Opinion
FSTCV156024387S
04-06-2016
Kristina Lawson v. Stamford Board of Education et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS (#104)
Hon. Charles T. Lee, J.
Before the court is the defendants' motion to dismiss counts one through five of the plaintiff's complaint on the grounds that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff failed to exhaust the available administrative remedies for the contract and tort claims and because her claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996) is not ripe for adjudication. For reasons set forth more fully below, the court grants the defendants' motion as to all five counts.
Count six was withdrawn by the plaintiff. Although the defendants initially moved to dismiss count seven, which alleged a claim under General Statutes § 31-51q, that motion is no longer before the court. The defendants first asked the court to view that motion as a motion to strike and then, based on the Supreme Court's recent decision in Trusz v. UBS Realty Investors, LLC, 319 Conn. 175, 123 A.3d 1212 (2015), both parties agreed that this claim was sufficiently pleaded to withstand a motion to strike. Accordingly, count seven remains in the case.
BACKGROUND
This claim arises out of the alleged demotion of the plaintiff, Kristina Lawson, by the defendants the Stamford Board of Education and Superintendent Winifred Hamilton, from an administrator position at Stamford public schools to a teaching position. The plaintiff alleges five claims: (1) breach of contract against all of the defendants; (2) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing against all of the defendants; (3) defamation against Hamilton; (4) tortious interference with contract against Hamilton; and (5) violation of due process, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996), against Hamilton.
The plaintiff's complaint, filed on January 20, 2015, alleges the following facts: The plaintiff was hired in July 2010 by the Stamford public school system as the Director of English Language Learner (ELL) and World Language Programs. At all relevant times, Winifred Hamilton was the Superintendent of Schools charged with the responsibility of managing the schools. At all relevant times, the plaintiff was a member of the Stamford Administrators Unit (SAU) of the teachers union and was bound by the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the union and the schools. Article XVI (B) of the plaintiff's SAU contract provides, in pertinent part, that " [n]o [a]dministrator shall be disciplined by being reduced in rank or compensation or deprived of any professional advantage except for cause." The CBA, which the plaintiff signed each year of her employment, provided a three step administrative process to resolve employee grievances.
Under the Equal Educational Opportunities Act (EEOA), 20 U.S.C. § 1703 et seq. (1974), all children enrolled in public school are entitled to equal educational opportunities, without regard to race, color, or national origin. In connection with this goal, the Stamford public schools receive federal grant money to improve educational opportunities for students who are not proficient in English. The plaintiff's responsibilities included managing the ELL programs and monitoring Stamford's compliance with the EEOA requirements. The plaintiff allegedly observed that the number of students eligible for ELL programs was inflated, which allowed the school district to receive more grant money. Based on this observation and additional discrepancies, the plaintiff allegedly refused to certify the district's compliance with the EEOA requirements to the state and federal departments of education.
The plaintiff then allegedly began to work to correct these discrepancies. However, the plaintiff alleges that she was reprimanded by her immediate supervisor and her efforts were never adopted. The plaintiff alleges that her attempts to report these problems were met with hostility, particularly from Hamilton. In June 2011, Hamilton allegedly reduced the plaintiff's responsibilities. In July 2012, the plaintiff alleges that her role was further reduced to a cluster of four schools. In September 2012, the plaintiff alleges that she received reprimands based on false or misdirected accusations. In November 2012, the district received a formal notice of violation of the EEOA from the Department of Justice. Hamilton allegedly blamed the plaintiff for the problems cited in the violation. In January 2013, Hamilton restructured the administration and eliminated the plaintiff's position through the reduction in force procedure in the CBA.
After the plaintiff's position was eliminated, she spoke to her union representative about challenging the position elimination. The plaintiff alleges that the union representative told her that she could not challenge a reduction in force through the administrative grievance process. In June 2013, the plaintiff was demoted to a teaching position at Stamford High School. The plaintiff alleges that this demotion violated her union contract and included a $40,000 reduction in the plaintiff's annual compensation. It is undisputed that the plaintiff did not file a grievance under the administrative grievance procedure concerning any of her claims.
