Opinion
C. A. 9:20-cv-03316-JD-MHC
11-01-2021
Michael E. Lawton, Plaintiff, v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Molly H. Cherry United States Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Michael E. Lawton (Lawton) filed the complaint in this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of the Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ's) final decision denying his claim for supplemental security income (SSI) under the Social Security Act (Act). This case was referred to the undersigned for a report and recommendation pursuant to Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(a) (D.S.C.). For the reasons that follow, the undersigned recommends that the ALJ's decision be remanded for further consideration.
Citations to the record refer to the page No. in the Social Security Administration Record. See ECF No. 21.
On June 11, 2018, Lawton filed an application for SSI, alleging disability as of that date.R.p. 15. His application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. R.pp. 15, 182-214, 217- 20, 224-27. He requested an administrative hearing, and on October 15, 2019, ALJ Brent Asseff held a hearing at which Lawton, who was represented by counsel, and a vocational expert (VE) testified. R.pp. 15, 46-89, 228. On December 10, 2010, the ALJ issued a decision in which he found that Lawton was not disabled. R.pp. 15-41.
Lawton was previously found disabled in 2003; however, in February 2015, the Social Security Administration determined that he was no longer disabled as of February 1, 2015. Lawton appealed this decision, and on August 30, 2017, an ALJ determined that Lawton was not disabled as of February 1, 2015.
Lawton requested review of the ALJ's decision by the Appeals Council, and on August 1, 2020, the Appeals Council denied Lawton's request, making the ALJ's decision a final decision for purposes of judicial review. R.pp. 1-6, 276-80. This appeal followed.
Because this Court writes primarily for the parties who are familiar with the facts, the Court dispenses with a lengthy recitation of the medical history from the relevant period. To the extent specific records or information are relevant to or at issue in this case, they are addressed within the Discussion section below.
II. APPLICABLE LAW
A. Scope of Review
Jurisdiction of this Court is pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). Under § 405(g), judicial review of a final decision regarding disability benefits is limited to determining (1) whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence, and (2) whether the correct legal standards were applied. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Walls v. Barnhart, 296 F.3d 287, 290 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990)). Accordingly, a reviewing court must uphold the final decision when “an ALJ has applied correct legal standards and the ALJ's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence.” Brown v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 873 F.3d 251, 267 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Substantial evidence” is an evidentiary standard that is not high: it is “more than a mere scintilla” and means only “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019). A reviewing court does not reweigh conflicts in evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir. 2012). “Where conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the [ALJ].” Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, this limited review does not mean the findings of an ALJ are to be mechanically accepted, as the “statutorily granted review contemplates more than an uncritical rubber stamping of the administrative action.” Howard v. Saul, 408 F.Supp.3d 721, 725-26 (D.S.C. 2019) (quoting Flack v. Cohen, 413 F.2d 278, 279 (4th Cir. 1969)).
B. Social Security Disability Evaluation Process
To be considered “disabled” within the meaning of the Social Security Act, a claimant must show that he has an impairment or combination of impairments which prevent him from engaging in all substantial gainful activity for which he is qualified by his age, education, experience, and functional capacity, and which has lasted or could reasonably be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. See 42 U.S.C. § 423. The Social Security Administration established a five-step sequential procedure in order to evaluate whether an individual is disabled for purposes of receiving benefits. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; see also Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 634-35 (4th Cir. 2015) (outlining the questions asked in the five-step procedure). The burden rests with the claimant to make the necessary showings at each of the first four steps to prove disability. Mascio, 780 F.3d at 634-35. If the claimant fails to carry his burden, he is found not disabled. Lewis v. Berryhill, 858 F.3d 858, 861 (4th Cir. 2017). If the claimant is successful at each of the first four steps, the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Id.
At the first step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has engaged in substantial gainful activity since his alleged disability onset date. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). At step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has an impairment or combination of impairments that meet the regulations' severity and duration requirements. Id. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). At step three, the ALJ considers whether the severe impairment meets the criteria of an impairment listed in Appendix 1 of 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P (the “Listings”) or is equal to a listed impairment. If so, the claimant is automatically eligible for benefits; if not, before moving on to step four, the ALJ assesses the claimant's residual functional capacity (RFC). Id. §§ 404.1520(d), (e), 416.920(d), (e); Lewis, 858 F.3d at 861.
