In support of this last contention, counsel cite cases from eleven of our sister States wherein it has been held, in construing constitutional provisions somewhat similar to those of Section 12 of Article 4 of our Constitution, that state agencies did not violate the respective restraints in purchasing policies issued by mutual companies, thereby becoming members in such corporations. See State v. Northwestern Mutual Life Inc. Co., 86 Ariz. 50, 340 P.2d 200 (1959); Clifton v. School District No. 14 of Russellville, 192 Ark. 140, 90 S.W.2d 508 (1936); Miller v. Johnson County Auditor et al., 4 Cal.2d 265, 48 P.2d 956 (1935); Louisville Board of Insurance Agents v. Jefferson County Board of Education, Ky., 309 S.W.2d 40 (1958); McMahon v. Cooney, 95 Mont. 138, 25 P.2d 131 (1933); French v. Mayor of Millville, 66 N.J.L. 392, 49 A. 465 (1901); Fuller v. Lockhart et al., 209 N.C. 61, 182 S.E. 733 (1935); Huffman et al. v. Schellstede et al., 348 P.2d 1078, (Okla.S.Ct. 1960); Johnson v. School District No. 1 of Multnomah County, 128 Or. 9, 270 P. 764, 273 P. 386 (1928); Downing et al. v. School District of Erie, 297 Pa. 474, 147 A. 239 (1929); Burton v. School District No. 19 et al., 47 Wyo. 462, 38 P.2d 610, (1934). Only one State Supreme Court, that of our neighboring State of Texas, has announced views similar to those expressed by the Court of Appeal herein.
That provision's correlative limitation, section 17, was "adopted for the purpose of preventing the investment of public funds in private enterprises." Lawrence v. Schellstede, 348 P.2d 1078, 1082 (Okla. 1960). Section 14 of article X of the Oklahoma Constitution provides:
The provision was intended to prevent public investment in private enterprises. Lawrence v. Schellstede, 1960 OK 10, ¶ 24, 348 P.2d 1078, 1082; Rural Water Dist. No. 3 v. Antlers Pub.Works Auth., 1993 OK CIV APP 185, ¶ 8, 866 P.2d 458, 460. City suggests that, if Appellees are permitted to recover the costs of moving the bailed property stored in their warehouse to another location, it would be "the same as a friendly private purchase of a fee simple title." We do not agree.
¶ 13 Section 17 is "a limitation, and not a grant of power, and was adopted for the purpose of preventing the investment of public funds in private enterprises." Lawrence v. Schellstede,348 P.2d 1078, 1082 (Okla. 1960); see also State ex rel. Brown v. City of Warr Acres,946 P.2d 1140, 1144 (Okla. 1997) (quoting Lawrence, at 1082).
Prohibitions of Article X, Section 17 do not apply to your question, as that section involves a gift to a public institution rather than to a private entity. See Lawrence v. Schellstede,348 P.2d 1078, 1082 (Okla. 1960). Further, the constitutional restrictions on cities and towns in Oklahoma do not apply to municipal-beneficiary public trusts.
That provision's correlative limitation, section 17, was "adopted for the purpose of preventing the investment of public funds in private enterprises." State ex rel. Brown v. City of Warr Acres, 1997 OK 117, ¶ 11, 946, P.2d 1140, 1143-44 (citing Lawrence v. Schellstede, 1960 OK 10, 348 P.2d 1078). The term "public purpose" in article X, section 14 should not be construed "in a narrow or restrictive sense."
Therefore, if the legislature is precluded from authorizing a city to appropriate money for the benefit of a corporation, association, or individual, then a municipality is precluded from appropriating such funds. Lawrence v. Schellstede, 348 P.2d 1078, 1080 (Okla. 1960), holds that § 17 was adopted for the purpose of preventing the investment of public funds in private enterprises. In citing Lawrence, the case of Sublett v. City of Tulsa, 405 P.2d 185, 197 (Okla.
Proposition III contends acquisition of land and construction of port facilities constitutes appropriation of funds, levying of taxes and loan of credit to private corporations or individuals, to be utilized in contravention of Art. X, Sec. 17. This contention is based upon the holding in Lawrence, etc. v. Schellstede et al., Okla., 348 P.2d 1078, wherein the provision was held to be a limitation adopted for the purpose of preventing investment of public funds in private enterprises. However, in Fischer v. Oklahoma City, 198 Okla. 22, 174 P.2d 244, we held that where land was acquired by eminent domain for airport use, the city properly could lease a part of the airport facilities to private corporations and individuals and such action did not violate Const., Art. X, Sec. 17.
Oklahoma courts have held that § 15 does not apply to municipalities since that provision is limited to the state. See Fretz v. City of Edmund, 168 P. 800, 804 (Okl. 1916); Lawrence v. Schellstede, 348 P.2d 1078, 1081 (Okl. 1960). In Andres v. First Arkansas Dev. Fin. Corp., 324 S.W.2d 97 (Ark. 1959), the Arkansas legislature passed a statute creating corporations to provide financial assistance to industrial development.
The constitutional provision at issue here was intended to prevent public investment in private enterprises. Lawrence v. Schellstede, 348 P.2d 1078, 1082 (Okla. 1960); see Willow Wind, Inc. v. City of Midwest City, 790 P.2d 1067, 1070 (Okla. 1989).