We have repeatedly rejected such purely geographic rationales. See, e.g., Pritchett v. State, 677 So.2d 317, 320 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); M.A.H. v. State, 559 So.2d 407, 408-09 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); L.D.P. v. State, 551 So.2d 1257, 1258 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Gipson v. State, 537 So.2d 1080, 1081-82 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). While law enforcement officers need not ignore the character of a neighborhood, cf. Illinois v. Wardlow, 13 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S20 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2000) (holding type of neighborhood may be relevant to existence of reasonable suspicion justifying a stop), Ms. Lester's mere "presence in a high drug crime area [did not] satisfy [either] the requisite standard of probable cause,"M.A.H., 559 So.2d at 409, prescribed by Florida's Stop and Frisk Law or the requirements Terry lays down for nonconsensual searches.

398 So.2d at 822. Cf. L.D.P. v. State, 551 So.2d 1257, 1258 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), and Gipson v. State, 537 So.2d 1080, 1081 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (both holding that an officer must have "probable cause" to believe a suspect is armed before the officer can conduct a patdown search or a frisk of the suspect to the extent necessary to disclose the weapon). Interpreting the evidence and reasonable inferences in favor of sustaining the trial court's ruling, see McNamara v. State, 357 So.2d 410, 412 (Fla. 1978), the state contends that a reasonably prudent person would have believed there was a threat to safety.

Bussey v. State, 528 So.2d 955 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). Applying these principles to the facts of this case, we find that the details of the tip and the extent to which they were corroborated by police justified the investigatory stop at issue in this case. C.F. argues that the details of the tip in our case were too vague to support a legal detention, citing L.D.P. v. State, 551 So.2d 1257 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). That court hinged its conclusion, however, on the fact that there was no description of any of the individuals allegedly selling drugs, no indication of their heights, ages, clothing, etc., and no description of the activities the individuals were allegedly engaged in, and no indication of what types of drugs the individuals would be selling.

See Pritchett v. State, 677 So.2d 317, 320 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (holding that "`[e]ven assuming the individuals' attempts to "walk off in different directions" could be said to constitute flight, the case law is clear that flight alone, even in a high crime area, does not give rise to a founded suspicion sufficient to justify a detention.'") (quoting L.D.P. v. State, 551 So.2d 1257, 1258 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)); see also Brown v. State, 636 So.2d 174, 175 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (flight at sight of police officers in high drug area in early morning hours does not establish reasonable suspicion); Grant v. State, 596 So.2d 98, 99 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (reasoning that "[t]he fact that a person in a high crime area flees at the sight of an officer does not constitute a reasonable suspicion."); Hill v. State, 561 So.2d 23, 24 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (holding that "[t]he fact that the defendant was standing in the roadway at 5:00 AM in a high crime residential area and that he walked away into the darkness upon seeing the approaching police car, did not provide police more than a bare hunch that criminal activity was afoot.") (citation omitted); Levin v. State, 449 So.2d 288, 289 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (concluding that "[i]t has long been recognized in this state that being out on the public street during late and unusual hours cannot constitute a valid basis to temporarily detain and frisk an individual under th

As the statute and case law indicate, an officer must have probable cause to believe a suspect is armed before the officer can conduct a pat down search or frisk of the suspect to ascertain the presence of a weapon. See Shaw; Rouse v. State, 643 So.2d 696 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); see also L.D.P. v. State, 551 So.2d 1257, 1258 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Gipson v. State, 537 So.2d 1080, 1082 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). In this case, the officer testified as follows:

"Even assuming the individuals' attempts to `walk off in different directions' could be said to constitute flight, the case law is clear that flight alone, even in a high crime area, does not give rise to a founded suspicion sufficient to justify a detention." L.D.P. v. State, 551 So.2d 1257, 1258 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). We have also ruled that "simply having cash in his hand did not create a founded suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to warrant detention, as the officer observed no exchange of drugs, money, or anything else."

M.A.H. v. State, 559 So.2d 407 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). Section 901.151 further authorizes a pat-down search to the extent necessary to disclose a weapon, if the officer has probable cause to believe that an individual is armed. L.D.P. v. State, 551 So.2d 1257 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). In the present case, Officer Van Nelson was not justified in stopping appellant pursuant to section 901.151.

Alexander replies that it is unclear from the testimony when the informant saw the cocaine, how he knew there was cocaine in the vehicle, and whether the cocaine was still in the car. He argues that following standard procedures is not sufficient to justify a pat-down search, citing Harris v. State, 574 So.2d 243 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), and L.D.P. v. State, 551 So.2d 1257 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). Assuming that the informant's tip, that he had seen a large amount of cocaine in the car driven by Alexander, provided reasonable suspicion that a crime was being committed, thereby justifying a stop of the vehicle, neither the facts nor the law supports the remainder of the trial court's finding, that the pat-down search was justified because the informant's tip gave the officer "probable cause to believe that defendant may have been armed and dangerous" because he was engaged in a drug transaction involving a large quantity of narcotics and a large sum of money.

Appellant's location in a known drug area and his movement away from the police did not justify the stop or the search. See L.P.D. v. State, 551 So.2d 1257 (Fla. 1st 1989) (fact that suspect was in a high drug and crime area is legally insufficient to satisfy the probable cause standard); State v. Gipson, 537 So.2d 1080 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (flight in high crime area upon seeing the police does not constitute a founded suspicion sufficient to justify a detention). Accordingly, the trial court's order denying appellant's motion to suppress the illegally obtained crack is reversed.

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. L.D.P. v. State, 551 So.2d 1257 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); State v. Hetland, 366 So.2d 831 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979), aff'd, 387 So.2d 963 (Fla. 1980).