial motion.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Aguiar owned an apartment building located at 1696 Newport Street in Long Beach (Building) since 1992 or 1993. During his ownership, he maintained a rule against automobile repair in the driveway or garages. As a property owner, sometime in 2002 Aguiar received a letter from the City of Long Beach (City) reminding him of the ordinance which prohibited individuals from working on their cars in garages.
Aguiar did not reside at the Building, but would visit it approximately 10 to 15 times per month. Dottie Hasson served as Aguiar’s on-site manager and, in December 2005, Justino Amozoc assisted her with cleaning the premises. Aguiar had given Hasson a copy of the letter from the City and instructed her to distribute it to the tenants. At various times before December 2005, Hasson had told tenants they were not permitted to barbecue or repair cars in their driveways. The Amozoc family and other tenants refused to abide by her instructions, and on several occasions she saw cars being repaired in the Amozoc driveway and the garage area. Though Aguiar stated he had never seen such repairs being performed nor recalled Hasson apprising him of any recurring problems in that regard, Martha Orozco stated that she called Aguiar more than once to tell him tenants were either barbecuing or working on their cars in the garage area. Aguiar typically relayed any complaints to the offending tenants.
On December 26, 2005 at approximately 8:30 p.m., a fire broke out in the garage area of the Building. The fire started when Ruiz Silivan Murillo, a friend of Amozoc’s who was removing a car fuel tank, spilled gasoline on a halogen lamp that was lighting the garage area. Appellants lost all their personal property in the fire. Aguiar learned of the fire from a message on his answering machine later that evening. No governmental agency cited Aguiar for any code violations related to the fire; using a halogen lamp for car repair work would not have been a fire code violation. A property manager who qualified as an expert opined that Aguiar owned, managed and maintained the Building reasonably.
In April 2007, appellants filed a complaint against Aguiar and Murillo alleging multiple causes of action, and seeking general, special and punitive damages. Aguiar answered, generally denying the allegations and asserting several affirmative defenses.
The trial court bifurcated the issue of liability and a jury trial on that issue commenced in December 2008. At the conclusion of the first day of trial and out of the presence of the jury, the trial court and counsel discussed evidentiary issues, verdict forms and Aguiar’s motion for nonsuit. Aguiar’s counsel indicated that he had previously submitted a verdict form. Upon review, it appeared that the form included individuals who were no longer parties to the action and questions about extraneous issues. When the trial court stated that it would not give that verdict form to the jury, appellants’ counsel stated that he intended to prepare a verdict form and bring it in the next morning. Directing its comments to appellants’ counsel, the trial court specified certain sub-questions related to negligence that should or should not be included in the verdict form. The trial court specifically pointed out that a causation question would be necessary in the verdict form.
Three plaintiffs—Victor Alvarez, Jacqueline Orozco and Martha Orozco—settled their property damage claims with Aguiar before trial began. Because Martha Orozco’s personal injury claims remained unsettled, she appeared as a plaintiff during the liability phase of the trial. Plaintiff Willie Fuller was dismissed from the action.
The trial court granted the motion for nonsuit in part, ruling that the only theory of liability that would be presented to the jury was negligence.
After the defense rested the following day, the trial court and counsel discussed the verdict form appellants’ counsel had prepared. The trial court found it insufficient because it failed to provide an apportionment of liability for nonparties who appellants claimed were at least in part responsible for the fire. At that point, appellants’ counsel argued that an apportionment finding was unnecessary during the first phase of the trial addressing liability and should be included in the second phase verdict form that would address damages. After further discussion, the trial court specifically instructed appellants’ counsel how to prepare the special verdict form, question by question. It directed there be multiple parts to the verdict form: It would inquire as to the negligence of Aguiar and Amozoc, ask whether Amozoc was Aguiar’s agent, ask whether Aguiar and/or Amozoc were a substantial factor causing injury, and finally ask whether Murillo’s actions were a superseding or intervening cause. After further discussion, appellants’ counsel indicated that the verdict form would include a question directing the jury to find a percentage of fault among Aguiar, Murillo and others instead of inquiring about a superseding or intervening cause.