Based on the aforementioned factual allegations, the plaintiff filed a complaint alleging two causes of action sounding in contract, two causes of action in tort, and one claim for violation of due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On April 1, 2015, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and a memorandum in support. The defendants attached to their memorandum the plaintiff's CBA for each year of her employment. On July 2, 2015, the plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition and an attached affidavit from Lawson. The court heard oral argument on September 8, 2015. The court ordered additional briefing on December 2, 2015. The plaintiff filed her supplemental brief on December 7, 2015. The defendants filed their reply on December 9, 2015.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
The defendants move to dismiss counts one through five of the plaintiff's complaint on the ground that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claims. The defendants contend that the grievance procedure was the exclusive remedy available to the plaintiff for resolving the contract and tort claims. Therefore, by not following the grievance procedure, the plaintiff has not exhausted her administrative remedies and the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over her contract or tort claims. Further, the defendants argue that the plaintiff's due process rights were not violated because the plaintiff failed to follow the grievance procedures in the CBA and because a demotion in position does not implicate a constitutionally protected property right.
In her memorandum in opposition, the plaintiff concedes that the two contract claims are covered by her SAU agreement, which normally would require her to exhaust the available administrative remedy, however, filing a grievance would have been futile because the defendants, who would have served as the decision makers at the plaintiff's grievance hearings, were biased against her and had been given false information by Hamilton. Therefore, the plaintiff is permitted to seek direct judicial adjudication of her claims. The plaintiff argues that the two tort claims are not covered by the SAU agreement and the plaintiff can seek direct judicial adjudication. The plaintiff reiterated that it would have been futile to grieve the tort claims due to the defendants' bias. Finally, the plaintiff argues that she has a constitutionally protected property right to continued employment in the same position and that, by mischaracterizing the plaintiff's demotion as a reduction in force, Hamilton deprived the plaintiff of an opportunity to contest the demotion, which violated her due process rights. The plaintiff acknowledges that she is not challenging the adequacy or constitutionally of the grievance procedure. Nevertheless, the plaintiff argues that it would have been futile to exhaust her administrative remedies as to her due process claim because the board was biased and misled through false information.
DISCUSSION
" A motion to dismiss shall be used to assert: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person; (3) insufficiency of process; and (4) insufficiency of service of process. Practice Book § 10-30. " The motion to dismiss . . . admits all facts which are well pleaded, invokes the existing record and must be decided upon that alone . . . Where . . . the motion is accompanied by supporting affidavits containing undisputed facts, the court may look to their content for determination of the jurisdictional issue and need not conclusively presume the validity of the allegations of the complaint." (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ferreira v. Pringle, 255 Conn. 330, 346-47, 766 A.2d 400 (2001).
" Under our exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine, a trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an action that seeks a remedy that could be provided through an administrative proceeding, unless and until that remedy has been sought in the administrative forum . . . In the absence of exhaustion of that remedy, the action must be dismissed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Levine v. Sterling, 300 Conn. 521, 528, 16 A.3d 664 (2011). " Because the exhaustion [of administrative remedies] doctrine implicates subject matter jurisdiction, [the court] must decide as a threshold matter whether that doctrine requires dismissal of the [plaintiff's] claim." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
" [J]usticiability comprises several related doctrines, namely, standing, ripeness, mootness and, the political question doctrine, that implicate a court's subject matter jurisdiction and its competency to adjudicate a particular matter . . . A case that is nonjusticiable must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Janulawicz v. Commissioner of Correction, 310 Conn. 265, 270, 77 A.3d 113 (2013).
1. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
" [T]he [exhaustion doctrine] is applied in a number of different situations . . . including when an exclusive grievance or arbitration procedure is contained in a collective bargaining agreement . . . In the collective bargaining context, [our Supreme Court has] stated that, [t]he purpose of the exhaustion requirement is to encourage the use of grievance procedures, rather than the courts, for settling disputes. A contrary rule which would permit an individual employee to completely sidestep available grievance procedures in favor of a lawsuit has little to commend it." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Garcia v. Hartford, 292 Conn. 334. 339-40, 972 A.2d 706 (2009). " It is well established that [u]nions and their employers have broad contractual authority to provide administrative remedies for disputes arising out of the employment relationship." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 340. If " the plaintiff was entitled to enforce the terms of the agreement under the grievance procedure, the court . . . correctly dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction for failure to pursue that remedy." Id., 341.
2. Futility of Administrative Remedies
" The [exhaustion] doctrine is . . . subject to numerous exceptions . . . [W]e have recognized such exceptions only infrequently and only for narrowly defined purposes . . . such as when recourse to the administrative remedy would be futile or inadequate." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Stepney, LLC v. Fairfield, 263 Conn. 558, 565, 821 A.2d 725 (2003). " It is futile to seek a remedy only when such action could not result in a favorable decision and invariably would result in further judicial proceedings." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sobczak v. Board of Education, 88 Conn.App. 99, 107, 868 A.2d 112 (2005). " Moreover, [f]utility is more than a mere allegation that the administrative agency might not grant the relief requested. In most instances, [the Supreme Court has] held that the failure to exhaust an administrative remedy is permissible only when the administrative remedy would be useless." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Johnson v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 248 Conn. 87, 104, 726 A.2d 1154 (1999).
