Case law rejects this construction of the statute. SeeLeach v. Schwartz , 645 S.W.3d 906, 911 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, no pet.) ("Schwartz's construction of the statute that would allow the trial court to start a hearing within the 60, 90, or 120-day timeframes and finish it sometime later would defeat the Legislature's intent to expedite TCPA determinations.")
(mem. op.) (statutory analysis observes no exceptions to ninety-day deadline for setting hearing, except for order of discovery under TCPA); Leach v. Schwartz, 645 S.W.3d 906, 912-13 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2022, no pet.) ("[F]ailure to hold the hearing on a timely basis is both a reason to deny the motion, and a reason to reverse the TCPA motion if granted.")
Plus, neither party has asked us to address-much less analyzed or cited any case law regarding-a trial court's authority to deny a TCPA motion to dismiss based on the movant's request for a premature hearing on less than 21 days' notice. Cf. Leach v. Schwartz, 645 SW.3d 906, 912-13 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2022, no pet.) ("|T]he failure to hold the hearing on a timely basis [i.e., before the statutory deadline] is both a reason to deny the motion, and a reason to reverse the TCPA motion if granted."); Wightman-Cervantes v. Hernandez, No. 02-17-00155-CV, 2018 WL 798163, at *4 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Feb. 9, 2018, pet. denied)