After deliberating, the jury returned its verdict, finding that Aguiar and Amozoc were negligent and that Amozoc was Aguiar’s agent or employee acting within the scope of that agency or employment, but that neither Aguiar nor Amozoc was a substantial factor causing injury to appellants. In the final question on the special verdict form, the jury found that Murillo was 80 percent responsible for appellants’ harm, Aguiar was 15 percent responsible and others were five percent responsible. The jury was polled, revealing a nine to three verdict that Aguiar was not a substantial factor and a 12 to zero verdict that Amozoc was not a substantial factor. At that point, the trial court indicated that the jury need not be polled on the final question, opining that it must have misunderstood the verdict. Appellants’ counsel, on the other hand, characterized the verdict as inconsistent. Out of the presence of the jury, the trial court stated that the verdict form should have included an instruction between the final two questions—questions six and seven—that the jury was not to proceed to question seven if it answered questions five and six negatively. The trial court indicated that if the verdict form had been prepared properly, the jury never would have answered question seven.
To resolve the matter, the trial court brought the jury back in the courtroom and explained that “nine or more of you agreed that, according to this [verdict form], that Mr. Amozoc, his conduct was not a substantial factor in causing the injury to the plaintiffs and also Mr. Aguiar’s conduct was not a substantial factor in causing injury to the plaintiff. Now, the verdict should have said, If you answer no to these two questions, don’t answer question number 15 [sic] because you can’t apportion negligence if you don’t find that there was, that the negligence was a substantial factor.” When one juror indicated that he or she did not understand, the trial court continued to explain that given a majority of the jury found that neither Aguiar nor Amozoc was a substantial factor, there was no need to answer further questions because causation by a substantial factor is a necessary element of the claim. The trial court then asked the jury “[i]f it [the verdict form] would have said, If you say no to those two questions, would you have gone on and did the apportionment, anyway, had this verdict told you to do the right thing?” When all jurors indicated they understood what the trial court was asking, the trial court inquired of each juror individually “[s]o if the verdict would have said Stop, would you have gone any further[?]” Each juror answered negatively, and the trial court excused the jury.
In December 2008, the trial court entered judgment on the special verdict in favor of Aguiar. Appellants thereafter moved for a new trial on the grounds that the verdict was inconsistent, the jurors misunderstood the term “substantial factor” and substantial evidence did not support the verdict. In support of their motion, appellants submitted a two-paragraph juror declaration; three jurors signed after the first paragraph and averred: “I was a juror in the matter of Alvarez v. Aguiar. I understood the term ‘substantial’ factor to mean more than 50%, not that he was not responsible.” The second paragraph of the juror declaration, signed by two of the three jurors, further provided: “I was the jury foreperson. I did not understand that ‘substantial’ factor meant that the defendant, Tony Aguiar, was not liable. I understood him to be 15% liable, and so did the other jurors. I, and we, thought it meant more than 50% and that is why I, and they, stated ‘No.’ Had we understood, I, and we, would have voted ‘Yes’ to the question of whether or not Aguiar was a substantial factor.”
Following a hearing on the new trial motion, the trial court denied the motion, ruling in a minute order: “Though the special verdict was confusing, the fault lies with counsel for drafting and approving the verdict.” It found that the confusing form of the verdict did not constitute a ground for a new trial.
Appellants appealed from the judgment and the denial of their motion for a new trial.
DISCUSSION
Appellants contend that the trial court improperly resolved the inconsistency in the jury’s verdict, arguing that the trial court should have reinstructed the jury on substantial factor and required further deliberations. Alternatively, they argue their motion for new trial should have been granted in light of the juror declaration. We find no merit to their contentions.
