Opinion
A153894
06-05-2018
L.E., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MARIN COUNTY, Respondent; MARIN COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, et al. Real Parties in Interest.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Marin County Super. Ct. No. JV 26507A)
L.E. (Mother) petitions this court for extraordinary relief from juvenile court orders terminating family reunification services and setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 to select a permanent plan for her daughter H.E. (Minor). Mother contends the juvenile court (1) abused its discretion when it removed Minor from Mother, (2) erred in finding reasonable services had been provided to Mother, and (3) abused its discretion when it terminated reunification services under section 366.21, subdivision (e). We deny the petition.
Further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In August 2016, Mother gave birth to Minor under a bridge in Fairfield. A friend of Mother's called 911, and paramedics transported Mother and Minor to the hospital. At the hospital, Mother tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine. Mother was homeless and had received no prenatal care.
Solano County Proceedings
On August 12, 2016, the Solano County Health and Social Services (Solano County Agency) filed a dependency petition for Minor. It described the circumstances of Minor's birth and alleged Mother had an extensive history of substance abuse and a history of neglect of two of her other children.
On August 16, 2016, Minor was ordered detained, and Mother was offered substance abuse treatment, parenting education, a housing referral, and visitation. Mother did not contest jurisdiction, and the Solano County juvenile court declared Minor a dependent of the court.
The Solano County Agency recommended that Mother not be offered reunification services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) (failure to reunify with a sibling or half sibling). The agency reported that Mother's son N.E. (who was born in May 2015 and detained at birth) was currently the subject of a separate juvenile dependency case in Solano County. In N.E.'s case, Mother was offered reunification services from November 2015 to June 2016. The agency noted that N.E.'s case arose due to concerns about Mother's "transient lifestyle, substance abuse, and mental health conditions," but since that case began, Mother remained homeless, continued to abuse substances, and had not addressed her mental health issues.
In addition, Mother's daughter K.E. was the subject of a juvenile dependency case in Clark County, Nevada in 2012 when K.E. was four years old. K.E. witnessed Mother threaten Mother's boyfriend with a knife and try to light him on fire. The incident led to Mother's arrest and incarceration. Mother was also found with drug paraphernalia and tested positive for cocaine.
The Solano County Agency also cited Mother's 20-year history of substance abuse. Mother reported that in 2009 she attended outpatient treatment in Georgia but stopped attending after several weeks. In 2012, she attended three months of treatment in West Oakland, but left after she clashed with workers there. Mother said she participated in an inpatient program in Oakland in November 2012, but left after 89 days. Regarding her housing history, Mother reported that she lived with an ex-partner in 2014, and after they broke up, she lived in various places such as friends' homes, a garage, a new romantic partner's home, and an abandoned house.
On January 13, 2017, following a contested disposition hearing, the Solano County juvenile court ordered reunification services for Mother.
In June 2017, the Solano County Agency filed a six-month status report recommending Minor be placed with Mother and the matter be transferred to Marin County for family maintenance services. It reported that Mother had entered Center Point, a residential substance abuse treatment program in Marin County, in November 2016. She was currently in Center Point's transitional housing program and had a job as a server at a restaurant. The agency found Mother's efforts during the reporting period were "excellent," but recommended the court continue monitoring her progress with Minor.
In July 2017, the Solano County juvenile court followed the agency's recommendations and placed Minor with Mother, ordered family maintenance services, and transferred the case to Marin County.
Marin County Proceedings
Marin County accepted the transfer. The Marin County Health and Human Services (Department) filed an updated case plan, reflecting that Minor was now residing with Mother.
The updated case plan required Mother to stay free from illegal drugs and obtain and maintain a stable and suitable residence for herself and Minor. Among other things, the plan provided (1) Mother "will verbalize to the assigned Social Worker and/or her support network any challenges she may have with maintaining her sobriety," (2) "[w]hen tempted to use substances, [Mother] will reach out to her sober support network/service providers instead of using," (3) "[Mother] will have a plan for safe care of [Minor] in the event that a relapse occurs and will communicate this plan to the social worker, Center Point, and her family/support network," (4) Mother will attend NA/AA meetings at least three times a per week, and (5) she "will test negative for all substances 100% of the time."
