Opinion
No. CV 03-040 18 26 S
April 29, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
St. Ambrose School, an elementary school within the defendant school system, hired the plaintiff in August 2000. The plaintiff retained that position until March 2003. The defendant maintains that the plaintiff resigned. The plaintiff contends that she was discharged. In her complaint the plaintiff has alleged wrongful termination, breach of contract and wrongful discharge.
Before the Court is the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The defendant claims (1) that the plaintiff's claims are precluded by the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment; (2) that the claims are precluded by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment; (3) that there is no evidence to support the plaintiff's wrongful termination claim; (4) there is no evidence to support the breach of contract claim; and (5) wrongful discharge is precluded in claims brought by contractual employees.
I. Facts
St. Ambrose is a private elementary school located in Bridgeport, Connecticut (Deposition of Sister Catherine van Houten, pp. 8-9). It is a school based upon the Roman Catholic faith that emphasizes prayer, spiritual works of mercy and a general observance of Roman Catholic beliefs and celebrations. (Affidavit of Sister Catherine van Houten at ¶¶ 4, 5.)
At the time this cause of action arose, the plaintiff was a second grade teacher at St. Ambrose. (Deposition of Bonnie Lazor, p. 2.) The central dispute occurred when Sister Catherine van Houten requested that all children write letters to President Bush wherein they expressed support for a peaceful resolution to the conflict in Iraq. (Amended Complaint, ¶ 5.)
The defendant contends that the assignment was prompted when representatives of the late Pope John Paul II met with President Bush and requested that all Catholics "pray and fast for peace . . ." (Exhibit E).
The defendant has attached to its motion for summary judgment a number of press releases and news items relating to this papal request. The defendant has also referred this court to 1 Timothy 2:1-02.
The plaintiff opposed the assignment. The basis for that opposition is disputed. The plaintiff alleges that she would not give the assignment without prior parental consent (Deposition of Bonnie Lazor at 25). After a disagreement concerning this assignment, the plaintiff claims she was terminated. Sister Catherine van Houten claims that the plaintiff resigned. (Compare deposition of Bonnie Lazor, p. 43 with deposition of Sister Catherine van Houten, pp. 34-35.)
The plaintiff had a one-year employment contract at St. Ambrose School. (Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment Exhibits G-I.) That contract provided for terminations based upon a number of considerations, including insubordination or other sufficient case. Upon termination, the contract provided a grievance procedure.
II. Standard of Review
Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Although the party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any material fact, a party opposing summary judgment must substantiate its adverse claim by showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact, together with the evidence disclosing the existence of such an issue. Practice Book §§ 17-45, 17-46; Burns v. Hartford Hospital, 192 Conn. 451, 455, 472 A.2d 1257 (1984). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Strada v. Connecticut Newspapers, Inc., 193 Conn. 313, 317, 477 A.2d 1005 (1984). Summary judgment is "designed to eliminate the delay and expense of litigating an issue where there is no real issue to be tried." Wilson v. City of New Haven, 213 Conn. 277, 279, 567 A.2d 829 (1989).
III. Applicable Law CT Page 7736
The defendant argues that summary judgment is warranted insofar as any judicial action would violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. That amendment provides "Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion." The same amendment precludes government from making any law "prohibiting the free exercise" of religion. U.S. Constitution, Amendment 1. In short, the first amendment "restricts the government's ability to intrude into ecclesiastical matters or to interfere with a church's governance of its own affairs." (Internal citations omitted). Bollard v. California Province of the Society of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 944 (9th Cir. 1999).
Any interference with the relationship between a religious institution and its ministers clearly would violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 320 F.3d 698, 702-3 (7th Cir. 2003). "On matters of church discipline, faith, practice, and religious law, the Free Exercise Clause requires civil courts to refrain from interfering with the determinations of the highest of these church judicatories to which the matter has been carried. This protection of the Free Exercise Clause is not limited to churches; it has been extended to various religiously-affiliated institutions, including schools." (Internal citations omitted, internal quotations omitted), Hartwig v. Albertus Magnus College, 93 F.Sup.2d 200 (D.Conn. 2000). Thus the first question is whether the institution involved is a religious institution. If so, the court must examine whether the employee was functioning in a ministerial capacity.
There can be little debate that St. Ambrose School is a religious institution. The fact that St. Ambrose is a religious institution is not determinative. The general rule is that the courts cannot interfere with the relationship between a church and its ministers or the equivalents thereof. Hope International University v. Superior Court, 119 Cal.App.4th 719 (2004). This "ministerial exception," first articulated in McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972), clearly precludes judicial intervention when a litigant's duties "go to the heart of the church's function in the manner of a minister or a seminary teacher." Hope International, 119 Cal.App.4th at 734. The nature of the employment relationship is critical.
The Court in Hope International provides a helpful analysis of the various types of situations wherein this exception clearly applies.
First, there are the relatively easy cases where a court can be certain of the applicability of the ministerial exception as a matter of law based on the very nature of the plaintiff's job — it is, like the Salvation Army officer in McClure, unquestionably, inherently or exclusively religious, and the reason for the discharge implicates the religious teachings of the employer. (See e.g., Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc. (11th Cir. 2000) 2003 F.3d 1299 [minister]; Combs v. Cen. Tex. Ann. Conf of United Methodist Church (5th Cir. 1999) 173 F.3d 343 [clergy member]; Bell v. Presbyterian Church (4th Cir. 1997) 126 F.3d 328 [ordained minister]; Young v. N. Ill. Conf. of United Methodist Church (7th Cir. 1994) 21 F.3d 184 [probationary minister]; Rayburn v. General Conf of the Seventh Day Adventists (4th Cir. 1985) 772 F.2d 1164 [applicant for pastoral position at church]; Kraft v. Rector, Churchwardens, and Vestry of Grace in New York (S.D.N.Y, Mar. 17, 2004, No. 01-CV-7871) [ordained priest]; Williams v. Episcopal Diocese of Mass. (Mass. 2002) 766 N.E.2d 820 [ordained priest]; Dunn v. Board of Incorporators African Methodist Episcopal Church (N.D.Tex., Dec. 18, 2001, Cir. A. No. 300CV2547D) 2001 WL 1636399 [church reverend]; Sanchez v. Catholic Foreign Soc. of America (M.D.Fla. 1999) 82 F.Sup.2d 1338 [ordained priest seeking to be rehired as priest].)
