Opinion
NO. 2017 CA 1602
07-10-2018
BETHANY LAURA LAWSON v. JEREMY ELLIOTT LAWSON
Sherman Q. Mack Albany, Louisiana Counsel for Defendant/Appellant Jeremy Lawson Leslie A. Burns Denham Springs, Louisiana Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee Bethany Laura Lawson
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION Appealed from the 21st Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of Livingston State of Louisiana
Case No. 145420
The Honorable Jeffery T. Oglesbee, Judge Presiding
Sherman Q. Mack
Albany, Louisiana Counsel for Defendant/Appellant
Jeremy Lawson Leslie A. Burns
Denham Springs, Louisiana Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee
Bethany Laura Lawson BEFORE: McCLENDON, WELCH, AND THERIOT, JJ. THERIOT, J.
Jeremy Elliot Lawson appeals the July 28, 2017 judgment of the Twenty-First Judicial Court granting Bethany Laura Lawson's exception of no cause of action. For the following reasons, we maintain the appeal, vacate the trial court's March 15, 2017 order granting Mr. Lawson's motion for new trial, and vacate the July 28, 2017 judgment.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Mr. and Mrs. Lawson were married on October 23, 2004. Mrs. Lawson filed for divorce on January 15, 2013. On March 12, 2013, the trial court signed an interim order granting Mrs. Lawson exclusive use and occupancy of the former matrimonial domicile and its contents until the community property issues were settled via agreement, partition, or court order. On April 5, 2013, Mr. Lawson filed an answer and reconventional demand in which he stated the following:
This document is titled "Answer to Reconventional Demand," but contains Mr. Lawson's answer to Mrs. Lawson's petition for divorce and Mr. Lawson's reconventional demand.
Plaintiff-in-reconvention respectfully requests that should this Honorable Court award defendant-in-reconvention, Bethany Laura Lawson, exclusive use of the former matrimonial domicile, a community asset, that she be cast in judgment awarding him a sum of money representing the fair market rental value of this asset.
The divorce was finalized on March 18, 2014. On June 9, 2014, Mrs. Lawson filed a petition for partition of community property. On November 10, 2015, Mrs. Lawson filed a peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action, arguing that Mr. Lawson had no right to rental reimbursement because he had not requested fair market rental value at the time of the interim order, nor did he raise the issue during any of the hearings that occurred after the interim order was made.
On March 2, 2017, following a community property trial, the trial court rendered judgment on all community property issues. The trial court ordered the parties to sell the former matrimonial home and to equally divide the proceeds. Further, the trial court denied the separate property claims of Mr. Lawson, which included his claim for the rental value of the former matrimonial domicile. The judgment did not address Mrs. Lawson's exception of no cause of action as to the rental reimbursement claims.
There is an inconsistency in the record regarding the date of this judgment. The judgment is dated March 2, 2016, but other documents in the record indicate that it was actually signed on March 2, 2017.
On March 9, 2017, Mr. Lawson filed a motion for new trial. The trial court granted the motion for new trial on March 15, 2017, but only as to the issue of the claim for fair market rental reimbursement which was allegedly not addressed in the March 2, 2017 judgment. On July 28, 2017, the trial court signed its judgment, sustaining Mrs. Lawson's exception of no cause of action and dismissing Mr. Lawson's rental reimbursement claim with prejudice. This appeal followed.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Appellant assigns the following as error:
(1) Was the trial court clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous in dismissing the Defendant-Appellant's claim for fair market rental reimbursement regarding the Plaintiff's exclusive use and occupancy of the former matrimonial domicile?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing a trial court's ruling sustaining an exception raising the objection of no cause of action, the appellate court conducts a de novo review. Calloway v. Lobrano, 2016-1170 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/12/17); 218 So.3d 644, 648. The exception raises a question of law, and the trial court's decision is based only on the sufficiency of the petition. Id. Simply stated, a petition should not be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of any claim that would entitle him to relief. Id. Every reasonable interpretation must be accorded the language of the petition in favor of maintaining its sufficiency and affording the plaintiff the opportunity to present evidence at trial. Id. The question, therefore, is whether, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and with every doubt resolved in his behalf, the petition states any valid cause of action for relief. Id. at 648-49.
While conducting our de novo review of this case, we discovered both legal error and factual error. A legal error occurs when a trial court applies incorrect principles of law and such errors are prejudicial. Boyd v. Boyd, 2010-1369 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/11/11); 57 So.3d 1169, 1174. Legal errors are prejudicial when they materially affect the outcome and deprive a party of substantial rights. Id.