On August 21, 2017, the juvenile court held a hearing to review the disposition orders from Solano County and the updated case plan. Mother agreed to the updated case plan. She was residing at Center Point transitional housing with plans to stay until June 2018.
Relapse and Supplemental Section 387 Petition
Soon after the review hearing, Mother relapsed. On September 18, 2017, Mother got into a physical altercation with another resident at Center Point, who reported Mother smelled of alcohol. The next day, Mother admitted to Center Point staff she had been drinking alcohol for the previous couple of weeks. The same day, Mother contacted her social worker, Chelsea Geyer, and reported she was being asked to leave Center Point and Minor was now staying with her godparents.
The godparents had also been Minor's foster parents when she was initially removed from Mother. Minor remained with the foster parents after Mother's relapse.
The next day, September 20, 2017, Mother met with Geyer. Mother reported that she made mistakes after she learned N.E.'s adoptive parents were changing his name (Mother having lost her parental rights to N.E.) and did not want her to have any more email contact. Mother said she felt hurt and started drinking beer, but she never drank around Minor. On September 21, Mother reported that she entered Helen Vine Detox Center.
On September 27, 2017, the Department filed a section 387 supplemental petition seeking placement of Minor with a foster caretaker. The next day, the juvenile court ordered Minor detained. Mother did not request a hearing on detention.
Initially, Mother contested jurisdiction and filed a trial brief and request for dismissal of the supplemental petition. At the jurisdiction hearing, however, Mother submitted on the Department reports and reserved the arguments in her trial brief for disposition. On December 14, 2017, the juvenile court found true the allegations of the section 387 petition as amended.
On December 22, 2017, Mother filed in pro per a JV-180 request to change order, seeking an order that Minor be returned to Mother's custody and that family maintenance continue. On January 12, 2018, the juvenile court denied Mother's motion because it did not present any new information since she submitted to jurisdiction on December 14, 2017. On January 23, 2018, Mother field a second JV-180 request in pro per, seeking "dismissal of original order and return the child home."
Disposition Report
On January 30, 2018, the Department filed a disposition report on the section 387 petition. It recommended no reunification services for Mother based on "the child being under 3 years old, the mother has had 8 1/2 months of services, [and] there is no substantial probability of return within the statutory timeframe." It recommended setting a section 366.26 hearing.
The Department found that Mother did not report her relapse to Geyer, Center Point, or the foster parents prior to the altercation at Center Point even though she later reported she had been using alcohol for a "couple of weeks" before the altercation. Since her relapse, Mother reentered Center Point September 29, 2017, and completed their 45-day residential program. After completing the program, Mother regained her employment at a restaurant and was looking for housing while she lived in hotels or in her car. Mother was attending Positive Changes substance abuse outpatient treatment. She drug tested twice at Center Point in November, but was a "no show[]" for tests on November 28 and 30 and December 4.
On December 5, 2017, Geyer talked to Mother about missing her drug tests. Mother said she would no longer comply with the drug tests because she did not think they were necessary "when she [was] 'already proving her sobriety and her dedication to her daughter.' " Mother also stopped attending Positive Changes because it conflicted with visitation. Instead, Mother reported she was " 'going to meetings, speaking with my sponsor, as well as interacting with an online community that supports me.' " Geyer reminded Mother that drug testing was one way she could provide the court concrete evidence of sobriety.
On December 15, 2017, Mother told Geyer she obtained housing in Vallejo and she would be willing to participate in testing at a facility other than Center Point. On December 20, Geyer identified a testing facility in Vallejo. Mother missed a drug test in Vallejo on December 28, which she later said was due to a scheduling conflict.
The Department concluded, "Regrettably, after 8 1/2 months of services (six months of Family Reunification and two and half months of Family Maintenance), [Mother] has not demonstrated that she can care for [Minor] outside of being in a treatment program. In fact, [Mother] failed to safely provide care for [Minor] while in a treatment program, as evidenced by her using alcohol for weeks while [Minor] was in her care and while living in transitional housing. Further, [Mother] has failed to follow through with agreements made with this Court in regards to relapse prevention and/or safety plans in the event of her relapse. [Mother] continues to be distrustful of the Department and [Geyer] and appears to be unwilling to work with the Department under any terms other than her own. [¶] Considering the statutory timeframe for reunification, there must be substantial probability of return to the mother's home in the remaining timeframe (3 1/2 months.) . . . [T]he Department has yet to see demonstrated protective capacities by the mother while outside a treatment program, or even within a program, and therefore the Department is of the opinion that return in four months is substantially improbable." Minor had "lived 16 of her 18 months of life out of her mother's care due to [Mother's] regrettable choices," and she deserved "the stability and continuity provided by consistent, safe, and sober caregivers."