The RFC is “the most the claimant can still do despite physical and mental limitations that affect her ability to work.” Mascio, 780 F.3d at 635 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
At step four, the ALJ determines whether, despite the severe impairment, the claimant retains the RFC to perform his past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), (f), 416.920(e), (f). If the ALJ finds the claimant capable of performing his past relevant work, he is not disabled. Id. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). If the exertion required to perform the claimant's past relevant work exceeds his RFC, then the ALJ goes on to the final step.
At step five, the burden of proof shifts to the Social Security Administration to show that the claimant can perform other jobs existing in significant No. in the national economy, considering the claimant's age, education, work experience, and RFC. Id. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g); Mascio, 780 F.3d at 634-35. Typically, the Commissioner offers this evidence through the testimony of a vocational expert answering hypotheticals that incorporate the claimant's limitations. Mascio, 780 F.3d at 635. “If the Commissioner meets her burden, the ALJ finds the claimant not disabled and denies the application for benefits.” Id.
III. DISCUSSION
A. The ALJ's findings
The ALJ employed the statutorily-required five-step sequential evaluation process to determine whether Lawton was disabled from the alleged onset date of June 11, 2018. The ALJ found, in pertinent part:
1. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since June 11, 2018, the application date (20 CFR 416.971 et seq.).
2. The claimant has the following severe impairments: depression; anxiety and panic attacks; PTSD; morbid obesity; degenerative joint disease and impingement syndrome, left shoulder; cervical radiculopathy right upper extremity; umbilical hernia, status postsurgical repair; insomnia; and stress fractures of the right foot. (20 CFR 416.920(c)).
3. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).
4. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(a) with exceptions. The claimant can occasionally climb ramps/stairs, but never climb ladders/ropes/scaffolds. The claimant can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. The claimant cannot reach overhead with the left upper extremity. The claimant can frequently handle and finger objects with the right, dominant upper extremity. The claimant cannot have exposure to unprotected heights, moving mechanical parts, humidity, and wetness. The claimant is limited to performing simple, routine tasks with a GED reasoning level of 1 or 2. The claimant can maintain concentration, persistence, and pace for two-hour intervals. The claimant is limited to occasional interaction with co-workers and supervisors, no more than incidental contact with the general public.
5. The claimant has no past relevant work (20 CFR 416.965).
6. The claimant was born on January 1, 1985 and was 33 years old, which is defined as a younger individual age 18-44, on the date the application was filed (20 CFR 416.963).
7. The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to communicate in English (20 CFR 416.964).
8. Transferability of job skills is not an issue because the claimant does not have past relevant work (20 CFR 416.968).
9. Considering the claimant's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant No. in the national economy that the claimant can perform (20 CFR 416.969 and 416.969(a)).
10. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, since June 11, 2018, the date the application was filed (20 CFR 416.920(g)).R.pp. 18-41.
B. Lawton's contentions of error
Lawton argues the ALJ erred (1) in finding Lawton did not meet or equal a Listing, (2) in failing to properly evaluate the opinions from various medical sources, (3) in failing to properly assess Lawton's obesity on his RFC, and (4) in failing to properly assess Lawton's mental RFC. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned agrees that the ALJ erred in his Listings analysis, warranting remand.
1. The ALJ's Listings analysis
Lawton argues that the ALJ erred at Step Three of the evaluation process by failing to properly evaluate his impairments. Specifically, Lawton argues there is overwhelming evidence that his impairments, individually and in combination, meet or equal the Listings as set forth in 12.15 (trauma and stressor-related disorders), 12.06 (anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorder) and/or 12.04 (depressive, bipolar, and related disorders). See 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 §§ 12.04, 12.06, 12.15. Lawton maintains that the ALJ failed to conduct an appropriate analysis of these Listings and the relevant criteria. The Court agrees.
The regulations provide that the burden of establishing disability under the Listings is on the claimant. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512, 416.912; Mascio, 780 F.3d at 634-35. “Under Step [Three], the regulation states that a claimant will be found disabled if he or she has an impairment that ‘[1] meets or equals one of our listings in appendix 1 of this subpart and [2] meets the duration requirement.'” Radford v. Colvin, 734 F.3d 288, 293 (4th Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii)). It is not enough that the claimant has the diagnosis of a listed impairment; the claimant must also show evidence of the requirements for the listing of that impairment. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1525(d), 416.925(d). “For a claimant to show that his impairment matches a listing, it must meet all of the specified medical criteria. An impairment that manifests only some of those criteria, no matter how severely, does not qualify.” Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990).
