Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-1817-14T2
03-08-2017
L.C., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. S.C., Defendant-Respondent, and W.S., Defendant.
L.C., appellant, argued the cause pro se. Kenneth L. Winters argued the cause for respondent (Jardim Meisner & Susser, P.C., and Law Offices of Michael E. Fingerman, P.C., attorneys; Mr. Winters and Lise A. Fisher, on the brief).
RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3. Before Judges Hoffman, O'Connor and Whipple. On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Camden County, Docket No. FD-04-2874-12. L.C., appellant, argued the cause pro se. Kenneth L. Winters argued the cause for respondent (Jardim Meisner & Susser, P.C., and Law Offices of Michael E. Fingerman, P.C., attorneys; Mr. Winters and Lise A. Fisher, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Plaintiff, L.C., appeals from a November 17, 2014 Family Part order denying her motion to vacate an August 13, 2012 order dismissing a paternity complaint. We affirm for the reasons that follow.
At the center of this dispute is R.S. and his understandable desire to identify his parentage. W.S. had filed an unsuccessful paternity action in Pennsylvania against defendant S.C. R.S., as an adult, filed his own unsuccessful paternity suit in New Jersey. The factual and procedural underpinnings of R.S.'s cases are recounted in the companion case also decided today, R.S. v. S.C., No. A-1185-13 (App. Div. March 8, 2017), and need not be fully repeated here, except to emphasize the issue of paternity is controlled by the final orders entered in Pennsylvania and cannot be re-litigated in New Jersey.
Although unclear from the record, at some point W.S. gave plaintiff, L.C., power of attorney over R.S.'s legal, financial, and health matters. --------
In July 2011, L.C. filed a complaint against defendants, S.C. and W.S., seeking an award of custody of R.S., then a minor, in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Atlantic County, Family Part. The Atlantic County Family Part judge awarded custody of R.S. to L.C. but made no determination regarding S.C. because jurisdiction for paternity remains in Pennsylvania. This order was never appealed.
Plaintiff filed another complaint to establish paternity on June 18, 2012, against S.C., this time in Camden County. S.C. moved to dismiss the complaint arguing New Jersey lacks subject matter and personal jurisdiction. The motion judge agreed, and on August 13, 2012, dismissed the complaint without prejudice.
On August 31, 2012, plaintiff moved for reconsideration arguing S.C. was a resident of New Jersey, the court had personal jurisdiction, and any representations by S.C.'s attorneys to the contrary were false. The motion judge denied plaintiff's motion for reconsideration on December 14, 2012, and plaintiff did not appeal.
On September 26, 2014, plaintiff moved to vacate the August 13, 2012 order alleging fraud and attorney collusion. S.C. denied all allegations of fraud and argued the Pennsylvania orders are entitled to full faith and credit, and New Jersey lacks subject matter jurisdiction. A different motion judge heard the motion on November 17, 2014. The judge treated the application pursuant to Rule 4:50 and denied relief, finding the court lacked both subject matter and personal jurisdiction over S.C. The judge found the issues raised were previously adjudicated in Pennsylvania. Additionally, plaintiff's motion had not presented any new information that had not been presented in her previously denied motion for reconsideration. Specifically, the judge stated, "[Plaintiff]'s position here essentially expresses disagreement with the conclusions reached, rather than presenting new evidence not available at the time of the prior proceeding." This appeal followed.
On appeal, plaintiff argues the court erred when it ruled it did not have personal or subject matter jurisdiction. We disagree.
We note initially that a trial court's determination granting or denying relief under Rule 4:50-1 is entitled to substantial deference and will not be reversed in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467 (2012). To warrant reversal of the court's Rule 4:50-1 order, a party must show that the decision was "made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis." Id. at 467-68 (quoting Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 191 N.J. 88, 123 (2007)). Having reviewed the record, we do not find the judge's determination to deny plaintiff's motion to vacate invalid.
As we stated in the companion case, New Jersey recognizes judicial decisions of sister states. "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State." U.S. Const. art. IV, §1. The Family Part judge specifically ruled the two final Pennsylvania orders, dated July 16, 2010, and May 19, 2011, were binding on the court.
Plaintiff's arguments regarding R.S.'s minor status at the time are unavailing. We are satisfied the prior paternity action in Pennsylvania was the functional equivalent, and involved the same legal right, as this case. L.C., asserting claims as R.S.'s representative, is bound by the result under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. See Pace v. Kuchinksy, 347 N.J. Super. 202, 215 (App. Div. 2002). This action involved the same parties in interest, there was a final judgment on the merits, and both actions involve an identical issue. Plaintiff's unsupported assertions of fraud do not render the Pennsylvania orders invalid.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION