Opinion
23-3259-JWL
12-20-2023
JOSE DANIEL LAZOS, Plaintiff, v. JEFF ZMUDA, et al., Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
JOHN W. LUNGSTRUM UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff Jose Daniel Lazos is hereby required to show good cause, in writing to the undersigned, why this action should not be dismissed due to the deficiencies in Plaintiff's Complaint that are discussed herein. Plaintiff is also given the opportunity to file an amended complaint to cure the deficiencies.
I. Nature of the Matter before the Court
Plaintiff brings this pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although Plaintiff is currently in custody at the Harvey County Detention Center in Newton, Kansas, his claims arose during his incarceration at the Lansing Correctional Facility in Lansing, Kansas (“LCF”).
Plaintiff alleges that he was assaulted and stabbed four times at around 6 am on April 19, 2023, at LCF. (Doc. 1, at 2.) Plaintiff alleges that after the assault he went to the clinic to receive medical care. Id. Officers asked him to sign a waiver of protective custody, and Plaintiff told them he would not sign the waiver and would invoke his right to protective custody. Id. Plaintiff alleges that he was handcuffed behind his back by SORT Officer Shannon and one other Correctional Officer, and relocated to the restricted housing unit. Id. at 2, 6. Plaintiff claims that his handcuffs were not removed until 10:30 am. Id. 2. Plaintiff states that it is standard procedure to handcuff him after he requested protective custody, but argues it is not standard policy to keep an inmate handcuffed when they are not combative. Id. at 16.
Plaintiff alleges that he was not combative and did not need to be restrained. Id. at 10. He alleges that once he was in the restrictive housing unit, he was placed in a cage that is usually intended for video visitation. Id. at 11. Plaintiff alleges that because there was no chair or stool to sit on, he remained standing while still handcuffed behind his back. Id. Plaintiff alleges that his requests to be uncuffed were either refused or ignored. Id. at 12. Plaintiff alleges that other inmates were brought into the restrictive housing unit and were placed in shower stalls, uncuffed, processed, and moved into restrictive housing cells. Id. at 13. Plaintiff alleges that the three inmates that assaulted him were treated better than Plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff alleges that they were given milk crates to sit on, were uncuffed, and were transferred to restrictive housing cells before Plaintiff. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that his handcuffs were removed at 10:30 am and he collapsed to the floor because he had been standing since 6 am. Id. at 14. Officers noticed that Plaintiff was unresponsive and called a medical code, nurses arrived, and Plaintiff's wound on his chin was treated by 11:30 am. Id. Plaintiff was then transferred to a restrictive housing cell. Id. Plaintiff alleges that he suffered injuries to his arms, wrists, elbows, and shoulders. Id. at 19.
Plaintiff asserts the following claims: Failure to Protect; Neglect of Duty; Excessive Force; Bystander Liability; Deliberate Indifference; Unconstitutional Retaliation; Inadequate Supervision; Equal Protection Clause; and Civil Conspiracy. Id. at 8. For relief, Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief; a “preliminary and permanent injunction ordering Defendant, Jeff Zmuda Secretary of Corrections to release plaintiff from custody of the Kansas Department of Corrections, discharging plaintiff from Post Release Supervision”; a temporary restraining order preventing Defendants from causing anymore harm or injury; medical costs and expenses; and compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 20, 22. Plaintiff names as defendants: Jeff Zmuda, Secretary of Corrections, Kansas Department of Corrections (“KDOC”); Jesse Howes, LCF Warden; John Doe, LCF Captain of Security; (fnu) Shannon, LCF SORT; (fnu) Kouegu, LCF Officer in Command; (fnu) Young, LCF CO1; (fnu) Collins, LCF CO.
II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2).
“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)(citations omitted); Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1523 (10th Cir. 1992). A court liberally construes a pro se complaint and applies “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In addition, the court accepts all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true. Anderson v. Blake, 469 F.3d 910, 913 (10th Cir. 2006). On the other hand, “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief,” dismissal is appropriate. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007).
A pro se litigant's “conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). “[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). The complaint's “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 555, 570.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained “that, to state a claim in federal court, a complaint must explain what each defendant did to [the pro se plaintiff]; when the defendant did it; how the defendant's action harmed [the plaintiff]; and, what specific legal right the plaintiff believes the defendant violated.” Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007). The court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff's complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff's behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
The Tenth Circuit has pointed out that the Supreme Court's decisions in Twombly and Erickson gave rise to a new standard of review for § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissals. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007)(citations omitted); see also Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009). As a result, courts “look to the specific allegations in the complaint to determine whether they plausibly support a legal claim for relief.” Kay, 500 F.3d at 1218 (citation omitted). Under this new standard, “a plaintiff must ‘nudge his claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.'” Smith, 561 F.3d at 1098 (citation omitted). “Plausible” in this context does not mean “likely to be true,” but rather refers “to the scope of the allegations in a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent,” then the plaintiff has not “nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1974).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Deliberate Indifference
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to protect him, used excessive force, and were deliberately indifferent. All of Plaintiff's claims appear to be based on the fact that his handcuffs were not removed for over four hours and he was forced to stand without anywhere to sit.