In essentially the same category are members of religious orders suing in regard to their relationship in the order. (See Rosati v. Toledo, Ohio Catholic Diocese (N.D. Ohio 2002) 233 F.Sup.2d 917 [novitiate released from order because she got breast cancer]; Turner v. Church of Jesus Christ (Tex.Ct.App. 2000) 18 S.W.3d 877 [termination of Mormon missionary because of illness].)
By the same token, individuals whose function is essentially liturgical, that is, connected to the religious or worship service of the organization, also come within the ministerial exception. Music and choir directors in particular come within the liturgical function aspect of the exception. (E.g., E.E.O.C. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, NC (4th Cir. 2000) 213 F.3d 795 [director of music ministry and part time music teacher at cathedral's elementary school]; Starkman v. Evans (5th Cir. 1999) 198 F.3d 173 [church choir director]; Assemany v. Archdiocese of Detroit (Mich.Ct.App. 1988) 434 N.W.2d 233 [church organist]; Egan v. Hamline United Methodist Church (Minn.Ct.App. 2004) 679 N.W.2d 350 [church music director at church]; Miller v. Bay View United Methodist Church (E.D.Wis. 2001) 141 F.Sup.2d 1174 [ministerial exception applied to music and choir director of church].) Those who perform priestly functions that may not seem outwardly liturgical, but are inextricably intertwined with the particular religious doctrine of a religious organization may also be said to come within this category. (See Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Washington, Inc. (4th Cir. 2004) 363 F.3d 299 [kosher supervisor at Jewish elderly home].)
Next are individuals whose duties for a church not only involve traditional public relations, but who are also, functionally, paid to actively proselytize on a church's behalf. (See Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago (7th Cir, 2003) 320 F.3d 698 [Hispanic Communications Manager for the Archdiocese of Chicago whose duties included outreach to local Hispanic community, including writing for church publications and translating church materials into Spanish].)
Hope International, 735-36.
More difficult cases include those involving teachers. There the line between teaching and church doctrine is sometimes blurred. Teaching religion for a church could fall within the exception. See E.E.O.C. v. Catholic University of America (4th Cir. 1996) 83 F.3d 455 (nun who taught canon law) Musante v. Notre Dame of Easton Church, No. Civ.A 301 CV 2352 MRK (D.Conn. Mar. 30, 2004) (director of religious education and pastoral assistant at Catholic Church). An assignment to teach secular subjects is generally not within the exception. See DeMarco v. Holy Cross High School, 4 F.3d 166, 171-72 (2d Cir. 1993) (math teacher at Catholic school) Geary v. Visitation of the Blessed Virgin Mary, 7 F.3d 324 (3rd Cir. 1993); Guinan v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Indianapolis, 42 F.Sup. 849 (S.D.Ind. 1998) (fifth grade teacher at a religious school taught both secular and religious subjects).
In summary, "the mere reference to a matter of religion does not bar this court from hearing this case under the First Amendment." Hartwig, 93 F.Sup.2d 217. Instead this court should consider whether the plaintiff in this case acts as a liaison between a religious institution and "those whom it would touch with its message." Alicea-Hernandez, 320 F.3d at 702-03.
Despite the affidavits of the litigants, that determination is not clear-cut. See Hartwig, 93 F.Sup.2d at 212 n. 14. On the present record there is a question concerning the nature and scope of the plaintiff's duties and responsibilities, although they appear to be primarily secular. The Establishment Clause is not implicated.
More importantly, in the present case the facts concerning the basis for the termination are highly contested. Although this court cannot become entangled in a purely ecclesiastical dispute, courts can address not theological issues. The Establishment Clause only guards against "extensive or continuous administrative or judicial intrusion into the functions of religious institutions." DeMarco v. Holy Cross High School, 4 F.3d 166, 170 (2d Cir. 1993). If the validity or plausibility of religious beliefs is not implicated, the first amendment is not affected. DeMarco, 4 F.3d at 171.
As noted in the Hartwig decision the party asserting the first amendment privilege must point to a disputed religious issue which the finder of fact would be asked to resolve. Here the finder of fact would not be asked to determine the validity of religious principles. Instead the question is whether those religious principles were the basis for all subsequent actions.
Evaluating a motive for an action, even a religious motive, does not put "into issue the validity or truthfulness of Catholic religious teaching." DeMarco. Instead, "the inquiry is directed toward determining whether the articulated purpose is the actual purpose for the challenged employment related action." DeMarco, 4 F.3d at 170-71.
However, the plaintiff cannot challenge the plausibility of the suggested religious purpose.
The defendant has failed to meet its burden in the present motion. There are significant disputed facts, including but not limited to whether the defendant's actions breached the existing contract, the basis for the termination, the source of the termination, the procedural apparatus required to terminate one of the defendant's employees, and whether Sister Catherine van Houten acted outside the scope of her authority, and whether Sister Catherine van Houten's alleged failure to follow the defendant's procedures relieved the plaintiff of her obligation to adhere to available grievance procedures.
The Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.
DEWEY, J.