I. The Trial Court Properly Entered Judgment on the Special Verdict.
Code of Civil Procedure section 624 describes the difference between general and special verdicts. Whereas “[a] general verdict is that by which they pronounce generally upon all or any of the issues, either in favor of the plaintiff or defendant; a special verdict is that by which the jury find the facts only, leaving the judgment to the Court. The special verdict must present the conclusions of fact as established by the evidence, and not the evidence to prove them; and those conclusions of fact must be so presented as that nothing shall remain to the Court but to draw from them conclusions of law.” (§ 624.) The requirement that the jury must resolve every controverted issue is one of the recognized pitfalls of special verdicts. “‘“[T]he possibility of a defective or incomplete special verdict, or possibly no verdict at all, is much greater than with a general verdict that is tested by special findings....” [Citation.]’” (Myers Building Industries, Ltd. v. Interface Technology, Inc. (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 949, 960 (Myers).) To address these potential problems, section 619 provides: “When the verdict is announced, if it is informal or insufficient, in not covering the issue submitted, it may be corrected by the jury under the advice of the Court, or the jury may be again sent out.”
Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
While we review the threshold question of a verdict’s inconsistency independently (Mendoza v. Club Car, Inc. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 287, 303 (Mendoza)), we review a trial court’s efforts to correct an ambiguous or inconsistent verdict for an abuse of discretion (Zagami, Inc v. James A. Crone, Inc. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1083, 1091–1092; Mendoza, supra, at pp. 305–306).
A. The Doctrine of Invited Error Precludes Appellants from Challenging the Special Verdict.
Immediately after the jury returned its special verdict, the trial court recognized that the inconsistency stemmed from the improper preparation of the verdict. According to the trial court, the jury never would have answered the apportionment question had the verdict included proper instructions. The trial court unambiguously stated to appellants’ counsel: “You prepared the verdict, prepared it wrong. There is no way they can answer questions five and six. If they answer no, they don’t go any further, but you didn’t tell them to do that.” Rejecting appellants’ suggestion that the verdict was inconsistent for reasons other than its improper preparation, the trial court stated: “That’s exactly the issue, whether or not if it had been prepared properly and, counsel, you should have known something about this but, obviously, you don’t. And I accept part of the blame, too, because I should have seen it because that’s what it should have said. But it didn’t say that so—wait a minute, so there is no need for the jury to proceed any further.”
“Where a party by his conduct induces the commission of error, he is estopped from asserting it as a ground for reversal. This application of the estoppel principle is generally known as the doctrine of invited error. [Citation.]” (Horsemen’s Benevolent & Protective Assn. v. Valley Racing Assn. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1538, 1555 (Horsemen’s); accord, Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 403 [explaining invited error doctrine].) Under the invited error doctrine, “[a]n appellant cannot submit a matter for determination by the lower court and then contend on appeal that the matter was beyond the scope of the issues.” (Horsemen’s, supra, at p. 1555; see also 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Appeal, § 384, p. 436 [same].) Similarly, “an appellant cannot complain of an erroneous instruction where he requested the instruction given or one substantially similar to it.” (Horsemen’s, supra, at p. 1555.) A party “may not avoid the application of the doctrine by asserting that the error was not deliberately or willfully induced. The good faith of defendant is immaterial.” (Jentick v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. (1941) 18 Cal.2d 117, 122.)
The doctrine of invited error applies to situations similar to this, where a party has prepared a special verdict form and relies on an error in the form to argue that the verdict should be reversed. (Myers, supra, 13 Cal.App.4th at p. 960, fn. 8 [doctrine of invited error supported denial of a new trial to a party who failed to propose an accurate special verdict form for the liability phase of the trial and thereafter opposed efforts to correct the problem during the punitive damages phase]; Mesecher v. County of San Diego (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1677, 1685–1686 [party who participated in the preparation of a verdict form which allowed the jury to answer two questions inconsistently based on the same facts was barred by the doctrine of invited error from raising the inconsistent verdict as a basis for appeal]; Newton v. Thomas (1955) 137 Cal.App.2d 748, 763 [where, through an “oversight” a verdict form allowed the jury to return a verdict in favor of plaintiffs who had waived their right to recover, “defendants’ responsibility in joining in the oversight denies them the right to claim error, ” as “[t]he situation is governed by the rule that where a party joins in the submission of an issue to a jury it cannot thereafter attack that submission [citation] and by the rule of ‘invited error’”].)