To meet Listing 12.04, 12.06, and/or 12.15, Lawton must show a qualifying impairment that satisfies the requirements of parts A and B or A and C of the Listing. See 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 §§ 12.04, 12.06, 12.15. There is no contention that Lawton did not meet the part A criteria in any of the Listings, as the ALJ found at Step Two that Lawton had the severe impairments of depression, anxiety and panic attacks, and PTSD. R.p.18. At Step Three, the ALJ found the severity of Lawton's “mental impairments, considered singly and in combination, do not meet or medically equal the criteria of listings 12.04, 12.06, and 12.15.” Rp. 18. The ALJ did not address the part A criteria of Listings 12.04, 12.06, and 12.15, but concluded Lawton's impairments met none of those Listings because they did not satisfy the part B criteria or the part C criteria. R.pp. 18-20. Thus, at issue is whether the ALJ erred in his evaluation of the part B and/or part C criteria. The Court considers both part B and part C in turn.
a. The ALJ erred in his evaluation of the part B criteria.
Listings 12.04, 12.06, and 12.15 contain the same part B criteria. To meet part B of the Listings, the claimant must have an extreme limitation of one or a marked limitation of two of the following areas of mental functioning: (1) understanding, remembering, or applying information; (2) interacting with others; (3) concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; or (4) adapting or managing oneself. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 §§ 12.04(B), 12.06(B), 12.15(B). A marked limitation means the claimant's “functioning in this area independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis is seriously limited.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.00(F)(2)(d). An extreme limitation means the individual is “not able to function in [the] area independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.00(F)(2)(e).
As to the part B criteria, the ALJ found the following:
In understanding, remembering or applying information, the claimant has a mild limitation.
The consultative examiner, Dr. Kimberly K. Kruse, Psy.D., stated that the claimant appeared capable of performing normal, multistep tasks in non-stressful settings if given appropriate periods of rest (Exhibit B3F/3). Isaac Seymour, LPCA, stated that the claimant had moderate limitations in his ability to understand, remember or apply information (Exhibit B13F/2). However, Deborah Whatley, APRN, his psychiatric provider, stated that his recent and remote memory were intact (Exhibit B7F/19, 18, 15 Exhibit 9F/2).
The Disability Determination Service psychological consultant Dr. Edward Waller, Ph.D. and Dr. Janet Boland, Ph.D., determined that the claimant had mild limitations in his ability to understand, remember or apply information (Exhibit B3A and Exhibit B6A). The Administrative Law Judge finds that the claimant has a mild limitation in his ability to understand, remember or apply information.
In interacting with others, the claimant has a moderate limitation.
Dr. Krause stated that the claimant would likely have difficulty performing well in an environment requiring social interaction; however, she stated that during the interview, the claimant was interpersonally relatable and aware of social cues (Exhibit B3F/4). Mr. Seymour stated that the claimant had moderate limitations for interacting with others (Exhibit B13F/2). Dr. Waller and Dr. Boland found that the claimant had moderate limitations for interacting with others (Exhibit B3A and Exhibit B6A). After careful review, the Administrative Law finds that the claimant had a moderate limitation in interacting with others.
With regard to concentrating, persisting or maintaining pace, the claimant has a moderate limitation.
APRN Whatley initially found that the claimant had mild impairment in his attention and concentration (Exhibit B7F/22). On later occasions, she found that his attention and concentration were intact (Exhibit B7F/19, 18, 15 Exhibit 9F/2). Dr. Krause stated that during her exam, the claimant was able to understand and follow instructions (Exhibit B3F/5). She stated that the claimant appeared capable of performing normal, multistep tasks in non-stressful settings if given appropriate periods of rest (Exhibit B3F/3). Dr. Waller and Dr. Boland found that the claimant
had moderate limitations in maintaining concentration, persistence or pace (Exhibit B3A). After careful consideration, the Administrative Law Judge finds that the claimant has moderate limitation in this regard.
As for adapting or managing oneself, the claimant has experienced a mild limitation.
