Opinion
C.A. No. 99C-12-022 WLW
Submitted: November 9, 2001
Decided: February 26, 2002
On Plaintiff's Motion for Additur or, in the Alternative, a New Trial. Denied.
Gary R. Dodge, Esquire, of The Law Offices of Gary R. Dodge, P.A., Dover, Delaware for Plaintiff.
Kenneth J. Young, Esquire, of Young Malmberg, P.A., Dover, Delaware for Defendant.
ORDER
Upon consideration of the submissions of the parties, it appears to the Court that, pursuant to Delaware Superior Court Civil Rule 59, Jerry W. Lawrence ("plaintiff") seeks a new trial or additur. Benjamin A. Shade ("defendant") opposes the motion. Because the jury award is not so grossly out of proportion to the injuries suffered as to shock the Court's conscience and sense of justice, plaintiff's motion is denied.
Background
This case arises out of an altercation that occurred between the plaintiff and defendant, at plaintiff's home, on September 15, 1998, from which plaintiff sustained injuries. Plaintiff filed the present civil law suit seeking damages for assault and battery. On September 24, 2001, the first day of the civil trial, the parties signed a Stipulation agreeing that the amount of any civil plaintiff's verdict would be reduced by $6,515.05, which was the amount of restitution ordered in the underlying criminal action. On September 26, 2001, the jury in the civil action awarded plaintiff $4,269.45. Plaintiff now seeks additur or a new trial.
Standard
Under Delaware law, enormous deference is given to jury verdicts. In the face of any reasonable difference of opinion, courts will yield to the jury's decision. It follows that, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, the validity of damages determined by the jury should likewise be presumed. Accordingly, a jury award should be set aside only in the unusual case where it is clear that the award is so grossly out of proportion to the injuries suffered as to shock the Court's conscience and sense of justice.
A jury award will meet this standard when it is so inadequate that it must have been based on passion, prejudice or misconduct rather than on an objective consideration of the trial evidence. Therefore, as a practical test, a court presented with a request for additur must review the record and determine whether the jury's award of damages is within a range supported by the evidence. As long as there is a sufficient evidentiary basis for the amount of the award, the jury's verdict should not be disturbed by a grant of additur or a new trial as to damages.
Young v. Frase, 702 A.2d 1234, 1236 (Del. 1997) (citations omitted).
Discussion
Applying the "practical test" set out by the Delaware Supreme Court, the record in this case supports the conclusion that the jury's award is within a range supported by the evidence. The record does not support the conclusion that the jury based its award upon passion, prejudice or misconduct.The plaintiff argues that he was entitled to the full extent of compensatory damages which he submitted to the jury, and that the jury inappropriately considered the issue of comparative negligence in determining its award. Plaintiff states that the overwhelming and uncontradicted evidence as to causation proved that he was entitled to all compensatory damages claimed. These arguments incorrectly characterize the jury's award.
Technically the jury did not have to find damages (other than the actual invasion) to find that an assault and battery occurred because damages are not an element of the claim. On the other hand, "if the plaintiff conclusively proves an injury worthy of compensation resulting from the defendant's tortious conduct, the plaintiff is entitled to at least some amount of damages." In the present case, however, the contact, or invasion, does not necessarily rise to the level of compensatory damages submitted by plaintiff. The jury may not have believed the level of invasion here equaled all the compensatory damages claimed.
Brzoska v. Olson, 668 A.2d 1355, 1360 (Del. 1995) (citations omitted) (noting that "proof of the technical invasion of the integrity of the plaintiff's person by even an entirely harmless, yet offensive, contact entitles the plaintiff to vindication of the legal right by the award of nominal damages"); Hall v. Dorsey, Del. Super., C.A. No. 96C-06-045, 1998 WL 960774 at *2-4, Quillen, J. (Nov. 5, 1998) (Op. and Order) (noting that intentional torts derive from actions for trespass which "required no proof of actual damages because the invasion of the plaintiff's rights was a tort unto itself," whereas "actual damages are an element of negligence, [thus] a zero verdict for the plaintiff in a negligence action is, as a technical matter, legally impossible").
Hall, 1998 WL 960774 at *7.
Medical Expenses
The jury award stated that plaintiff was entitled to "$4,269.45 (The Amount of Med. Exp. Receipts)." What the jury meant to award in the way of medical expenses is not precisely clear here, however, because plaintiff submitted evidence of $4,650.05 in medical expenses. The Court could determine that the jury meant to award all medical expenses in this case. Nonetheless, if the Court increased the medical award to $4,650.05, no additional recovery would accrue to plaintiff since under the pre-trial stipulation his award is to be reduced by $6,515.05, the amount of the prior restitution ordered. For this reason, if there was any error as to the award for medical expenses, it is harmless and the Court will not increase the amount awarded for medical expenses.
Pain and Suffering
Plaintiff claims he has a right to pain and suffering because there was medical testimony that his injuries were painful, and that he suffered during the recovery period. Plaintiff states that the jury concluded that "the Defendant's intentional misconduct proximately caused the Plaintiff's injuries." However, according to the Jury Verdict Form, the jury simply decided that the defendant intentionally assaulted and battered plaintiff, and that defendant's intentional misconduct "was a proximate cause of injury to plaintiff." The jury did not decide that the defendant's conduct was the cause of all injury to plaintiff. There was extensive testimony as to other causes which the jury may have felt caused some of his injuries. Even if the Court were inclined to increase the award for pain and suffering, the Court's inclination would be to award no more than a minimal amount. Thus, any error is harmless in that a modified award would still be under the stipulated limit of the prior restitution ($6,515.05). For this reason, the Court will not increase the award for pain and suffering.
Work-related Expenses
Plaintiff maintains that he should have been awarded the cost of hiring casual labor during the time of his recuperation. However, the jury could have found that it was not proven that the intentional misconduct of the defendant was the proximate cause of these expenses. By the testimony presented, the jury could have found that the expenses were not reasonable nor necessarily caused by the injuries sustained.
Conclusion
"As long as there is a sufficient evidentiary basis for the amount of the award, the jury's verdict should not be disturbed by a grant of additur or a new trial as to damages." Moreover, "[a] motion for additur is an expedient but intrusive way of adjusting a jury's award in exceptional cases where the amount of the award is shockingly inadequate. This is not such a case."
Young, 702 A.2d at 1237.
Id at 1238.
Wherefore, plaintiff's Motion for Additur or, in the Alternative, a New Trial is denied. IT IS SO ORDERED.