“[P]rison officials have a duty to ‘provide humane conditions of confinement,' including ‘tak[ing] reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of . . . inmates.'” Hooks v. Atoki, 983 F.3d 1193, 1205 (10th Cir. Dec. 29, 2020)(quoting Requena v. Roberts, 893 F.3d 1195, 1214 (10th Cir. 2018) (alteration and omission in original) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994)).
A claim of deliberate indifference requires a plaintiff to allege “that an official acted (or failed to act) in an objectively unreasonable manner and with subjective awareness of the risk.” Strain v. Regalado, 977 F.3d 984, 987 (10th Cir. 2020) (noting that “the word deliberate makes a subjective component inherent in the claim”); see also Hooks, 983 F.3d at 1205 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844 (explaining that “prison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted”)).
A defendant's subjective intent is also inherent in the concept of deliberate indifference. Id. at 1203. “[A]n official's intent matters not only as to what the official did (or failed to do), but also why the official did it.” Id. at 1204 (citing Strain, 977 F.3d at 993). Plaintiff must “establish that the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Strain, 977 F.3d at 990 (citations and alteration omitted).
Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to show that a defendant was both aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm existed, and that they also drew the inference. Plaintiff's claims suggest, at most, negligence. Plaintiff should show good cause why his claims should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
B. Retaliation and Conspiracy
Plaintiff fails to state a claim of retaliation or conspiracy. “[I]t is well established that an act in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally protected right is actionable under [42 U.S.C.] Section 1983 even if the act, when taken for a different reason, would have been proper.” Smith v. Maschner, 899 F.2d 940, 947 (10th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). The Tenth Circuit has held that:
Government retaliation against a plaintiff for exercising his or her First Amendment rights may be shown by proving the following elements: (1) that the plaintiff was engaged in constitutionally protected activity; (2) that the defendant's actions caused the plaintiff to suffer an injury that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that activity; and (3) that the defendant's adverse action was substantially motivated as a response to the plaintiff's exercise of constitutionally protected conduct.Shero v. City of Grove, 510 F.3d 1196, 1203 (10th Cir. 2007).
However, an “inmate claiming retaliation must allege specific facts showing retaliation because of the exercise of the prisoner's constitutional rights.” Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1264 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotations and citations omitted). Thus, for this type of claim, “it is imperative that plaintiff's pleading be factual and not conclusory. Mere allegations of constitutional retaliation will not suffice.” Frazier v. Dubois, 922 F.2d 560, 562 n. 1 (10th Cir. 1990). “To prevail, a prisoner must show that the challenged actions would not have occurred ‘but for' a retaliatory motive.” Baughman v. Saffle, 24 Fed.Appx. 845, 848 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing Smith v. Maschner, 899 F.2d 940, 949-50 (10th Cir. 1990); Peterson v. Shanks, 149 F.3d 1140, 1144 (10th Cir. 1998)).
Plaintiff's claims of retaliation are subject to dismissal for failure to allege adequate facts in support of the claims. Plaintiff's allegations regarding retaliation are generally conclusory, lacking facts to demonstrate any improper retaliatory motive.
Plaintiff's bald allegation of a conspiracy is likewise insufficient to state a claim. Plaintiff fails to assert factual allegations in support of these claims. To state a claim for conspiracy, Plaintiff must include in his complaint enough factual allegations to suggest that an agreement was made. Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1183 (10th Cir. 2010). A bare assertion of conspiracy, absent context implying a meeting of the minds, fails to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. Id. Here, Plaintiff provides no factual information whatsoever to demonstrate any type of agreement was made between anyone. Such conclusory allegations fail to state a plausible claim for relief.
C. Equal Protection
To allege an equal protection violation, a plaintiff must state facts indicating that defendants treated him differently than other similarly situated individuals. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). Plaintiff does not allege that he was treated differently on the basis of class membership. To proceed upon an equal protection claim as a “class-of-one plaintiff,” there must be allegations that others similarly situated in every material respect were intentionally treated differently and that the government's action was irrational and abusive. Haik v. Salt Lake City Corp., 567 Fed.Appx. 621, 631-32 (10th Cir. 2014); Kan. Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins, 656 F.3d 1210, 1216 (10th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff has failed to allege that the other inmates were similarly situation in every material respect. See Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1312 (10th Cir. 1998) (“In order to assert a viable equal protection claim, plaintiffs must first make a threshold showing that they were treated differently from others who were similarly situated to them.”) (citation omitted). Plaintiff should show good cause why his equal protection claim should not be dismissed.
