Opinion
22-3203-JWL-JPO
10-28-2022
SHANE RICHARD LAWRENCE, Plaintiff, v. TRAVIS WRIGHT, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
JAMES P. O'HARA UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Shane Richard Lawrence brings this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis. Mr. Lawrence is a pretrial detainee being held at the Atchison County Jail in Atchison, Kansas, at the time of filing. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff is ordered to show cause why his Complaint should not be dismissed or stayed.
I. Nature of the Matter before the Court
The Complaint is based on Plaintiff's arrest on September 10, 2021. Plaintiff states that he was operating a motorcycle at about 5:00 p.m. when he was pulled over by the defendant, Travis Wright, a captain with the Atchison County Sheriff's Department. Plaintiff alleges that Wright exited his vehicle with his weapon drawn and asked Plaintiff his name and whether he had a driver's license. Plaintiff claims he only gave his first name and said that yes, he has a license. Wright yelled that Plaintiff should get off the motorcycle. As he was complying, Wright ran up, seized Plaintiff by the left arm, and dragged him off the motorcycle. Wright told Plaintiff to put his hands behind his back and that he was under arrest. Plaintiff claims that he did not resist, but Wright tased him on his back. Plaintiff states that Wright was wearing a body camera and recorded the arrest. As a result of being tased, Plaintiff alleges that he suffered a hernia and rectal prolapse, which required surgery, as well as vision problems and tinnitus.
Plaintiff challenges the legality of the arrest. He claims that Defendant Wright violated his Fourth Amendment rights because he did not have probable cause for the arrest and his Eighth Amendment rights by using excessive force because Plaintiff was not fleeing or being combative.
Plaintiff names Wright as the only defendant and requests relief in the form of a declaration that Wright violated his constitutional rights, $150,000 in compensatory damages, and $1,750,000 in punitive damages.
II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). “Prisoner” is defined as “any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c). Additionally, with any litigant, such as Plaintiff, who is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court has a duty to screen the complaint to determine its sufficiency. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2).
“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citations omitted); Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1523 (10th Cir. 1992). A court liberally construes a pro se complaint and applies “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In addition, the court accepts all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true. Anderson v. Blake, 469 F.3d 910, 913 (10th Cir. 2006). On the other hand, “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief,” dismissal is appropriate. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007).
A pro se litigant's “conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). “[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitlement to relief' requires “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). The complaint's “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 555, 570.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained “that, to state a claim in federal court, a complaint must explain what each defendant did to [the pro se plaintiff]; when the defendant did it; how the defendant's action harmed [the plaintiff]; and, what specific legal right the plaintiff believes the defendant violated.” Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007). The court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff's complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff's behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
The Tenth Circuit has pointed out that the Supreme Court's decisions in Twombly and Erickson gave rise to a new standard of review for § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissals. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); see also Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009). As a result, courts “look to the specific allegations in the complaint to determine whether they plausibly support a legal claim for relief.” Kay, 500 F.3d at 1218 (citation omitted). Under this new standard, “a plaintiff must ‘nudge his claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.'” Smith, 561 F.3d at 1098 (citation omitted). “Plausible” in this context does not mean “likely to be true,” but rather refers “to the scope of the allegations in a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent,” then the plaintiff has not “nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1974).
III. Discussion
An online search of the Atchison County Court dockets shows that Plaintiff has two pending criminal cases. The first is based on charges dated September 10, 2021, for theft, interference with a law enforcement officer, and driving while suspended. The case is currently set for trial on November 22, 2022. See State v. Lawrence, Case No. 2021-CR-000155 (Atchison County District Court). Therefore, it appears that Plaintiff's claims here are based on an arrest that resulted in state criminal charges and that Plaintiff's state criminal case is ongoing. As a result, the Court may be prohibited from hearing Plaintiff's claims under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971).
Docket accessed via the Kansas District Court Public Access Portal (https://prodportal.kscourts.org) (last visited October 27. 2022).
Even though the original Younger holding was applied to a claim for injunctive relief, the Tenth Circuit has expanded the doctrine to include monetary relief. D.L. v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 497, 392 F.3d 1223, 1228 (10th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he Younger doctrine extends to federal claims for monetary relief when a judgment for the plaintiff would have preclusive effects on a pending state-court proceeding.”) (citations omitted); see also Parkhurst v. State of Wyoming, 641 F.2d 775, 777 (10th Cir.1981) (claim for money damages “would necessarily call into question the validity of the state conviction” and “frustrate the spirit” of Younger). However, the Tenth Circuit has directed that damage claims subject to the doctrine should be stayed rather than dismissed. Myers v. Garff 876 F.2d 79 81 (10th
The Younger abstention doctrine is based on “notions of comity and federalism, which require that federal courts respect state functions and the independent operation of state legal systems.” Phelps v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 885, 889 (10th Cir. 1997). “The Younger doctrine requires a federal court to abstain from hearing a case where . . . (1) state judicial proceedings are ongoing; (2) [that] implicate an important state interest; and (3) the state proceedings offer an adequate opportunity to litigate federal constitutional issues.” Buck v. Myers, 244 Fed.Appx. 193, 197 (10th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (citing Winnebago Tribe of Neb. v. Stovall, 341 F.3d 1202, 1204 (10th Cir. 2003); see also Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)). “Once these three conditions are met, Younger abstention is non-discretionary and, absent extraordinary circumstances, a district court is required to abstain.” Buck, 244 Fed.Appx. at 197 (citing Crown Point I, LLC v. Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass'n, 319 F.3d 1211, 1215 (10th Cir. 2003)).
Here, it appears that the first and second conditions for Younger abstention would be met because Kansas undoubtedly has an important interest in enforcing its criminal laws through criminal proceedings in the state's courts. In re Troff, 488 F.3d 1237, 1240 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[S]tate control over criminal justice [is] a lynchpin in the unique balance of interests” described as “Our Federalism.”) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 44). Likewise, the third condition would be met because Kansas courts provide Plaintiff with an adequate forum to litigate his constitutional claims by way of pretrial proceedings, trial, and direct appeal after conviction and sentence, as well as post-conviction remedies. See Capps v. Sullivan, 13 F.3d 350, 354 n.2 (10th Cir. 1993) (“[F]ederal courts should abstain from the exercise of . . . jurisdiction if the issues raised . . . may be resolved either by trial on the merits in the state court or by other [available] state procedures.”) (quotation omitted); see Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 637 (1984) (state courts have obligation ‘to guard, enforce, and protect every right granted or secured by the constitution of the United States . . . .'”); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1974) (pendant state proceeding, in all but unusual cases, would provide federal plaintiff with necessary vehicle for vindicating constitutional rights).
Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff's Complaint is subject to dismissal or stay pending resolution of his state criminal prosecution.
IV. Response Required
For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff's Complaint is subject to dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b) and 1915(e)(2)(B). Plaintiff is therefore required to show good cause why his Complaint should not be dismissed without prejudice or stayed. Plaintiff is warned that his failure to file a timely response may result in the Complaint being dismissed or stayed for the reasons stated herein without further notice.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff is granted to and including November 28, 2022, in which to show good cause, in writing, why his Complaint should not be dismissed without prejudice or stayed for the reasons stated herein.
IT IS SO ORDERED.