" The mere possibility, or even likelihood, of an adverse decision does not render a remedy futile." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sobczak v. Board of Education, supra, 88 Conn.App. 107. " It is not the plaintiff's preference for a particular remedy that determines whether the remedy . . . is adequate . . . and an administrative remedy, in order to be adequate, need not comport with the plaintiffs' opinion of what a perfect remedy would be." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hunt v. Prior, 236 Conn. 421, 434, 673 A.2d 514 (1996).
In Cahill v. Board of Education, 198 Conn. 229, 502 A.2d 410 (1985), the plaintiff failed to grieve an alleged violation of General Statutes § 10-151, which provides a statutory procedure terminating a tenured teacher, and alleged that it would have been futile to do so because the defendant board of education was biased against the plaintiff. The Supreme Court held that, " [the defendant's bias], nevertheless, does not constitute a valid reason for bypassing the statutory procedure available and the protections offered therein to the teacher involved. The place to make the claim of bias and to make a record on the claim of bias was before the defendant board. The plaintiff cannot be allowed to bypass that board and seek relief in court in the first instance. By not appearing before the board, the plaintiff not only deprived the defendant board of the opportunity to hear, analyze and review a matter within its responsibility and expertise, but also deprived herself of the opportunity to put on her case and to make a proper record on which to seek judicial relief in the event she was terminated." Cahill, supra, 241-42 (1985).
Conversely, the Supreme Court found that exhausting administrative remedies was futile when the defendant board of education refused to hold an administrative hearing on the plaintiff's claims. LaCroix v. Board of Education, 199 Conn. 70, 505 A.2d 1233 (1986). The Supreme Court held that " [The plaintiff] . . . did not deliberately decide to bypass the statutory appeal route, and the defendant board's unwillingness to provide the hearing within the statutory period was a significant contributing factor in the plaintiff's failure to pursue a direct appeal . . . The defendant's total default relieved the plaintiff of the obligation to pursue further administrative steps, and permitted the plaintiff to invoke judicial remedies . . ." Id., 81
In determining whether a claim based in contract law must be grieved through the administrative process, the Appellate Court stated that " [c]ollective bargaining agreement procedures are the exclusive remedy unless the parties expressly agree otherwise . . . [W]here nothing is said in the collective bargaining agreement about exclusivity, the agreement is considered to be the exclusive remedy." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) D'Agostino v. Housing Authority, 95 Conn.App. 834, 840, 898 A.2d 228 (2006).
" [I]n construing contracts, we give effect to all the language included therein, as the law of contract interpretation . . . militates against interpreting a contract in a way that renders a provision superfluous . . . Therefore, [w]hen interpreting a contract, we must look at the contract as a whole, consider all relevant portions together and, if possible, give operative effect to every provision in order to reach a reasonable overall result." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Afkari-Ahmadi v. Fotovat-Ahmadi, 294 Conn. 384, 391, 985 A.2d 319 (2009). " Where . . . there is clear and definitive contract language, the scope and meaning of that language is not a question of fact but a question of law . . . [W]e interpret contract language in accordance with a fair and reasonable construction of the written words and . . . the language used must be accorded its common, natural, and ordinary meaning and usage where it can be sensibly applied to the subject matter of the contract. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santana v. Hartford, 94 Conn.App. 445, 463-64, 894 A.2d 307 (2006).
3. Application of Grievance Procedure to Tort Claims
" In determining whether a tort claim is subject to the grievance procedures of a collective bargaining agreement, the critical inquiry, therefore, is whether the tortious conduct is encompassed by the terms of the agreement." Sobczak v. Board of Education, supra, 88 Conn.App. 109. In Sobczak, the plaintiff alleged negligent infliction of emotional distress resulting from a hostile work environment. Id., 108. The CBA defined a grievance as " a violation of a specific term or terms of this Agreement or a problem incident to job descriptions, classifications, duties, and working conditions to the detriment of an employee . . ." Id., 109. The Appellate Court held that the conclusion that " a hostile work environment is a problem incident to working conditions cannot be debated. We accordingly conclude that the plaintiff's claim was subject to the grievance procedure set forth in the agreement. Because he failed to exhaust the available grievance procedure, his claim must fail." Id.