APRN Whatley assessed the claimant as unkempt or disheveled (Exhibit B7F/21, 19, 17, 15, Exhibit 9F/2). However, Dr. Krause noted that the claimant drives and he cared for a dog regularly (Exhibit B3F/3). She stated that the claimant had no problems maintaining his hygiene and self-care (Exhibit B3F/3). She reported that the claimant was able to prepare basic meals and he performed basic chores at home (Exhibit B3F/3). She stated that the claimant appeared capable of managing his own funds (Exhibit B3F/5). Dr. Waller found that the claimant had mild limitations for adapting or managing himself (Exhibit B3A) while Dr. Boland determined that the claimant had moderate limitations in this regard (Exhibit B6A). Considering all of the evidence, the Administrative Law Judge finds that the claimant has mild limitation in his ability to adapt and manage himself.R.pp. 19-20.
Lawton mainly argues that the ALJ erred in the above assessment in two ways. First, he argues the ALJ erred in failing to properly assess the medical source statement provided by Isaac Seymour, Lawton's therapist. Second, Lawton points to evidence in the record detailing instances that support him being markedly or extremely impaired under the part B criteria that the ALJ seemingly ignored.
As to the medical source statement, Seymour noted that Lawton was (1) moderately impaired in his ability to understand, remember, or apply information; (2) markedly impaired in his ability to interact with others; (3) extremely impaired in his ability to concentrate, persist, or maintain pace; and (4) extremely impaired in his ability to adapt or manage oneself. R.p 698. As shown above, the ALJ based his decision on whether Lawton met the Listings exclusively on what various medical sources opined as to each part B criteria. However, the ALJ excluded Seymour's opinion when discussing Lawton's ability in concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace, and in adapting or managing oneself-areas where Seymour opined that Lawton had “extreme” limitations. See R.pp. 19-20, 698. Moreover, in the part B criteria where the ALJ did mention Seymour's opinions-understanding, remembering or applying information, and in interacting with others-the ALJ erroneously stated Seymour opined that Lawton had moderate limitations for interacting with others. This was incorrect: Seymour noted marked limitations as to this criterion. Compare R.p. 19, with R.p. 698.
The undersigned finds reversible error here for several reasons. First, the ALJ cannot simply ignore evidence in the record and fail to reconcile it with his decision. See Radford, 734 F.3d at 295 (“The record should include a discussion of which evidence the ALJ found credible and why, and specific application of the pertinent legal requirements to the record evidence.”). Seymour had been Lawton's licensed therapist since June 2018, yet the ALJ relied on the reports of the Administration's doctors over Lawton's therapist without explanation. See Id. at 295-96 (remanding where, inter alia, the ALJ's reliance on state medical opinions for a Listings evaluation did not indicate why those opinions merited such high evidentiary weight over the claimant's treating physicians). This omission strikes the undersigned as impermissible cherry-picking. See Lewis, 858 F.3d at 869 (“An ALJ has the obligation to consider all relevant medical evidence and cannot simply cherrypick facts that support a finding of nondisability while ignoring evidence that points to a disability finding.” (quoting Denton v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 419, 425 (7th Cir. 2010))).
Radford was decided before the major overhaul in the social security regulations that took effect March 17, 2017. See Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 FR 5844-01, 2017 WL 168819 (Jan. 18, 2017), corrected by 82 Fed.Reg. 15132-01, 2017 WL 1105368 (Mar. 27, 2017). The Court acknowledges those regulations are inapplicable to Lawton's case as his application was after the March 2017 effective date. Nevertheless, ALJs still have an obligation to consider all relevant medical evidence and provide a narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports their conclusion under the new regulations. It is the lack of explanation here-not mere reliance on the Administration's doctors over Lawton's therapist-that warrants remand.
Second, Lawton bears the burden of showing either an extreme limitation of one or a marked limitation of two of the part B criteria, and Seymour's medical source statement provides evidence of two extreme limitations in Lawton's mental functioning. The ALJ's failure to address such outcome determinative evidence is inexplicable. Compare Reid v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 769 F.3d 861, 865 (4th Cir. 2014) (noting “there is no rigid requirement that the ALJ specifically refer to every piece of evidence in his decision, ” and finding the ALJ's decision was based on the entire record and supported by substantial evidence where “Reid [] failed to point to any specific piece of evidence not considered by the [ALJ] that might have changed the outcome of his disability claim” (emphasis in original) (citation omitted)), with Dutton v. Colvin, No. 1:14-CV-1779-BHH, 2015 WL 1733799, at *13 (D.S.C. Apr. 16, 2015) (“Unlike in Reid where the plaintiff neglected to cite specific evidence not considered by the ALJ that might have changed the outcome, Plaintiff cites a specific evaluation and report from Mr. Price, a certified rehabilitation counselor.”). Consequently, as Lawton has pointed to specific evidence apparently not considered by the ALJ which could change the outcome of his case, remand is warranted.
