Opinion
No. 35578.
Decided March 23, 1965.
Unemployment compensation — Payable if quit work with just cause — Just cause, when.
Benefits under the Ohio Unemployment Compensation Act are not payable when an employee quits his work without just cause and has not been employed a sufficient time under new employment to qualify; there is just cause and benefits are payable, where an employee voluntarily quits after some six and one-half years of steady employment to accept a job with a forty percent increase in pay even though her new employment lasted only one week and two days before she was laid off due to lack of work.
Mr. Walter R. Wagner, for appellant.
Mr. C. Richard Gregg, for the bureau.
This matter is before the court on appeal from the decision of the Board of Review of the Bureau of Unemployment Compensation.
The appellant, Susan A. Layton, had been employed at the Fanny Farmer Candy shop in Norwalk, Ohio, from August 11, 1958, until March 17, 1965, when she was separated by reason of a voluntary quit. On March 18, 1965, she was employed by the Clevite Harris Products Company, Milan, Ohio, and was laid off March 26, 1965, due to lack of work. Appellant subsequently filed application for unemployment benefits, which application was disallowed by the Board of Review. Basis for the decision of the Board of Review was Section 4141.29(D)(2)(a), Revised Code, which reads in part as follows:
"(D) Notwithstanding division (A) of this section, no individual may serve a waiting period or be paid benefits under the following conditions:
"* * *
"(2) For the duration of his unemployment if the administrator finds that:
"(a) He quit his work without just cause * * *."
The record discloses that the appellant, with some six and a half years steady employment with Fanny Farmer, where she was earning at a pay rate of $1.65 per hour, applied for employment with Clevite Harris and was offered a position paying $2.37 per hour. After giving a week's notice to Fanny Farmer, she was separated and on the following day went to work for Clevite Harris. Her position at Clevite Harris lasted one week and two days, when she was separated due to lack of work.
The record also discloses that the reason for the appellant's switch in jobs was the 40% increase in pay, plus the fact that the Clevite Harris plant was 3 or 4 miles closer to her home.
The question raised in this appeal is whether, under the facts so stated, the appellant quit the job with Fanny Farmer "without just cause." It is the opinion of this court that the appellant's separation from Fanny Farmer was "with just cause." The sections of the Revised Code pertaining to the Unemployment Compensation Act do not define "just cause" and, hence, each case must be decided on its individual facts. To hold that an employee who leaves one job to take on a better paying job automatically disqualifies himself from unemployment compensation until employed a sufficient time under the new employment would be a harsh rule and contrary to the liberal intent and purpose of the Unemployment Compensation Act. While there may be cases where the quitting of one job to secure another might well be "without just cause," as where the reason for such move was based on personal whims or for insufficient cause, the facts in this case are not of that nature.
The appellant here had been steadily employed for six and a half years with a long established and well known candy manufacturer. When a position with another well known and established manufacturing company was offered to her with an approximate 40% increase in pay, she accepted it. To rule that such a transfer of jobs in a period of rising living costs would be a quit "without just cause" would put a penalty on one's desire to better one's financial position and a premium on being satisfied with more security at less pay. Such interpretation of the Unemployment Compensation Act could not be reconciled with the intent of the Legislature or with one's inherent desire to improve his standard of living.
It is, therefore, the conclusion of the court that the decision of the Board of Review was unlawful, unreasonable and against the manifest weight of the evidence and is, therefore, reversed and vacated.
Decision reversed.