Initial Disposition Hearing and Addendum to Disposition Report
At a hearing on February 5, 2018, the juvenile court declined to return Minor to Mother as requested in Mother's pro per JV-180 motion, stating it "continue[d] to have very significant concerns about [Minor's] safety in [Mother's] care." The court observed that much of Mother's motion did not make sense and the "gist of her concerns [would] be addressed in the course of the disposition hearing." Mother disagreed with the Department's recommendations and requested a contested hearing. The Department's attorney asked the court to remind Mother of the importance of testing, and the court did so. Mother's attorney stated that Mother was willing to test to demonstrate her sobriety.
On March 2, 2018, the Department filed an addendum report on disposition. It documented that, on February 6, Geyer informed Mother she had a referral for substance abuse testing in Vallejo. On February 8, Mother was a "no show" for a test. Geyer texted Mother and received no response. Mother did not show for testing on February 7, 8, and 9. On February 14, Mother texted Geyer that she could not make a visit with Minor because she felt sick. Geyer asked Mother if she had received the text messages regarding testing. Mother said she had. Geyer asked if there was any way the Department could help Mother in completing the testing, and Mother responded, " 'I don't feel that you can, no.' " Geyer asked if there were any other supports or resources she could offer and whether Mother was able to connect with the access line for mental health service, which was previously provided. Mother did not respond.
Contested Hearing on Disposition
On March 7, 2018, at the contested hearing, Geyer testified about how Minor ended up in the foster parents' care. Mother had arranged for Minor to stay with the foster parents for about three days in September 2017, so Mother could go out of town for a court case. The plan was for the foster parents to return Minor on a Saturday, but when they tried to do so, Mother did not answer her door or answer her cell phone. Another resident at Center Point retrieved Mother, who did not appear well. The foster parents reported that Mother smelled of mouthwash and she was not making eye contact. The foster mother asked if she could keep Minor for an additional night, and Mother agreed. Two days later, Mother was kicked out of Center Point after the altercation with another resident. Minor was never returned to Mother's care.
In cross-examination, Geyer agreed that she spoke to Mother's counselor at Center Point in October 2017, and the counselor reported Mother was "very together," she had been very forthcoming with the incidents that surrounded her relapse, she was very introspective and insightful, and she could "pinpoint all of her triggers." Geyer did not personally refer Mother to any outpatient treatment programs, but she provided Mother the Marin County access line and referred her to a parent partner, who helped Mother find the outpatient program at Positive Changes. Geyer had not visited Mother's home in Vallejo. After Mother completed a 45-day program at Center Point (post-relapse), she told Geyer she would not participate in drug testing because she was proving her sobriety through a 12-step program, a sponsor, and online support groups. Geyer contacted the person Mother identified as her sponsor. The person said she knew Mother, but she had not officially become her sponsor at that time.
Mother testified she was currently renting a bedroom in a house in Vallejo. She had use of the bathroom, kitchen, living room, and garage, and there was another bedroom in the house she could rent for Minor. She was currently employed at a restaurant as a bookkeeper and server.
Mother began work at the restaurant on April 22, 2017, she completed her reentry program at Center Point on May 31, and she began staying at Center Point's transitional house on June 1. Mother relapsed after she learned that N.E. would not be returned to her and her attorney advised her to stop the appeal process. The relapse lasted about two and a half weeks. Mother testified she took steps to protect Minor by not drinking around her "or within any timeframe that she would be within my personal physical care" and she "didn't over indulge."
