Opinion
No. 05-08-00088-CR
Opinion Filed October 14, 2008. DO NOT PUBLISH Tex. R. App. P. 47.
On Appeal from the 283rd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F06-63569-UT.
Before Justices WRIGHT, LANG-MIERS, and MAZZANT.
OPINION
William Wallace Lawrie entered a guilty plea to indecency with a child. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.11(a) (Vernon 2003). The trial court deferred adjudicating guilt, placed appellant on community supervision for five years, and assessed a $1500 fine. The State later moved to adjudicate guilt, alleging appellant violated the terms of his community supervision. After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion, adjudicated appellant guilty, and assessed punishment at five years' imprisonment. In three issues, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to prison, and the sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. We affirm the trial court's judgment. Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to prison, and the sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the United States and Texas Constitutions. See U.S. Const. Amend. VIII, XIV; Tex. Const. Art. 1, § 13. Appellant argues that because of his serious medical conditions, and the fact that his only access to the outside world is through the use of the internet on his computer, the trial court could have monitored or prohibited his computer use rather than send him to prison. The State responds that appellant did not preserve his complaints for appellate review and, alternatively, the sentence does not violate either constitution. Appellant did not complain about the sentence either at the time it was imposed or in a motion for new trial. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Castaneda v. State, 135 S.W.3d 719, 723 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.). Even constitutional rights, including the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, may be waived. Rhoades v. State, 934 S.W.2d 113, 120 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996); Castaneda, 135 S.W.3d at 723. Moreover, there is no evidence the sentence is cruel or unusual, and it is within the statutory punishment range for the offense. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.33 (Vernon 2003); Kirk v. State, 949 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1997, pet. ref'd). We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing appellant to a term in prison. We resolve appellant's three issues against him. We affirm the trial court's judgment.