Similarly, in Peluso v. Greenwich, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford, Docket No. CV-11-6021270-S, (December 14, 2012, Adams, J.), the court held that administrative remedies must be exhausted for a common law tort claim when the CBA broadly covered, " any matter affecting [an employee's] health or other safety . . ." The court held that this broad language covered the plaintiff's claim for defamation and the plaintiff was obligated to exhaust their administrative remedies. Id. See also Nichols v. Bridgeport, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-02-0394052, (July 7, 2008, Arnold, J.) (finding that a CBA encompassed tort claims where the agreement required administrative remedies for " [a]ny grievance or dispute that may arise between the parties concerning the application, meaning or interpretation of this Agreement . . .").
4. Ripeness and the Necessity of Exhausting Administrative Remedies for Due Process Claim
" [T]he due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions require that one subject to significant deprivation of liberty or property must be accorded adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard . . . We note, however, that [d]ue process, unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances . . . [D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands . . . Accordingly, resolution of the issue whether the [grievance] procedures provided here are constitutionally sufficient requires analysis of the governmental and private interests that are affected." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Tedesco v. Stamford, 222 Conn. 233, 242, 610 A.2d 574 (1992). " Our Supreme Court has stated that [i]t is undisputed that the [employee] had a property interest in his continued employment . . . because the collective bargaining agreement stated that he could be terminated only for just cause." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santana v. Hartford, supra, 94 Conn.App. 469.
" Exhaustion of administrative remedies . . . is not required before bringing a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Flanagan v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 54 Conn.App. 89, 733 A.2d 881 (1999). Rather, as explained by the Supreme Court, the correct jurisdictional inquiry is whether the administrative body under challenge has rendered a final decision sufficient to assure that the case is ripe for review. Williamson Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985). The Supreme Court explained,
The question whether administrative remedies must be exhausted is conceptually distinct, however, from the question whether an administrative action must be final before it is judicially reviewable . . . While the policies underlying the two concepts often overlap, the finality requirement is concerned with whether the initial decisionmaker has arrived at a definitive position on the issue that inflicts an actual, concrete injury; the exhaustion requirement generally refers to administrative and judicial procedures by which an injured party may seek review of an adverse decision and obtain a remedy if the decision is found to be unlawful or otherwise inappropriate.Id., 192-93. " Unless a court has a final decision before it, it cannot determine whether a claimant was deprived of property and whether the government conduct was arbitrary or capricious." Southview Associates, Ltd. v. Bongartz, 980 F.2d 84, 97 (1992).
ANALYSIS
There is no dispute that the plaintiff did not initiate a grievance procedure before bringing claims to the Superior Court and so has not exhausted her administrative remedies. The court will address the consequence of this in the context of the plaintiff's claims below.
A. Contract Claims
The plaintiff asserts two claims based in contract law: breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The plaintiff's CBA is silent on whether the grievance procedure is the exclusive remedy for contract claims. Following the holding in D'Agostino, supra, 95 Conn.App. 840, because the plaintiff's CBA is silent as to exclusivity, the CBA is presumed to be the exclusive remedy for contract claims arising out of the CBA. Therefore, plaintiff was obligated to exhaust this remedy unless she establishes an exception to the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine.
The plaintiff pleads that it would have been futile to attempt to exhaust her administrative remedies for the two contract claims because her demotion was mischaracterized as a reduction in force, for which there is no remedy in the CBA. Article seven of the plaintiff's CBA lays out the specific protocol for a reduction in force. Further, Article Seventeen lays out the three step grievance procedure and specifically states that " [a] grievance shall mean a complaint by an administrator that there has been a violation, misinterpretation or misapplication of any of the specific provisions of this Agreement." Since the plaintiff pleaded that the defendants misapplied the reduction in force protocols as a way to demote the plaintiff, she could have grieved the misapplication as such. The court finds that the grievance procedure available to the plaintiff was not futile purely because the plaintiff's demotion was allegedly mischaracterized as a reduction in force. To the contrary, the plaintiff had an explicit right to grieve misapplications of provisions in her CBA, and therefore, the plaintiff was obligated to exhaust the available administrative remedies before seeking judicial remedies.
The plaintiff also claims that availing herself to the grievance procedure in the CBA would have been futile because the defendants were biased against her. This contention is not supported by the case law. As stated in Sobczak, supra, 88 Conn.App. 109, even a likelihood of an adverse decision does not render an administrative remedy futile. Further, the facts of this case are similar to Cahill, supra, 198 Conn. 229, in that the defendants' bias against the plaintiff did not render the available administrative remedies futile. Nor do the facts of this case meet the threshold set by LaCroix, supra, 199 Conn. 81, where the court held that administrative remedies were futile when the defendant refused to hold a hearing. Here, there is no indication that the plaintiff sought to initiate the grievance process and was ignored or refused. Accordingly, the remedies available to the plaintiff were not futile due to the defendants' bias.