Mother testified she was currently clean and sober. She managed her sobriety by attending two meetings per week with an NA group in San Rafael, she spoke almost daily with her sponsor, and she volunteered to resubmit herself to the dependency drug court program in Solano County and had corresponded with her prior dependency drug court counselor. Mother testified she stopped drug testing because she thought there was no case plan. She also said she did not feel comfortable testing at Center Point after her relapse and altercation in September 2017 (although she completed a 45-day program there after her relapse). Mother received a referral from Geyer for a therapist in August 2017. Mother believed she followed the safety plan when she had her relapse.
In cross-examination, Mother testified that Geyer never told her she was not receiving services. Instead, Mother told Geyer that, based on her understanding of the reports and findings, she was no longer receiving case plan services. Mother also told Geyer that "it did not coincide with [her] emotional wellbeing to continue to revisit the location, . . . . Center Point, where [she] would have [been] reminded constantly that [her] daughter was not with [her]." Mother testified said, after taking two tests, "I felt like I had already served my time." Asked why she did not test in Vallejo, Mother answered that she told Geyer it would be problematic and "I wasn't comfortable with the process . . ." Mother also admitted that Geyer encouraged Mother to drug test.
Mother's attorney argued Mother's circumstances presented no current risk to Minor and, therefore, the section 387 petition should be dismissed and Minor should be returned to Mother's custody under the original case plan. She also argued the Department did not provide reasonable services.
Juvenile Court Decision
After a short break, the juvenile court announced its decision. The court denied the request for dismissal. It began by addressing Mother's argument (made in her trial brief) that past events were not relevant and that the court should only consider the conditions existing at the time of the hearing. The court cited In re Janet T. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 377, stating the case demonstrates "evidence of past events may have probative value in considering current conditions where the circumstances existing at the time of the hearing make it likely the child would suffer the same type of harm in the future." Therefore, it considered Mother's history in deciding whether Minor was at risk at the time of the disposition hearing.
In In re Janet T., the court observed, "[E]vidence of past events may have some probative value in considering current conditions. But under section 300, subdivision (b) this is only true if circumstances existing at the time of the hearing make it likely the children will suffer the same type of 'serious physical harm or illness' in the future. This is so because under subdivision (b) a child may be considered dependent 'only so long as is necessary' to protect the child from risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness." (In re Janet T., supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 388, fn. omitted.)
The juvenile court determined that return of Minor to Mother would create a substantial risk of harm. First, it noted that Mother's relapse was not an isolated incident. Her substance abuse was a long-standing issue, she had outpatient treatment in 2009 and 2012 and inpatient treatment in 2012, and it was Mother's substance abuse (along with her homelessness and lack of prenatal care) that brought Minor to the Department's attention in 2016. Second, the court found that Mother did not take action to protect Minor when she relapsed. She did not place Minor with the foster parents when she started drinking. Rather, Mother only had the foster parents take care of Minor because she was traveling out of town. Third, the court was concerned that the relapse led to a loss of housing, and that a relapse in the future could similarly jeopardize her housing, which would create substantial risk to Minor. Fourth, the fact that the relapse occurred "within the support of a structured setting" (and only about two months after Minor was placed with Mother) gave the court "little confidence that [Mother could] maintain [her] sobriety . . . for any extended period of time without that structure in place," and "given the long history that we've had." Fifth, the court cited Mother's failure to drug test, stating testing was an important part of the case plan "[b]ecause it is objective criteria as to whether or not you are sober."
Further, the juvenile court found Mother to be an unreliable witness, observing her testimony was evasive and contradictory, and she sometimes used "stock phrases" rather than answering questions. The court expressed concern that Mother did not always take responsibility for her own actions. Finally, it observed that since Mother was not participating in drug tests, it had no "verification of [Mother's] sobriety."
The court also noted Mother's pro per documents (filed in December 2017 and January 2018) indicated distorted thinking, which, in turn, suggested lack of sobriety.
The juvenile court rejected the argument that Mother was not provided sufficient services, explaining to her, "[Y]ou were referred to a therapist, which you chose not to follow up on. And I don't believe that the social worker is required to come pick you up and drive you to a therapist[]'s office or make the appointments for you. You did state to the social worker that you had done your time or you had had enough, and that you were not going to participate any further. Well, that's a decision that you made." Geyer testified that she checked in with Mother regularly, but the court stated, "there's not a lot that a social worker can do when you are declining to participate in the services." The court found by clear and convincing evidence that reasonable services were provided. It concluded Mother's progress was minimal.