D. Neglect of Duty, Bystander Liability, and Inadequate Supervision
Plaintiff has failed to state a constitutional violation based on neglect, bystander liability, and inadequate supervision. Negligence is a state law claim and does not supply grounds for a constitutional cause of action. Claims under § 1983 may not be predicated on mere negligence. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330 (1986). It is well-settled that state law violations are not grounds for relief under § 1983. “[A] violation of state law alone does not give rise to a federal cause of action under § 1983.” Malek v. Haun, 26 F.3d 1013, 1016 (10th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). This Court is not obliged to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims, even if valid, given that Plaintiff has failed to allege a federal claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Loggins v. Norwood, 854 Fed.Appx. 954, 957 (10th Cir. 2021) (unpublished) (affirming district court's decision declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's remaining statelaw claims alleging slander and defamation).
The “negligent failure to provide adequate medical care, even one constituting medical malpractice, does not give rise to a constitutional violation.” Perkins v. Kan. Dep't of Corr., 165 F.3d 803, 811 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976)).
E. Request for Relief
Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief is moot. Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated at LCF. Plaintiff is currently in custody at the Harvey County Detention Center in Newton, Kansas. Because Plaintiff's request relates solely to alleged wrongdoing on the part of LCF employees, the Court would be unable to provide Plaintiff with effective relief and his requests for injunctive relief are moot. Article III of the Constitution extends the jurisdiction of federal courts only to “live, concrete” cases or controversies. Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Bureau of Reclamation, 601 F.3d 1096, 1109 (10th Cir. 2010). “Article III's requirement that federal courts adjudicate only cases and controversies necessitates that courts decline to exercise jurisdiction where the award of any requested relief would be moot-i.e. where the controversy is no longer live and ongoing.” Cox v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 43 F.3d 1345, 1348 (10th Cir. 1994), superseded by statute on other grounds. Consequently, “[m]ootness is a threshold issue because the existence of a live case or controversy is a constitutional prerequisite to federal court jurisdiction.” Rio Grande, 601 F.3d at 1109 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
“Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief.” O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 4951974). The Tenth Circuit has applied this principle to § 1983 actions brought by inmates, and held that an inmate's transfer from one prison to another generally renders moot any request for injunctive relief against the employees of the original prison concerning the conditions of confinement. See Green v. Branson, 108 F.3d 1296, 1299-1300 (10th Cir. 1997); see also Wirsching v. Colorado, 360 F.3d 1191, 1196 (10th Cir. 2004) (inmate's release from prison moots his claims for declaratory and injunctive relief); McAlpine v. Thompson, 187 F.3d 1213, 1215 (10th Cir. 1999) (recognizing prisoner's release from prison mooted his § 1983 claim for injunctive relief); Love v. Summit County, 776 F.2d 908, 910 n.4 (10th Cir. 1985) (noting transfer of inmate to different prison renders his § 1983 claim for injunctive relief moot); see also Pfeil v. Lampert, 603 Fed.Appx. 665, 668 (10th Cir. 2015) (unpublished) (holding that “RLUIPA claims regarding prison conditions become moot if the inmate plaintiff is released from custody.”) (citations omitted).
The mootness doctrine is based on the reality that even if the inmate receives injunctive relief, the defendants from the former prison would be unable to provide the relief to plaintiff. Because Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated at LCF, his claims for injunctive relief are moot and subject to dismissal.
Plaintiff also seeks declaratory relief. “A claim for declaratory relief that does not ‘settl[e] . . . some dispute which affects the behavior of the defendant toward the plaintiff' is moot, Rio Grande Silvery Minnow, 601 F.3d at 1110 (quotations omitted), because it fails to ‘seek[] more than a retrospective opinion that [the plaintiff] was wrongly harmed by the defendant[.]” Prison Legal News v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 944 F.3d 868, 880 (10th Cir. 2019) (quoting Jordan v. Sosa, 654 F.3d 1012, 1025 (10th Cir. 2011)); see also Church v. Polis, 2022 WL 200661, at *4 (10th Cir. Jan. 24, 2022) (“But declaratory-judgment claims become moot if circumstances change such that the defendants are not ‘actually situated to have their future conduct toward the plaintiff altered by the court's declaration of rights.'”) (citation omitted).
Plaintiffs seeks punitive damages, which “are available only for conduct which is ‘shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.'” Searles, 251 F.3d at 879 (quoting Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983)). Plaintiff presents no plausible basis for a claim of punitive damages because he alleges no facts whatsoever establishing that any defendant acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Plaintiff's request for punitive damages is subject to dismissal.
