Opinion
2d Civil Nos B321703 B322956 B323407
01-29-2024
LARRY LAWSON et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. SHADOW HILLS SINGLE FAMILY LOTS OWNERS' ASSOCIATION et al., Defendants and Respondents.
Callahan &Blaine, Peter S. Bauman and James M. Sabovich for Plaintiffs and Appellants. HPS Associates, Arthur R. Petrie, II and Dan E. Heck for Defendants and Respondents Shadow Hills Single Family Lots Owners' Association and Shadow Hills of Santa Barbara Master Association. Rimon, Craig S. Granet and Claire K. Mitchell for Defendants and Respondents George R. Guffey and Mary Ellen Guffey.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara Super. Ct. No. 19CV00454, Thomas P. Anderle, Judge.
Callahan &Blaine, Peter S. Bauman and James M. Sabovich for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
HPS Associates, Arthur R. Petrie, II and Dan E. Heck for Defendants and Respondents Shadow Hills Single Family Lots Owners' Association and Shadow Hills of Santa Barbara Master Association.
Rimon, Craig S. Granet and Claire K. Mitchell for Defendants and Respondents George R. Guffey and Mary Ellen Guffey.
BALTODANO, J.
Nancy and Larry Lawson and Melinda and John Coggi (collectively, Appellants) sued the Shadow Hills of Santa Barbara Master Association (MA), the Shadow Hills Single Family Lots Owners' Association (SFLOA) (collectively with the MA, the HOA), and George and Mary Ellen Guffey (collectively with the HOA, Respondents) for various causes of action based on alleged wrongs committed in their housing development. The trial court found in favor of Respondents on all causes of action after a bench trial. Appellants contend the court: (1) deprived them of their right to a jury trial, and (2) erroneously awarded Respondents attorney fees. We affirm the judgment in part, reverse in part, and vacate the attorney fee awards.
George Guffey passed away during the pendency of this appeal.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Shadow Hills is a housing development in Santa Barbara for residents 55 years of age and older. Appellants are owners of single-family homes in the development. So are the Guffeys. All three couples are members of both the MA and the SFLOA.
The MA is governed by equitable servitudes entitled "Amended Master Declaration of Covenants, Conditions[,] and Restrictions of Shadow Hills of Santa Barbara." The SFLOA's equitable servitudes are entitled "Amended Declaration of Covenants, Conditions[,] and Restrictions for Shadow Hills Single Family Lots." The SFLOA and MA have also adopted "Revised Shadow Hills Rules and Policies - 2014" and the "2018 Shadow Hills Rules and Regulations." Together, these governing documents provide that landscaping and irrigation services will be provided by the HOA. These servitudes "run with the land" and are binding on anyone who acquires a Shadow Hills property. A breach of their provisions "give[s] rise to a cause of action in favor of the [MA] and any aggrieved owner for the recovery of damages."
After years of disputes over landscaping, irrigation, and related land uses, Appellants sued the HOA and the Guffeys. They alleged that the HOA has not provided them with the same landscaping and irrigation services provided to other Shadow Hills owners. They also alleged that the Guffeys have "encroached on a significant portion of the HOA's common area" at the expense of them and other owners.
Appellants alleged five causes of action against the HOA: (1) breach of equitable servitudes, for failing to provide the landscaping and irrigation services required by the governing documents and failing to properly maintain the common area; (2) negligence, for failing to exercise reasonable care when providing landscaping and irrigation services; (3) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, for failing to provide those services; (4) breach of fiduciary duty, for the same; and (8) violation of the Common Interest Development Open Meeting Act (Civ. Code, § 4900 et seq.), for taking actions at times other than during noticed board meetings. They alleged three causes of action against both the HOA and the Guffeys: (5) nuisance, for failing to provide required services and for the Guffeys' alleged encroachment on common area lands; (7) quiet title, to confirm their superior interest in the common area encroached on by the Guffeys; and (9) declaratory relief, to declare each parties' rights under the governing documents. Appellants alleged one cause of action, (6) trespass, against the Guffeys alone for their encroachment. They sought monetary damages, statutory penalties, declaratory and injunctive relief, and attorney fees.
We adopt the designations of the causes of action as listed in the second amended complaint.
Appellants repeatedly referenced their demand for a jury trial in their pretrial pleadings. Appellants and the HOA posted jury fees, while Appellants and the Guffeys filed proposed jury instructions. The trial court similarly indicated the matter would be tried by a jury. But at trial call, the court said the dispute was "essentially one in equity and the relief sought depends upon the application of equitable doctrines." It tried all causes of action in a bench trial and found in favor of Respondents. It then awarded the HOA $800,000 in attorney fees, and the Guffeys $500,000.
DISCUSSION
Right to a jury trial
Appellants contend the trial court erred when it denied their request for a jury trial. We independently review this contention. (Caira v. Offner (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 12, 23 (Caira).) And as explained below, we conclude Appellants' second amended complaint presents "a 'mixed bag' of equitable and legal claims." (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1238 (Nwosu).)