The trial court properly recognized that by having agreed to prepare the special verdict form, appellants’ counsel undertook the obligation to prepare it properly. As explained in Myers, “[i]t is incumbent upon counsel to propose a special verdict that does not mislead a jury into bringing in an improper special verdict.” (Myers, supra, 13 Cal.App.4th at p. 960, fn. 8.) Here, by failing to direct the jury to stop answering further questions once it concluded that neither Aguiar nor Amozoc was a substantial factor causing injury, appellants’ verdict form enabled the jury to reach an inconsistent verdict. The form allowed the jury to make an apportionment of fault notwithstanding its prior determination that appellants failed to establish a critical element of their claim. Because the special verdict form prepared by appellants was the basis for the inconsistency in the jury’s determination, the doctrine of invited error applies to bar their challenge to the verdict. (Ibid.)
A. The Trial Court Properly Exercised Its Discretion to Correct the Verdict.
Even if we were to consider appellants’ arguments on the merits, we would find no basis to disturb the judgment. The verdict contained an obvious inconsistency in that it found Aguiar and Amozoc were not substantial factors causing injury, yet apportioned a percentage of liability to Aguiar. (See City of San Diego v. D.R. Horton San Diego Holding Co., Inc. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 668, 682 [an inconsistent verdict results when the fact finder makes “‘inconsistent determinations of fact based on the same evidence’” and “may arise from an inconsistency between or among answers within a special verdict”].) Section 619 expressly permits the jury to correct an inconsistent verdict “under the advice of the Court....” (See Singh v. Southland Stone, U.S.A., Inc. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 338, 358, fn. 10 [“An inconsistent verdict is considered ‘informal or insufficient’ within the meaning of the statute”].) Pursuant to this provision, the trial court described the verdict form’s omission to the jury and inquired of each juror whether he or she would have continued to the apportionment question if the verdict properly had included the omitted direction. The trial court’s inquiry and polling were the type of corrective actions that section 619 contemplates. (See Keener v. Jeld-Wen, Inc. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 247, 269, fn. omitted [“when a verdict is truly ambiguous, the adversely affected party should request that the trial court act under Code of Civil Procedure section 619 to secure from the jury a ‘“more formal and certain verdict”’”]; cf. Fulton v. Huguet (1952) 113 Cal.App.2d 692, 696–699 [where jury indicated it had reached a verdict but polling revealed an eight-to-four decision, trial court engaged in discussion with juror who indicated she misunderstood polling question, and as a result juror changed her vote to yield a nine-to-three verdict; appellate court held trial court’s procedure was proper and there was no error in refusing to require jury to further deliberate].)
While section 619 gave the trial court the ability to utilize a different procedure to correct the verdict—such as reinstructing the jury and sending it back to deliberate—none of the cases cited by appellants persuade us that the trial court abused its discretion by questioning and polling the jury instead. Indeed, most of the cases cited by appellants involve general principles related to special verdicts and do not involve the situation here where the verdict’s inconsistency resulted from the form being improperly prepared. (See, e.g., Mizel v. City of Santa Monica (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1059, 1069–1072 [trial court properly exercised discretion to ask jury to deliberate further where inconsistency in verdict resulted from jury’s responses and not the verdict form itself]; Shaw v. Hughes Aircraft Co. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1336, 1345 [inconsistent verdict finding no breach of contract and a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing resulted after jury specifically asked trial court whether it should answer further questions if it found no breach of contract, and trial court instructed it to continue to answer questions unless directed otherwise by the verdict form].)