Finally, to the extent the ALJ did offer Seymour's opinion to support his finding of a moderate limitation in interacting with others, his reliance was erroneous because Seymour had opined that Lawton had a higher limitation than what the ALJ stated it was. The Court finds the ALJ's reliance on a misstated medical opinion does not pass muster under the substantial evidence standard. For all of these reasons, remand is warranted.
As to the evidence Lawton argues was ignored, the Court finds further error. Lawton points to various instances throughout the record where it was noted that Lawton had difficulties in in his ability to interact with others; in his ability to concentrate, persist, or maintain pace;and in his ability to adapt or manage oneself. None of this, Lawton argues, was considered by the ALJ. The Court agrees.
With regard to his inability to interact with others, Lawton cites to medical records noting: “[he is] easily annoyed/irritable . . . lack of socializing” (R.p. 407); “reports anger and shortness of patience has gotten worse . . . I verbally blow up” (R.p. 578); “highly anxious about germs and being touched by people” (R.p. 734); “I have always had anger issues. I don't want to” (R.p. 495); “on edge . . . annoyed irritable” (R. 499); “does not socialize often” (R.p. 499); “reports hypervigilance in crowds” (R.p. 423); “does not do well around crowds and prefers to stay inside” (Rp. 430).
With regard to his ability to concentrate, persist, or maintain pace, Lawton cites to medical records noting: “difficulty concentrating . . . restlessness” (R.p. 407); “will experience intrusive thoughts and thought rumination” (R.p. 735); “difficulty concentrating . . . restlessness” (R.p. 499); “difficult to control worry and flashbacks” (R.p. 499); “reports both physiologic and cognitive based anxiety . . . ongoing mood lability” (R.p. 423); “denies social activities outside the home” (R.p. 424); “presents with a lack of self-direction towards improving his basic needs” (Rp. 498).
With regard to his ability to adapt or manage oneself, Lawton cites to medical records noting: “he will pick scabs and scratch his arms often” (R.p. 733); “has not taken a shower in over 10 years . . . water makes him very anxious” (R.p. 734); “negative thoughts about self/life” (R.p. 407); “did have slight smell, reported has not showered in years” (R.p. 412); “to date has issues with water” (R. 499); “Self-Care: limited coping skills for self-care” (R.p. 499); “eats only one meal a day, whatever is around lots of junk food” (R.p. 504); “has had major paniC. A.nxiety issues, avoidance of water and multiple heath/nutritional issues” (R.p. 505); “still presenting with several traumatic symptoms and having a hard time moving taking care of some basic needs . . . he presents with a lack of self-direction towards improving his basic needs” (R.p. 498); reports medication not working . . . the meds I am on are suppose[d] to be helping with my mood . . . well I get hostile and still my moods are continuously elevated” (R.p. 709); “has been smoking a pack a day with more as he feels more stressed.” (R.p. 711).
As shown above, the ALJ based his decision on whether Lawton met a Listing exclusively on what various medical sources opined as to each part B criteria. There was no meaningful discussion by the ALJ during his part B criteria evaluation of any of the symptom evidence Lawton highlights in his brief. See Cook v. Heckler, 783 F.2d 1168, 1173 (4th Cir. 1986) (stating that without identifying the relevant listings and comparing the claimant's symptoms to the listing criteria, “it is simply impossible to tell whether there was substantial evidence to support the determination”). Moreover, there is little to no discussion of the medical source opinions upon which the ALJ relied in making his determination. Indeed, on the whole, the ALJ simply lists the conclusions from various medical sources in the record and then makes a conclusion himself. See Thomas v. Berryhill, 916 F.3d 307, 311 (4th Cir. 2019) (“[O]ur precedent makes clear that meaningful review is frustrated when an ALJ goes straight from listing evidence to stating a conclusion.”). The ALJ must build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusions; however, that bridge cannot exist if the evidence is not even mentioned in the first place. See Radford, 734 F.3d at 295 (“A full explanation by the ALJ is particularly important in this case because Radford's medical record includes a fair amount of evidence supportive of his claim; indeed, there are five years of medical examinations, and there is probative evidence strongly suggesting that Radford meets or equals Listing 1.04A.” (internal citation omitted)); Snelgrove v. Colvin, No. 814CV04440JMCJDA, 2015 WL 13229265, at *10 (D.S.C. Nov. 18, 2015) (remanding where the Court was unable to determine whether substantial evidence supported the ALJ's analysis at Step Three where the ALJ's analysis was conclusory and did not sufficiently explain how the claimant failed to meet a Listing), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Snelgrove v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 8:14-CV-04440-JMC, 2015 WL 13228056 (D.S.C. Dec. 4, 2015). For this additional reason, remand is warranted.
