On the other hand, substantial deference is given to the Committee's findings of fact, unless such findings are not supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record.See also, Syllabus Point 1, Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Lakin, 217 W. Va. 134, 617 S.E.2d 484 (2005); Syllabus Point 1, Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Lusk, 212 W. Va. 456, 574 S.E.2d 788 (2002); Syllabus Point 3, Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Barber, 211 W. Va. 358, 566 S.E.2d 245 (2002). The above standard of review is consistent with this Court's ultimate authority with regard to legal ethics matters in this State. Syllabus Point 3 of Committee on Legal Ethics v. Blair, 174 W. Va. 494, 327 S.E.2d 671 (1984), holds: "This Court is the final arbiter of legal ethics problems and must make the ultimate decisions about public reprimands, suspensions or annulments of attorneys' licenses to practice law."
On the other hand, substantial deference is given to the Committee's findings of fact, unless such findings are not supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record. Syl. pt. 1, Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Lakin, 217 W. Va. 134, 617 S.E.2d 484 (2005); syl. pt. 1, Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Lusk, 212 W. Va. 456, 574 S.E.2d 788 (2002); syl. pt. 3, Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Barber, 211 W. Va. 358, 566 S.E.2d 245 (2002); syl. pt. 2, Lawyer Disciplinary Board, v. Turgeon, 210 W. Va. 181, 557 S.E.2d 235 (2000), cert denied, 534 U.S. 841, 122 S.Ct. 99, 151 L.Ed.2d 59 (2001). The above standard of review is consistent with this Court's ultimate authority with regard to legal ethics matters in this State. As syllabus point 3 of Committee on Legal Ethics v. Blair, 174 W. Va. 494, 327 S.E.2d 671 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1028, 105 S.Ct. 1395, 84 L.Ed.2d 783 (1985), holds: "This Court is the final arbiter of legal ethics problems and must make the ultimate decisions about public reprimands, suspensions or annulments of attorneys' licenses to practice law."
On the other hand, substantial deference is given to the Committee's findings of fact, unless such findings are not supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record. Syl. pt. 1, Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Lakin, 217 W. Va. 134, 617 S.E.2d 484 (2005) syl. pt. 1, Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Lusk, 212 W. Va. 456, 574 S.E.2d 788 (2002) syl. pt. 3, Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Barber, 211 W. Va. 358, 566 S.E.2d 245 (2002) syl. pt. 2, Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Turgeon, 210 W. Va. 181, 557 S.E.2d 235 (2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 841, 122 S.Ct. 99, 151 L.Ed.2d 59 (2001). The above standard of review is consistent with this Court's ultimate authority with regard to legal ethics matters in this State. As syllabus point 3 of Committee on Legal Ethicsv. Blair, 174 W. Va. 494, 327 S.E.2d 671 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1028, 105 S.Ct. 1395, 84 L.Ed.2d 783 (1985), holds: "This Court is the final arbiter of legal ethics problems and must make the ultimate decisions about public reprimands, suspensions or annulments of attorneys' licenses to practice law."
On the other hand, substantial deference is given to the Committee's findings of fact, unless such findings are not supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record. Syl. pt. 1, Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Lakin, 217 W. Va. 134, 617 S.E.2d 484 (2005); syl. pt. 1, Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Lusk, 212 W. Va. 456, 574 S.E.2d 788 (2002); syl. pt. 3, Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Barber, 211 W. Va. 358, 566 S.E.2d 245 (2002); syl. pt. 2, Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Turgeon, 210 W. Va. 181, 557 S.E.2d 235 (2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 841, 122 S.Ct. 99, 151 L.Ed.2d 59 (2001). The above standard of review is consistent with this Court's ultimate authority with regard to legal ethics matters in this State. As syllabus point 3 of Committee on Legal Ethics v. Blair, 174 W. Va. 494, 327 S.E.2d 671 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1028, 105 S.Ct. 1395, 84 L.Ed.2d 783 (1985), holds: "This Court is the final arbiter of legal ethics problems and must make the ultimate decisions about public reprimands, suspensions or annulments of attorneys' licenses to practice law."
On the other hand, substantial deference is given to the Committee's findings of fact, unless such findings are not supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record. Syl. pt. 1, Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Lakin, 217 W. Va. 134, 617 S.E.2d 484 (2005) syl. pt. 1, Lawyer Disciplinary Board v Lusk, 212 W. Va. 456, 574 S.E.2d 788 (2002) syl. pt. 3, Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Barber, 211 W. Va. 358, 566 S.E.2d 245 (2002) syl. pt. 2, Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Turgeon, 210 W. Va. 181, 557 S.E.2d 235 (2000). The above standard of review is consistent with this Court's ultimate authority with regard to legal ethics matters in this State. As syllabus point 3 of Committee on Legal Ethics v. Blair, 174 W. Va. 494, 327 S.E.2d 671 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1028, 105 S.Ct. 1395, 84 L.Ed.2d 783 (1985), holds: "This Court is the final arbiter of legal ethics problems and must make the ultimate decisions about public reprimands, suspensions or annulments of attorneys' licenses to practice law."
The above standard of review is consistent with this Court's ultimate authority with regard to legal ethics matters in this State. As syllabus point 3 of Committee on Legal Ethics v. Blair, 174 W.Va. 494, 327 S.E.2d 671 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1028, 105 S.Ct. 1395, 84 L.Ed.2d 783 (1985) holds: "This Court is the final arbiter of legal ethics problems and must make the ultimate decisions about public reprimands, suspensions or annulments of attorneys' licenses to practice law." Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Lusk, 212 W.Va. 456, 461, 574 S.E.2d 788, 793 (2002); syl. pt. 2, Barber, supra; syl. pt. 3, Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Frame, 198 W.Va. 166, 479 S.E.2d 676 (1996). See also, 2A M.J. Attorney and Client ยง 55 (1993), stating that the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia "is the final arbiter of legal ethics problems."
In fact, since that proceeding was stayed, no party offers any rationale why that proceeding could not simply recommence, affording a procedural remedy to this errant reciprocal proceeding that serves all interests and circumvents the majority's tortured interpretation of our own disciplinary rules.LDB v.Lusk , 212 W. Va. 456, 461, 574 S.E.2d 788, 793 (2002) (quoting Syl. Pt. 2, LDB v.Barber , 211 W. Va. 358, 566 S.E.2d 245 (2002) ).
This Court has previously imposed restitution in lawyer disciplinary proceedings that did not involve restrictions on a lawyer's license or as a condition for reinstatement. See Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Lusk, 212 W. Va. 456, 462, 574 S.E.2d 788, 794 (2002) (annulling law-license and requiring restitution); Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Ask in, 203 W. Va. 320, 324, 507 S.E.2d 683, 687 (1998) (same). See also Matter of Elowitz, 177 Ariz. 240, 866 P.2d 1326, 1330 (Ariz.