The court also concluded that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent because he "was fully familiar with the defective condition of the sidewalk, in view of his long period of residence in the area" and, if he "had exercised due care, he could have utilized the non-defective portion of the sidewalk, as a means of returning to his home." In this case, the plaintiff knew of the dangerous condition at the time of his fall, although he testified that the inadequate illumination of the area prevented him from seeing it. This knowledge distinguishes this case from the one where the injured party had previous knowledge of a defect but did not think of it or momentarily forgot it at the time the injuries were sustained. See Russakoff v. Stamford, 134 Conn. 450, 58 A.2d 517 (1948); Lawson v. Waterbury, 115 Conn. 716, 161 A. 667 (1932); Clark v. Torrington, 79 Conn. 42, 63 A. 657 (1906); Congdon v. Norwich, 37 Conn. 414 (1870); Angelillo v. Meriden, 16 Conn. Sup. 223 (1949), aff'd, 136 Conn. 553, 72 A.2d 654 (1950); 40 Am.Jur.2d, Highways 572. Although pedestrians are bound to make reasonable use of their senses to ascertain the condition of the ground and the area over which they are passing, the general rule is that pedestrians can assume that a municipality has performed its duty to maintain the sidewalks under its control in a reasonably safe condition for the ordinary use of pedestrians unless the contrary is evident or reasonably should have been evident.

That the plaintiff attempted to step over this stone although she knew of the condition of the sidewalk, instead of avoiding it by taking a different route, does not conclusively establish negligence upon her part, and notwithstanding these facts the question of her contributory negligence was one of fact for the court's determination. Congdon v. Norwich, 37 Conn. 414, 420; Lucy v. Norwich, 93 Conn. 545, 549, 106 A. 762; Blake v. Waterbury, 105 Conn. 482, 484, 136 A. 95; Meallady v. New London, 116 Conn. 205, 206, 164 A. 391; Lawson v. Waterbury, 115 Conn. 716, 717, 161 A. 667. Our determination that the court did not err in finding the plaintiff free from contributory negligence reduces the defendant's final claim, that its conclusion that the defect was the sole proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury was unwarranted, to the contention that this is so because of the "intervention" of the man who overtook and passed her just before her fall. Where, however, as in this case, the plaintiff's injury was the direct result of a defect in the sidewalk which naturally exposed her to danger in relation to those events naturally incident to its use, this effect cannot be accorded to the nonculpable conduct of this fellow traveler.

She testified that she had seen children slide on the walk before, but did not know it was icy that morning, and that the ice upon which she fell was covered by a slight coating of snow. Under the circumstances there was nothing to attract her attention to the danger in the situation which would require her to take special care when she stepped upon the walk. Lawson v. Waterbury, 115 Conn. 716, 161 A. 667. Whether she exercised due care was a question of fact for the jury. The court did not err in denying the defendants' motion to set the verdict aside.

See Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Halterman, 22 Ohio App. 234, 236, 237, 153 N.E. 922; Lawson v. City of Waterbury, 115 Conn. 716, 161 A. 667. The legal duty of the plaintiff was to not fail to do those things for her own safety which a reasonably prudent person, guided by those impulses which regulate the conduct of human affairs, would ordinarily do in the exercise of ordinary care.

The plaintiff, in walking along the sidewalk, was not bound to keep her eyes continually upon it, but was required to exercise such watchfulness as persons of ordinary prudence would observe. See Lawson v. Waterbury, 115 Conn. 716, 718, 161 A. 667 (1932). The court finds that the plaintiff did not prove that she did so. The differential in elevations between sidewalk panels was, or should have been, visible to the plaintiff given the weather conditions on that day. The court does not credit that, on approaching the defect as the plaintiff did, the difference in elevations was as imperceptible as the plaintiff claimed.

The exercise of due care did not require the plaintiff to continually keep her eyes on the sidewalk while walking, but only to exercise a degree of watchfulness that a reasonable prudent person would observe. See Lawson v. Waterbury, 115 Conn. 716, 718, 161 A. 667 (1932). Furthermore, a recent superior court decision has held that stepping aside to allow other pedestrians to pass by does not establish contributory negligence.

However, the court finds that as she walked along she was not required to continually look at the sidewalk, and that she was exercising the degree of care that persons of ordinary prudence would observe under all of the existing circumstances. See Lawson v. Waterbury, 115 Conn. 716, 718. The slab of concrete that she tripped on was raised approximately 1 3/4 inches above the slab next to it creating an unreasonable hazard for people walking along the sidewalk where the plaintiff was walking.

See "Connecticut Jury Instructions" Fourth Edition, Vol. 2, pp. 905-06, Sec. 553, Wright Ankerman. The same concept was supported by the court in Lawson v. Waterbury, 115 Conn. 716, 718 (1932) where it indicated that the plaintiff in walking along a sidewalk was not bound to keep his eyes continually upon it, but only exercise such watchfulness as persons of ordinary prudence would observe. Neither Connecticut law, nor common sense, damns a plaintiff for not looking constantly at the ground while she walks forward.

On the other hand if the jury found on any permissible theory, that plaintiff had the right of way to pass safely through the intersection or on the cross-walk adjoining it, ahead of defendant's car; that she looked to the west at a time when, had she sufficiently concentrated her attention she could have seen defendant's car in time to have halted and avoided the collision but did not see it or perceive the likelihood of its presence because she was conversing with her companion or her attention otherwise distracted — even then, while an exceedingly close question would be presented, it is doubtful if such momentary inadvertence on plaintiff's part would be negligence as a matter of law. Lawson vs. Waterbury, 115 Conn. 716, 718. The vigilance which plaintiff was required to exercise to acquit herself of contributory negligence was, of course, to be measured in degree by the conditions surrounding her and under which she acted.