b. The ALJ erred in his evaluation of the part C criteria.
Lawton argues that the ALJ also erred in his analysis of the part C criteria for Listing 12.15. The Court agrees.
In order to meet the part C criteria, a claimant must show:
C. Your mental disorder in this listing category is “serious and persistent;” that is, you have a medically documented history of the existence of the disorder over a period of at least 2 years, and there is evidence of both:
1. Medical treatment, mental health therapy, psychosocial support(s), or a highly structured setting(s) that is ongoing and that diminishes the symptoms and signs of your mental disorder (see 12.00G2b); and
2. Marginal adjustment, that is, you have minimal capacity to adapt to changes in your environment or to demands that are not already part of your daily life (see 12.00G2c).20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.15.
In evaluating Lawton's impairments under the part C criteria, the ALJ found:
The undersigned has also considered whether the “paragraph C” criteria are satisfied. In this case, the evidence fails to establish the presence of the “paragraph C” criteria. There is no evidence that the claimant has a serious and persistent mental disorder, and that the claimant relies on medical treatment, mental health therapy, psychosocial supports, or a highly structured setting to diminish the signs and symptoms of the mental disorder, and that despite the diminished symptoms and signs, the claimant has achieved only marginal adjustment, as described in the listing.
Dr. Waller and Dr. Boland opined that the evidence did not establish the presence of the paragraph “C” criteria (Exhibit B3A and Exhibit B6A).R.p. 20 (emphasis in original).
As an initial matter, the ALJ's statement that there is “no evidence” tending to show any of the criteria is incorrect. Indeed, as with the ALJ's evaluation of the part B criteria, the analysis here omits consideration of evidence that tends to show Lawton satisfies the part C criteria. For example, in Seymour's medical source statement, he opined that Lawton satisfied all of the part C criteria. R.p. 698-99. Again, the ALJ cannot ignore evidence in the record and fail to reconcile it with his decision.
Moreover, Lawton's PTSD has been well documented over the course of several years, and Lawton points to evidence-which the ALJ did not consider in his analysis-that arguably satisfies the part C criteria. See ECF No. 22 at 5-10. The ALJ erred in failing to properly assess the medical findings which appear to support Lawton satisfying the part C criteria. In short, the ALJ presented a cursory analysis which frustrates this Court's review. See Lothridge v. Kijakazi, No. 5:20-2110-RMG-KDW, 2021 WL 4155664, at *11-12 (D.S.C. Aug. 25, 2021) (“Because the ALJ did not provide any specifics in her Paragraph C analysis the basis for her decision is unclear. The undersigned has no choice but to recommend remand as it is not possible, from reading the ALJ's decision, to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ's conclusions regarding Paragraphs A and C of the Listings.”), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 5:20-2110-RMG, 2021 WL 4155169 (D.S.C. Sept. 13, 2021). Accordingly, the undersigned recommends remand for this additional reason.
2. Remaining allegations of error
Because the Court has determined that the errors in ALJ's Listings evaluation warrant remand, the Court declines to further address any remaining claims of error. With respect to any remaining claims of error, the ALJ will be able to reconsider and re-evaluate the evidence in toto as part of the reconsideration. See Hancock v. Barnhart, 206 F.Supp.2d 757, 763 n.3 (W.D. Va. 2002) (noting the ALJ's prior decision has no preclusive effect, as it is vacated, and the new hearing is conducted de novo).
IV. RECOMMENDATION
It is recommended that the decision of the Commissioner be REVERSED and REMANDED pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further administrative review.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).