Additionally, the plaintiff claims that her tort claims meet the futility exception because members of her union leadership and the interim Director of Human Resources for the Board of Education (Director) told the plaintiff that she could not raise her grievances through the administrative process. In support of this contention, the plaintiff's affidavit states that the Director told her that her position was eliminated under the reduction in force provision of the CBA. The affidavit does not allege that the Director told the plaintiff that she could not file a grievance or that she had no recourse for this demotion. Further, even if the plaintiff's union representatives told the plaintiff that she had no recourse, the grievance procedure set forth in the plaintiff's CBA states that any administrator may file a written grievance and submit it to the superintendent, regardless of union support or representation. This is similar to the facts of Sobczak, supra, 88 Conn.App. 107, where the plaintiff's union refused to represent the plaintiff in the administrative procedure. In that case, the court held that the plaintiff's claims did not meet the threshold for futility because the plaintiff " was expressly permitted to initiate a grievance either on his own or with the assistance of a representative other than the union" Similarly, in this case the plaintiff was permitted to initiate a grievance without the assistance of her union. Therefore, her claims do not meet the futility exception. The court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's contract claims because she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies.
B. Tort Claims
The plaintiff asserts two tort claims: defamation and tortious interference with contract. The plaintiff pleads that she was not obligated to exhaust the administrative remedies for the two tort claims because the CBA does not control tort claims. Conversely, the defendants argue that the language of the " Purpose" section of the grievance procedure in the CBA does relate to tort claims. That section states " [t]he purpose of this procedure is to secure at the lowest possible administrative level, equitable solutions to problems which may arise affecting the welfare or working conditions of administrators . . ." The plaintiff argues that this section is a policy statement and is not binding. The court finds that, following Afkari-Ahmadi, supra, 294 Conn. 391, all language of a contract must be given effect. The court will not interpret the contract in a way that renders a provision superfluous. Therefore, the court finds that the " Purpose" section of Article seventeen is a binding provision of the CBA.
Next, the court must determine whether the language in the " Purpose" section of the CBA encompasses tort claims. The Appellate Court held in Sobczak, supra, 88 Conn.App. 105, that a CBA that covered " problems incident to job descriptions, classifications, duties, and working conditions . . ." encompassed tort claims that arose from the work environment. Similarly, in Peluso, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-11-6021270-S, the court held that language stating that " any matter affecting an employee's health or safety . . ." encompassed common law tort claims, including defamation. This court similarly finds that the broad language in the plaintiff's CBA stating that the purpose of the grievance procedure is to address problems affecting the " welfare or working conditions" of employees covers the plaintiff's tort claims. The plaintiff's claims for defamation and tortious interference with contract certainly affect her welfare and working conditions. Therefore, the court finds that the plaintiff's tort claims were covered by the CBA and were subject to the grievance procedure.
The plaintiff pleads, in the alternative, that her tort claims meet the futility exception to the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine and she was entitled to direct judicial adjudication of her claims. This argument fails for the same reasons that futility does not apply to the plaintiff's contract claims. The claims that the defendants were biased against the plaintiff, that the defendants were misinformed about the plaintiff's demotion, or that the plaintiff's union leadership misled or discouraged her do not meet the threshold required for establishing futility. The court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's tort claims because the plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies.
C. Due Process Claim
Finally, the court addresses the plaintiff's violation of due process claim. The plaintiff does not contend that the administrative remedies procedure was unconstitutional. Instead, the plaintiff pleads that her administrative remedies were futile because Hamilton supplied false information to the board of education and mischaracterized her demotion as a reduction in force, making it impossible for the plaintiff to obtain a fair hearing. Here, the appropriate jurisdictional question is one of ripeness. The plaintiff did not invoke the administrative remedies and the defendant board of education was unable to render a final decision. Without a final decision, the court cannot determine whether the plaintiff was deprived of property or whether the defendants' conduct was arbitrary or capricious in violation of due process. Accordingly, the plaintiff's claim for a violation of due process is not ripe for adjudication and is nonjusticable. The plaintiff's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is dismissed for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The court notes that the parties have cited contradicting case law on the issue of whether an individual has a constitutionally protected property right to continued employment in the same position. The court does not reach this issue in deciding the defendants' motion because the plaintiff's due process claim is not ripe and cannot be adjudicated.
CONCLUSION
By reason of the forgoing, the defendants' motion to dismiss counts one through five of the complaint is GRANTED. The seventh count, alleging a claim under General Statutes § 31-51q, remains in the case.