The court terminated family reunification services and set a hearing under section 366.26 for July 2, 2018. Mother filed a timely petition for writ of mandate.
DISCUSSION
Mother challenges the juvenile court's order removing Minor from Mother based on current risk to Minor, its finding that reasonable services were provided to Mother, and its order terminating reunification services under section 366.21, subdivision (e). A. Removal of Minor Based on Finding of Current Risk of Harm
The juvenile court ordered Minor removed, finding by clear and convincing evidence that placement with Mother would be detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the Minor. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) Mother contends the Department failed to establish facts showing that removal was still warranted at the time of the disposition hearing.
Section 361, subdivision (c)(1), authorizes removal of a dependent child from the physical custody of his or her parent if the juvenile court finds clear and convincing evidence that "[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor's physical health can be protected without removing the minor from the minor's parent's . . . physical custody."
"When an appellate court reviews the jurisdictional or dispositional findings of the juvenile court, it looks to see if substantial evidence, whether contradicted or uncontradicted, supports the findings. [Citations.] The appellate court must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's order, drawing every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in favor of the prevailing party. [Citation.] Substantial evidence 'means evidence that is "reasonable, credible and of solid value; it must actually be substantial proof of the essentials that the law requires in a particular case." ' " (In re Alexzander C. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 438, 446.)
Mother argues there was insufficient evidence of current risk of harm to Minor because the incident of relapse occurred more than six months before the disposition hearing, Mother's relapse did not cause Minor actual harm, there was no evidence "this was not an isolated incident of relapse brought on by the Mother's upset over the issue of her son's name change," and "speculation or worry about future harm is not evidence." We disagree.
Mother acknowledges that a juvenile court may consider past events in assessing current risk "if the circumstances existing at the time of the hearing make it likely that the child will suffer the same type of 'serious physical harm or illness in the future,' " citing In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 824, abrogated on another point by In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622. Here, the juvenile court expressly found Mother's relapse was not an isolated incident. Rather, it was part of a long history of substance abuse that included other attempts at treatment that failed. The court found a current substantial risk of harm to Minor if she were placed with Mother, citing Mother's failure to follow a safety plan when she did relapse in September 2017, the fact that Mother relapsed even in the structured setting of Center Point, the fact that the relapse led Mother to lose her housing, and Mother's failure to demonstrate current sobriety by drug testing. This is substantial evidence supporting the court's finding.
Mother essentially asks us to accept her characterization of her relapse as an isolated incident, but that is not our role. We do "not reweigh the evidence or express an independent judgment" (In re Alexzander C., supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 446), and the possibility that the record could support a contrary conclusion is not enough to defeat a juvenile court's findings (In re H.E. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 710, 724). In this case, sufficient evidence was presented at the contested hearing for the juvenile court to find Mother's then-current circumstances posed a substantial danger to Minor's physical health, safety, protection, and well-being if Minor were placed in her custody (due to either the high risk of relapse or the possibility Mother was not currently sober, given her refusal to drug test). The juvenile court did not err in ordering Minor removed. B. Reasonable Services
"To support a finding that reasonable services were offered or provided to the parent, 'the record should show that the supervising agency identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult. . . .' . . . [¶] 'The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.' " (In re A.G. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 994, 1001.)
In its disposition report, the Department identified the reasonable services provided to Mother: monthly contact with Mother, monthly contact with Minor and her caregivers, coordination of visitation and schedule changes, collaboration and communication with Mother's "case managers, treatment facilities, and other service providers to ensure and manage service delivery," transit cards for Mother, connecting Mother with a "parent partner," child care funding while Minor was in family maintenance with Mother, coordination of family team meetings with Mother and the foster parents, referrals and support for Mother to engage in mental health treatment and substance abuse treatment, and contracting drug testing in Solano County.
Mother argues the services she received were unreasonable because there is no evidence the Department provided her a referral to mental health services at any time following her relapse. The record shows, however, that Geyer referred Mother to a parent partner, who helped Mother find the outpatient program at Positive Changes. Geyer also provided Mother the Marin County access line. Further, Mother testified that Geyer gave her a referral to a therapist in August 2017 (before her relapse), but Mother did not contact a therapist because she had a counselor and "many counseling sessions" at Center Point. Indeed, Mother relies on her Center Point's counselor's assessment that she was "very together" and forthcoming about her relapse as evidence that she successfully overcame her relapse. This evidence also demonstrates that Mother received mental health services post-relapse.
