Opinion
9803–9804 Index 153854/16
07-09-2019
Howard LEADER, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. PARKSIDE GROUP, et al., Defendants-Respondents.
Santamarina & Associates, New York (Kacy Popyer of counsel), for appellants. Law Office of Steven S. Sieratzki, New York (Steven S. Sieratzki of counsel), for respondents.
Santamarina & Associates, New York (Kacy Popyer of counsel), for appellants.
Law Office of Steven S. Sieratzki, New York (Steven S. Sieratzki of counsel), for respondents.
Renwick, J.P., Kapnick, Singh, Moulton, JJ.
A party seeking to vacate a judgment based on excusable default must demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense ( CPLR 5015[a][1] ; see Benson Park Assoc., LLC v. Herman, 73 A.D.3d 464, 465, 899 N.Y.S.2d 614 [1st Dept. 2010] ).
The preference for deciding cases on the merits does not justify vacating a default judgment where the moving party fails to satisfy the two-prong test of showing a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense (see Eisenstein v. Rose, 135 A.D.2d 369, 370, 521 N.Y.S.2d 670 [1st Dept. 1987] ).
Defendants failed to establish a meritorious defense in that collateral estoppel barred them from re-litigating the Housing Court's determination of the legal rent, as the Appellate Term properly concluded. Defendants had their day in court and failed to present evidence concerning individual apartment improvements and plaintiffs' alleged arrears. In light of this finding, we need not reach the other prong of reasonable excuse for the default.
Restitution was improper here because the court should have declined to vacate the judgments for the reasons stated.
We have considered defendants' remaining arguments and find them unavailing.