Only Mendoza, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th 287 involved a flawed special verdict form; appellants understandably rely heavily on the case because it involved an inconsistent verdict finding a defendant not liable yet apportioning fault to it. There, the plaintiff sued a golf cart manufacturer (CCI) and others after the brake released on a parked golf cart and the rolling golf cart caused him severe injury. In a special verdict, the jury found that there was a design defect in the golf cart which caused injury to the plaintiff, but then answered “no” to question seven—whether the plaintiff’s injury was caused by a reasonably foreseeable use of the golf cart. (Id. at pp. 298–299.) Nonetheless, because the verdict form failed to direct the jury to stop answering questions in the event of a “no” answer to question seven, the jury continued to answer subsequent questions and apportioned 40 percent of the fault to CCI. (Id. at p. 299 & fn. 7.) After the verdict was read, the trial court explained the inconsistency to the jury: “‘You will notice in question number seven your answer was no. That was reflected with 12 no votes. By answering no to question number seven, that eliminates liability for [CCI]. So when you get to question number 10 then, [CCI] should not be included in the breakdown of the percentages. So what I am going to ask you to do is reflect on seven and 10 and make any appropriate changes.’” (Id. at p. 299.) After deliberating for approximately 10 minutes, the jury changed its answer to question seven from “no” to “yes.” (Id. at p. 300.)
The appellate court affirmed the denial of CCI’s motions for a new trial and to vacate the judgment. It concluded that the verdict was inconsistent and that the trial court properly exercised its discretion to invoke section 619 to correct the verdict. (Mendoza, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at pp. 302–306.) Moreover, Mendoza found nothing prejudicial in the trial court’s informing the jury of the legal effect of its inconsistent answers. (Id. at pp. 307–309.) Importantly, the Mendoza court emphasized the wide latitude accorded to trial courts in determining whether to apply section 619. (Mendoza, supra, at p. 302.) Moreover, Mendoza did not suggest that courts are required to employ only one type of procedure to correct a verdict; the focus of the decision involved the trial court’s obligation to correct an inconsistent verdict. The court stated: “Where the discrepancy is identified before the jury is discharged, the court retains control of the jury and may, pursuant to section 619, use its power to correct the verdict before it becomes final. [Citation.] In fact, it is the court’s duty in such a case to attempt to remedy the situation. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 303.)
The trial court here acted within its discretion by selecting the manner in which it chose to exercise its duty to correct the inconsistent verdict. It carefully explained to the jury how the verdict form should have been structured and asked each juror individually if his or her answer would have remained the same on the apportionment question if the verdict had been properly prepared. The jury unanimously indicated that it would not have apportioned any fault to Aguiar if it had received proper instructions in the verdict form. Although appellants suggest that the trial court should have either inquired further or reinstructed the jury on the question of substantial factor which preceded apportionment, there was no suggestion that the jury did not understand that question or that it was ambiguous. These circumstances distinguish this case from Mendoza, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th 287, where one of the jurors expressly stated that the jury’s interpretation of the reasonably foreseeable use question was different than what the trial court described, and where the verdict contained an unexplained omission in the reasonably foreseeable use question rendering it potentially ambiguous. (Id. at pp. 300, 304–305.)
In Mendoza, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at page 297, the parties jointly drafted the special verdict form and thus CCI had not caused the omission of any direction between special verdict questions.
As the Mendoza court recognized, “[t]he Court of Appeal will only interfere with the trial court’s exercise of discretion when it finds under all the circumstances, viewed most favorably in support of the trial court’s action, no judge could have reasonably reached the same result. [Citation.]” (Mendoza, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 301.) We find no basis to interfere with the trial court’s correction of the verdict here.
II. The Trial Court Properly Denied Appellants’ Motion for New Trial.
Appellants moved for a new trial on the ground that the inconsistent verdict was the result of confusion and misunderstanding on the part of the jurors. In a single declaration, three jurors averred that they did not understand the meaning of “substantial factor, ” believing that it required them to find the defendant more than 50 percent liable for a “yes” answer. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the confusing nature of the verdict form was not a ground for a new trial. We review a trial court’s order denying a motion for a new trial for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 524; Hata v. Los Angeles County Harbor/UCLA Medical Center (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1791, 1800.)
The exclusive grounds for granting a new trial are set forth in section 657. (Neal v. Montgomery Elevator Co. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1198.) Under section 657, a new trial may be ordered on all or part of the issues for any of the following causes “materially affecting the substantial rights” of the aggrieved party: (1) irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any order of the court or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial; (2) misconduct of the jury; (3) accident or surprise; (4) newly discovered evidence; (5) excessive or inadequate damages; (6) insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict; and (7) error in law occurring at the trial and excepted to by the party making the application. (§ 657.)