The California Constitution guarantees the right to a jury trial. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 16.)" '[T]he right so guaranteed, however, is the right as it existed at common law in 1850, when the Constitution was first adopted.'" (Caira, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 23.)" 'As a general proposition, "[t]he jury trial is a matter of right in a civil action at law, but not in equity." '" (Ibid.) Accordingly," '" '[i]f the action has to deal with ordinary common-law rights cognizable in courts of law, it is to that extent an action at law.'" '" (Ibid.)
" '" 'In determining whether the action was one triable by a jury at common law, the [trial] court is not bound by the form of the action but rather by the nature of the rights involved and the facts of the particular case-the gist of the action.'" '" (Caira, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at pp. 23-24.)" '" 'A jury trial must be granted where the gist of the action is legal, where the action is in reality cognizable at law." '" (Id. at p. 24.)" 'On the other hand, if the action is essentially one in equity and the relief sought "depends upon the application of equitable doctrines," the parties are not entitled to a jury trial.'" (Ibid.) But the relief sought "is not necessarily determinative." (Ibid.)"' "The fact that damages is one of a full range of possible remedies does not guarantee the right to a jury." '" (Ibid., alterations omitted.)
Here, the trial court correctly concluded that the seventh, eighth, and ninth causes of action-quiet title, Open Meetings Act violation, and declaratory relief-set forth equitable claims. Quiet title and declaratory relief are equitable proceedings that generally do not entitle plaintiffs to jury trials. (Caira, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at pp. 24-25.) Appellants do not seriously argue otherwise with respect to their quiet title cause of action. They argue they are entitled to a jury trial on their declaratory relief cause of action because it involves "pure issues of fact" (see Entin v. Superior Court (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 770, 788), but seek a "judicial declaration of the rights, duties, and obligations of all parties under the [g]overning [d]ocuments." That is an issue to be decided by the court. (Ibid.) For the HOA's alleged violation of the Open Meeting Act, Appellants seek an injunction-a form of equitable relief that does not entitle them to a jury trial. (Connerly v. Schwarzenegger (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 739, 748.) Their request for incidental statutory penalties does not change that. (Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 846-847.)
But the trial court erred when it concluded that the first six causes of action are equitable claims. These causes of action- breach of equitable servitudes, negligence, breach of the implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duty, nuisance, and trespass-are based on alleged breaches of the governing documents. By their terms, the covenants set forth in these documents "run with the land." Covenants that run with the land-i.e., those, like the provision of landscaping and irrigation services, that benefit a property (see Civ. Code, § 1462)-date back to sixteenth century common law (Citizens for Covenant Compliance v. Anderson (1995) 12 Cal.4th 345, 353), well before the jury trial right was enshrined in the Constitution. And they "may be enforced by proceedings in equity or law." (Chee v. Amanda Goldt Property Management (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1380, second italics added.)
Additionally, the governing documents provide that breaches of their terms permit actions for damages, which Appellants sought for all six causes of action. Actions for damages are generally legal in nature. (Raedeke v. Gibraltar Sav. &Loan Assn. (1974) 10 Cal.3d 665, 671-672; see also Rau, Covenants Running with the Land: Viable Doctrine or Common-Law Relic? (1978) 7 Hofstra L.Rev. 139, 177 [historically, "the remedy for breach of an affirmative covenant was damages, obtained in a court of law"].) We therefore conclude that Appellants were entitled to a jury trial on the first six causes of action, at least with respect to the issue of damages to remedy any past breach. (Pacific Western Oil Co. v. Bern Oil Co. (1939) 13 Cal.2d 60, 68-69.)
Given our conclusion, we do not resolve Appellants' contentions regarding Respondents' invocation of the business judgment rule based on Lamden v. La Jolla Shores Clubdominium Homeowners Assn. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 249.
The erroneous denial of the right to a jury trial is reversible per se. (Valley Crest Landscape Development, Inc. v. Mission Pools of Escondido, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 468, 493.) But where a complaint "consist[s] of a 'mixed bag' of equitable and legal claims, the equitable claims are properly tried first by the [trial] court." (Nwosu, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 1238.) Because Appellants here were not entitled to a jury trial on their seventh, eighth, and ninth causes of action, the court essentially tried those equitable claims first. Remanding for a jury trial on the first six causes of action is therefore proper. (Ibid.) We leave it to the court below to decide in the first instance whether its decision on the seventh, eighth, and ninth causes of action obviates the need for a jury trial on any of the remaining causes of action. (See id. at pp. 1238-1241.)
Attorney fees
Appellants contend the trial court erroneously awarded attorney fees to Respondents. "An order awarding attorney fees' "falls with a reversal of the judgment on which it is based." '" (Gunther v. Alaska Airlines, Inc. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 334, 358.) Because we reverse the judgment on the first six causes of action, we vacate the attorney fee awards. The court below may reconsider the attorney fee awards after any trial that occurs on remand. (Id. at pp. 358-359.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed as to the first six causes of action in Appellants' second amended complaint, and the trial court's attorney fee awards are vacated. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
We concur: YEGAN, Acting P. J., CODY, J.