Plaintiff also seeks to be released from post-release supervision. Such a challenge must be brought in a habeas action. “[A] § 1983 action is a proper remedy for a state prisoner who is making a constitutional challenge to the conditions of his prison life, but not to the fact or length of his custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499 (1973) (emphasis added). When the legality of a confinement is challenged so that the remedy would be release or a speedier release, the case must be filed as a habeas corpus proceeding rather than under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the plaintiff must comply with the exhaustion of state court remedies requirement. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 482 (1994); see also Montez v. McKinna, 208 F.3d 862, 866 (10th Cir. 2000) (exhaustion of state court remedies is required by prisoner seeking habeas corpus relief). “Before a federal court may grant habeas relief to a state prisoner, the prisoner must exhaust his remedies in state court. In other words, the state prisoner must give the state courts an opportunity to act on his claims before he presents those claims to a federal court in a habeas petition.” O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999); see Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92 (2006); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518-19 (1982). Therefore, any claim seeking release is not cognizable in a § 1983 action.
IV. Motion for Appointment of Counsel
Plaintiff filed a motion for appointment of counsel (Doc. 3). He sets forth his unsuccessful attempts to obtain counsel.
The Court has considered Plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel. There is no constitutional right to appointment of counsel in a civil case. Durre v. Dempsey, 869 F.2d 543, 547 (10th Cir. 1989); Carper v. DeLand, 54 F.3d 613, 616 (10th Cir. 1995). The decision whether to appoint counsel in a civil matter lies in the discretion of the district court. Williams v. Meese, 926 F.2d 994, 996 (10th Cir. 1991). “The burden is on the applicant to convince the court that there is sufficient merit to his claim to warrant the appointment of counsel.” Steffey v. Orman, 461 F.3d 1218, 1223 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Hill v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 393 F.3d 1111, 1115 (10th Cir. 2004)). It is not enough “that having counsel appointed would have assisted [the prisoner] in presenting his strongest possible case, [as] the same could be said in any case.” Steffey, 461 F.3d at 1223 (quoting Rucks v. Boergermann, 57 F.3d 978, 979 (10th Cir. 1995)).
In deciding whether to appoint counsel, courts must evaluate “the merits of a prisoner's claims, the nature and complexity of the factual and legal issues, and the prisoner's ability to investigate the facts and present his claims.” Hill, 393 F.3d at 1115 (citing Rucks, 57 F.3d at 979). The Court concludes in this case that (1) it is not clear at this juncture that Plaintiff has asserted a colorable claim against a named defendant; (2) the issues are not complex; and (3) Plaintiff appears capable of adequately presenting facts and arguments. The Court denies the motion without prejudice to refiling the motion if Plaintiff's Complaint survives screening.
V. Response and/or Amended Complaint Required
Plaintiff is required to show good cause why his Complaint should not be dismissed for the reasons stated herein. Plaintiff is also given the opportunity to file a complete and proper amended complaint upon court-approved forms that cures all the deficiencies discussed herein. Plaintiff is given time to file a complete and proper amended complaint in which he (1) raises only properly joined claims and defendants; (2) alleges sufficient facts to state a claim for a federal constitutional violation and show a cause of action in federal court; and (3) alleges sufficient facts to show personal participation by each named defendant.
To add claims, significant factual allegations, or change defendants, a plaintiff must submit a complete amended complaint. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15. An amended complaint is not simply an addendum to the original complaint, and instead completely supersedes it. Therefore, any claims or allegations not included in the amended complaint are no longer before the court. It follows that a plaintiff may not simply refer to an earlier pleading, and the amended complaint must contain all allegations and claims that a plaintiff intends to pursue in the action, including those to be retained from the original complaint. Plaintiff must write the number of this case (23-3259-JWL) at the top of the first page of his amended complaint and he must name every defendant in the caption of the amended complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). Plaintiff should also refer to each defendant again in the body of the amended complaint, where he must allege facts describing the unconstitutional acts taken by each defendant including dates, locations, and circumstances. Plaintiff must allege sufficient additional facts to show a federal constitutional violation.
If Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint within the prescribed time that cures all the deficiencies discussed herein, this matter will be decided based upon the current deficient Complaint and may be dismissed without further notice for failure to state a claim.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2) is granted. Plaintiff remains obligated to pay the remainder of the $350.00 filing fee. The agency having custody of Plaintiff shall forward payments from Plaintiff's account in installments calculated under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The Clerk is to transmit a copy of this order to Plaintiff, to the finance office at the institution where Plaintiff is currently confined, and to the Court's finance office.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel (Doc. 3) is denied without prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is granted until January 19, 2024, in which to show good cause, in writing to the undersigned, why Plaintiff's Complaint should not be dismissed for the reasons stated herein.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is also granted until January 19, 2024, in which to file a complete and proper amended complaint to cure all the deficiencies discussed herein.
The Clerk is directed to send § 1983 forms and instructions to Plaintiff.
IT IS SO ORDERED.