Substantial evidence supports the court's finding that the Department provided Mother reasonable reunification services. Geyer provided Mother with referrals and resources, but Mother sometimes chose not to participate. In February 2018, Geyer was still trying to help Mother comply with drug testing and offering resources, but Mother was not responsive. "The requirement that reunification services be made available to help a parent overcome those problems which led to the dependency of his or her minor children is not a requirement that a social worker take the parent by the hand and escort him or her to and through classes or counseling sessions." (In re Michael S. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1448, 1463, fn. 5.) As the juvenile court in this case observed, "there's not a lot that the social worker can do when you are declining to participate in the services." C. Termination of Reunification Services
Finally, Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion when in terminated reunification services under section 366.21, subdivision (e).
While "services are presumptively provided for 12 months to children over the age of three and their parents (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1)), the presumptive rule for children under the age of three on the date of initial removal is that ' court-ordered services shall not exceed a period of six months from the date the child entered foster care.' (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(2)[.)]" (M.V. v. Superior Court (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 166, 174-175.)
Here, the juvenile court terminated family reunification services on March 7, 2018, finding Mother had received six months of family reunification services and two-and-a-half months of family maintenance and her progress had been minimal. (See § 366.21, subd. (e)(3).)
Section 366.21, subdivision (e)(3) provides: "If the child was under three years of age on the date of the initial removal . . . , and the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent failed to participate regularly and make substantive progress in a court-ordered treatment plan, the court may schedule a hearing pursuant to Section 366.26 within 120 days. If, however, the court finds there is a substantial probability that the child, who was under three years of age on the date of initial removal . . ., may be returned to his or her parent or legal guardian within six months or that reasonable services have not been provided, the court shall continue the case to the 12-month permanency hearing."
We note "the reunification 'clock' " started ticking upon the initial removal of Minor under the original section 300 petition, and it continued to run despite the subsequent placement of Minor with Mother during the dependency. (D.T. v. Superior Court (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1035.) The filing of the section 387 petition did not trigger a new period of reunification services. (Ibid.)
Mother argues the court abused its discretion in terminating reunification services because reasonable services were not provided. This argument fails because (as we have concluded) substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that the Department provided reasonable services in this case.
Next Mother asserts the court was required to extend services to the date of the 12-month review because Mother made "substantial progress with the court-ordered treatment plan." (§ 366.21, subd. (e)(3).) She argues the court's finding that her progress was minimal was not supported by substantial evidence. We are not persuaded.
Mother's updated case plan, which she agreed to, required Mother (1) to report any challenges she had in maintaining her sobriety, (2) to reach out to her support network "instead of using," (3) to have a safety plan for Minor in the event of relapse, and (4) to "test negative for all substances 100% of the time." During the period of her relapse in September 2017, mother failed to comply with the first three plan requirements. From December 5, 2017, until the contested hearing on March 7, 2018, mother failed to comply with the fourth case plan requirement. Mother continued to refuse to test even though Geyer reminded her in December 2017 that drug testing was concrete evidence of sobriety, and the court admonished her in February 2018, "a no test equals a positive test." This is substantial evidence supporting the court's finding that Mother's progress with the court-ordered treatment plan was minimal. (See, e.g., Dawnel D. v. Superior Court (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 393, 398 [despite parent's consistent participation in groups and classes, substantial evidence supported finding of parent's noncompliance with her case plan where she tested positive for drugs and "did not test according to the schedule"], disapproved on another point by Tonya M. v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 836; Jennifer A. v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1322, 1343 ["Drug testing is an important component of the reunification plan, and we must consider the missed tests to be positive tests."].)
DISPOSITION
The petition for extraordinary writ is denied, and the stay of the dependency court's section 366.26 hearing is lifted. Our decision is final as to this court immediately. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.450(a), 8.490(b)(2)(A).)
/s/_________
Miller, J. We concur: /s/_________
Kline, P.J. /s/_________
Stewart, J.