Even repeated requests for contraband knowingly possessed by an individual who at first demurs do not constitute entrapment. Lawrence v. State, 227 Ga. App. 70, 73 (6) ( 487 S.E.2d 608) (1997). Here, the undercover officer garnered the desired action after only one request.
This court has previously held that possession of a controlled substance is a lesser included offense of the sale of the same controlled substance. See Lawrence v. State, 227 Ga. App. 70, 71-72 (2) ( 487 SE2d 608) (1997). We see no logical distinction between the purchase of a controlled substance and the sale of a controlled substance for purposes of charging possession as a lesser included offense.
See Nel v. State.Judgment affirmed. Johnson, P.J., and Miller, J., concur. Lawrence v. State, 227 Ga. App. 70, 72(3) ( 487 S.E.2d 608) (1997).Reviere v. State, 231 Ga. App. 329, 334(6) ( 498 S.E.2d 332) (1998).
We disagree. 227 Ga. App. 70, 71 (1) ( 487 S.E.2d 608) (1997). The evidence, although circumstantial, was sufficient for the jury to conclude that the substance possessed by McDade was indeed cocaine.
Thus, a drug sale was consummated between Palmer and the officers.Lawrence v. State, 227 Ga. App. 70, 72 (3) ( 487 S.E.2d 608) (1997); see Robinson v. State, 164 Ga. App. 652, 653-654 (1) ( 297 S.E.2d 751) (1982) (a sale of drugs is complete when the seller delivers the drugs to the feigned buyer); see also Clay v. State, 232 Ga. App. 541 (1) ( 502 S.E.2d 267) (1998). Given our holding that a sale of drugs did occur, for which the officers were authorized to arrest Palmer, we need not address Palmer's challenge to his possession conviction on the ground that the officers had no authority to arrest him.
(Punctuation omitted.) Lawrence v. State, 227 Ga. App. 70, 73 (5) ( 487 S.E.2d 608) (1997); see also Autry v. State, 210 Ga. App. 150, 151 (2) ( 435 S.E.2d 512) (1993). See Sims v. State, 197 Ga. App. 214, 216 (3) ( 398 S.E.2d 244) (1990).
We note, as the State points out, that the deal was for Turner to buy the marijuana in the reverse sting, not steal it. In any event, we find nothing in either the officers' or Turner's testimony which warranted a jury charge on entrapment. It is never error for the trial judge to refuse to charge on entrapment when the evidence fails to create a legal issue of entrapment.Lawrence v. State, 227 Ga. App. 70, 73 ( 487 S.E.2d 608) (1997). 4. Next, Tew claims the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a black handgun with similar characteristics to the gun Tew used to shoot the officer.
Carswell v. State, 268 Ga. 531, 532-533(2) ( 491 S.E.2d 343) (1997). Finally, an investigator does not make an offer of hope or benefit upon telling a defendant that his or her cooperation will be made known to the prosecution, Leigh v. State, 223 Ga. App. 726, 727(1) ( 478 S.E.2d 905) (1996); Lawrence v. State, 227 Ga. App. 70, 72-73(5) ( 487 S.E.2d 608) (1997) or by offering help to the defendant. Cooper v. State, 256 Ga. 234, 235 (2) ( 347 S.E.2d 553) (1986) (The "slightest hope of benefit" means the hope of a lighter sentence.). "Once Miranda warnings are given and a person in custody gives a statement to police without invoking his right to remain silent and without requesting an attorney, he has in effect waived his rights."
Here, according to the officers' testimony, Brown said he sold cocaine in large quantities, displayed a large amount of cash, ordered the agent to drive his vehicle around the block, supplied Peek with two items immediately before Peek offered to sell two small pieces of crack, and when the drug deal stalled, Brown walked up and issued his "take or leave it" ultimatum. See Lawrence v. State, 227 Ga. App. 70, 72(3) ( 487 S.E.2d 608) (1997) (aiding and abetting in the sale of cocaine makes one a party to the crime). Further, consistent with Brown's inculpatory remark that he was selling only "hundreds," Brown possessed $612 in cash, comprised of five 100's, one 50, three 20's, and two 1's. Also, Brown immediately fled when the officers identified themselves.
The fact that the State could combine the two drugs if it were "short" belies its argument that the packages of cocaine are, in fact, "different" drugs. Moreover, the State's reliance on our decision in Lawrence v. State, 227 Ga. App. 70, 71(2) ( 487 S.E.2d 608) (1997), is misplaced. There, the cocaine was the same, but the charged offenses were different; the defendant sold some of the cocaine and retained the rest for his personal use. "If a person intends to distribute only a designated part of narcotics which are possessed, both the offense of possession and sale may be punished."