Appellants fail to identify a specific statutory ground warranting a new trial. Rather, their challenge focuses on the content of the juror declaration; they argue that the declaration set forth objectively verifiable facts of juror confusion and misunderstanding requiring a new trial. Because Aguiar did not object to the admission of the declaration in his opposition to the motion for a new trial, the trial court had no occasion to address admissibility. But the declaration’s admission is only the beginning of the inquiry. Typically, such declarations are offered in support of a motion for new trial on the ground of juror misconduct. In that event, “‘the trial court must undertake a three-step inquiry. [Citation.] First, it must determine whether the affidavits supporting the motion are admissible. (Evid. Code, § 1150.) If the evidence is admissible, the trial court must determine whether the facts establish misconduct. [Citation.] Lastly, assuming misconduct, the trial court must determine whether the misconduct was prejudicial.’ [Citation.]” (Whitlock v. Foster Wheeler, LLC (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 149, 160.) It follows from the second step of this three-part test that the trial court need not consider an erroneously admitted juror declaration in the event the declaration fails to establish any facts supporting one of the statutory grounds for a new trial.
Here, three jurors averred as to what they “thought” and “understood the term ‘substantial’ factor to mean” and to how that understanding affected their verdict. Because the language in the declaration plainly reflected the jurors’ mental thought processes, the declaration could not be considered to support a new trial. (Evid. Code, § 1150; People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1264 [“Because, as a matter of substantive law, the jurors’ mental processes leading to the verdict are of no jural consequence, evidence of those mental processes is of no ‘consequence to the determination of the action’”]; Drust v. Drust (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 1, 9 [“posttrial solicitation and use of jurors’ statements concerning their conduct and deliberation and which seek to explain the effect of evidence upon their mental processes is improper”].)
Citing Krouse v. Graham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 59, appellants contend that the declaration showed the jurors discussed the concept of substantial factor and therefore described an overt act that could be considered to impeach the verdict. In that case, four juror declarations recited that several jurors “‘commented’” on their belief that the plaintiffs’ attorney would receive one-third of any award, “‘considered’” this belief in making their award and “‘determined’” the amount of damages by adding $30,000 for legal fees. (Id. at pp. 79, 80.) Though conceding that there was room to construe the declarations as reflecting the jurors’ mental processes, the court ultimately held that the declarations were admissible, reasoning that an express agreement to include attorney fees in the award would amount to jury misconduct requiring reversal. (Id. at pp. 81–82.) Here, in contrast, the declaration did not aver that the jurors discussed their misunderstanding, but rather, stated the collective misunderstanding that “we” had concerning the meaning of substantial factor. A declaration that at most suggests “‘deliberative error’ in the jury’s collective mental process—confusion, misunderstanding, and misinterpretation of the law” may not be used to impeach a verdict. (Ford v. Bennacka (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 330, 336.) The jurors’ statements here were akin to those in Mesecher v. County of San Diego, supra, 9 Cal.App.4th at pages 1682 to 1683, where the juror declarations showed a majority of the jurors had found that a battery had been committed by relying on an improper definition of the offense that conflicted with the definition contained in the jury instructions. The court ruled that the declarations established nothing more than the jurors’ subjective collective mental process and rejected the notion that the fact that several jurors communicated their misunderstanding to one another compelled a different result. According to the court, “‘[t]he subjective quality of one juror’s reasoning is not purged by the fact that another juror heard and remembers the verbalization of that reasoning.’ To hold otherwise would destroy the rule... which clearly prohibits the upsetting of a jury verdict by assailing these subjective mental processes.’” (Id. at p. 1683.)
For these reasons, we find no basis to disturb the trial court’s denial of appellants’ motion for a new trial.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Aguiar is entitled to recover his costs on appeal.
We concur: BOREN, P. J, CHAVEZ J