DISCUSSION
Rule to Show Cause
As a preliminary matter, we first address whether this court has jurisdiction over Mr. Lawson's appeal. On November 21, 2017, this court issued a rule to show cause ordering the parties to show cause why the trial court's July 28, 2017 ruling was or was not a final judgment subject to appeal. This court also remanded the appeal and invited the trial court to advise in writing why the July 28, 2017 ruling did not warrant a La. Code Civ. P. art. 1915(B) designation, or in the event the ruling did warrant an article 1915(B) designation, to provide reasons for its determination that there was no just reason for delay. Following the limited remand, the trial court signed an order on December 21, 2017, clarifying its July 28, 2017 ruling by holding that the ruling constituted a final judgment, which did not require a La. Code Civ. P. art. 1915(B) designation. Following the trial court's March 2, 2017 judgment, Mr. Lawson filed a motion for new trial. The trial court granted this motion, but only as to the issue of rental reimbursement due to the trial court's failure to address Mrs. Lawson's exception of no cause of action. Judgment was subsequently rendered on that issue on July 28, 2017. Following the July 28, 2017 judgment, no issues remained in this matter,
A judgment that determines the merits in whole or in part is a final judgment. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1841. Although the July 28, 2017 judgment only pertained to the issue of rental reimbursement, that issue was the only issue before the trial court. Therefore, because the July 28, 2017 judgment decided the merits of the case, it constitutes a final judgment and is appealable. See La. Code Civ. P. arts. 1841 and 2083. Accordingly, we recall the rule to show cause order and maintain the appeal.
Assignment of Error
As stated above, we discovered both factual and legal error while conducting our de novo review. The trial court erred in finding that it had failed to render judgment on Mr. Lawson's rental reimbursement claims, and, as a result, legally erred in granting the motion for new trial. On April 2, 2015, Mr. Lawson filed a detailed descriptive list, which included his separate property claim for the rental value of the former matrimonial domicile from April 2013 due to Mrs. Lawson's exclusive use of the property. On March 2, 2017, the trial court rendered judgment pursuant to Mrs. Lawson's petition to partition the community property, stating in part:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the separate property claims of Jeremy Lawson are hereby denied (Rental value of former matrimonial domicile from April 2013 due to [Mrs. Lawson's] exclusive use; welding machine; and green cloth luggage).Additionally, the trial court's reasons for judgment state that "[t]he separate property claims of Jeremy Lawson are denied based upon the testimony and evidence presented to the court." Thus, the record indicates that the trial court had addressed Mr. Lawson's rental reimbursement claim. According to Louisiana jurisprudence, an issue is moot when a judgment or decree on that issue has been "deprived of practical significance" or "made abstract or purely academic." Tobin v. Jindal, 2011-0838 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/10/12); 91 So.3d 317, 321. Accordingly, a case is moot when a rendered judgment or decree can serve no useful purpose and give no practice relief or effect. Id. Because the March 2, 2017 judgment decided the issue raised in Mrs. Lawson's exception of no cause of action, the exception of no cause of action is moot.
However, the trial court granted Mr. Lawson's motion for new trial "for the limited purpose of addressing Mr. Lawson's claim for fair market rental reimbursement that was not addressed in the March 2, 2017 judgment." Mr. Lawson's motion for new trial was set before the trial court on April 5, 2017 and was continued to May 3, 2017. After an in-chambers status conference, the trial court set a hearing for July 19, 2017 on the issue of rental reimbursement and Mrs. Lawson's exception.
The trial court's granting of the motion for new trial was based on its belief that the March 2, 2017 judgment failed to address Mr. Lawson's claim for rental reimbursement and Mrs. Lawson's exception of no cause of action. However, the March 2, 2017 judgment clearly denies Mr. Lawson's rental reimbursement claim, thus depriving Mrs. Lawson's exception of no cause of action of practical significance and rendering that exception moot. See Tobin, 91 So.3d at 321. See also Reasonover v. Lastrapes, 2009-1104 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/11/10); 40 So.3d 303, 307 n.3 (finding that when a judgment had the same effect as granting an exception would have had, the exception was rendered moot); Ochsner v. IdeaLife Ins. Co., 2004-1067 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/8/06); 945 So.2d 128, 134, writ denied, 2006-2840 (La. 2/2/07); 948 So.2d 1082 (finding an exception of no cause of action moot when a judgment effectively answered and disposed of the question forming the basis of the exception of no cause of action). Accordingly, the trial court manifestly erred in granting the motion for new trial based on its alleged failure to address an issue that was in fact addressed. Therefore, we vacate the trial court's order granting Mr. Lawson's motion for new trial. We also vacate the July 28, 2017 judgment granting the exception of no cause of action.
DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, we maintain the appeal, vacate the trial court's March 15, 2017 order granting Jeremy Elliot Lawson's motion for new trial, and vacate the July 28, 2017 judgment. Costs of this appeal are assessed to Appellant, Jeremy Elliot Lawson.
APPEAL MAINTAINED; MARCH 15, 2017 ORDER VACATED; JULY 28, 2017 JUDGMENT VACATED. McClendon, J., concurring.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:374C provides for the award of rental payments for a spouse's occupancy of the family residence pending partition of the community. McCarroll v. McCarroll, 96-2700 (La. 10/21/97), 701 So.2d 1280, 1288. However, in McCarroll, the supreme court held that rental payments may not be retroactively assessed under LSA-R.S. 9:374C unless otherwise agreed by the spouses or ordered by the court. McCarroll, 701 So.2d at 1289. In this matter, when the use and occupancy of the former matrimonial domicile was determined, no fair market rental value was ordered by the trial court, nor was there any agreement of the parties. Accordingly, the trial court correctly denied Mr. Lawson's reimbursement claim. Therefore, I respectfully concur.