Opinion
Civ. 5:21-CV-00073-MTT-CHW
10-05-2021
ROOSEVELT LAWRENCE, Plaintiff, v. GOVERNOR BRIAN KEMP, et al., Defendants.
RECOMMENDATION OF DISMISSAL
Charles H. Weigle United States Magistrate Judge
In accordance with the Court's previous orders and instructions, pro se Plaintiff Roosevelt Lawrence, an inmate currently confined at the Wilcox State Prison in Abbeville, Georgia, has paid the required filing fee and explained his previous noncompliance (ECF No. 11). Plaintiff's Recast Complaint (ECF No. 5) is thus ready for preliminary screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and § 1915(e). For the reasons discussed below, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's Recast Complaint be DISMISSED without prejudice.
PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF PLAINTIFF'S RECAST COMPLAINT
I. Standard of Review
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) obligates the district courts to conduct a preliminary screening of every complaint filed by a prisoner who seeks redress from a government entity, official, or employee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Screening is also required under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) when the plaintiff is proceeding IFP. Both statutes apply in this case, and the standard of review is the same. When conducting preliminary screening, the Court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true. Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006) abrogated in part on other grounds by Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34 (2010); Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1159-60 (11th Cir. 2003). Pro se pleadings, like the one in this case, are “held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Still, the Court must dismiss a prisoner complaint if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A claim is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court may dismiss claims that are based on “indisputably meritless legal” theories and “claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A complaint fails to state a claim if it does not include “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The factual allegations in a complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and cannot “merely create[] a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (first alteration in original). In other words, the complaint must allege enough facts “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” supporting a claim. Id. at 556. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
To state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) an act or omission deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or a statute of the United States; and (2) the act or omission was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Hale v. Tallapoosa Cnty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995). If a litigant cannot satisfy these requirements or fails to provide factual allegations in support of his claim or claims, the complaint is subject to dismissal. See Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1282-84 (11th Cir. 2003).
II. Factual Allegations
The claims in Plaintiff's Recast Complaint, which is the operative pleading in this action, are based upon his confinement in the Wilcox State Prison (“WSP”) from December 19, 2020 through January 6, 2021. Recast Compl. 5, ECF No. 5; see also Schreane v. Middlebrooks¸ 522 Fed.Appx. 845, 847 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (noting that generally, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint unless the amended complaint specifically refers to or adopts the original complaint). According to the Recast Complaint, Plaintiff was placed in segregation at WSP on December 9, 2020 after being advised that he had tested positive for COVID-19. Recast Compl. 5, ECF No. 5. Plaintiff alleges he asked several Defendants why he was being placed in segregation rather than being taken to medical for treatment, but he did not get a satisfactory response. Id. Plaintiff was also advised that he would not be released from segregation until “k building comes off quarantine.” Id. Plaintiff states he was held in segregation until January 6, 2021, which was more than fourteen days after he tested positive for the virus and more than a week after the quarantine in K-Building ended. Id. at 5. Plaintiff contends that his placement in segregation without a disciplinary hearing violated his due process rights, and he also alleges that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated because he did not receive any medical treatment after he tested positive for COVID-19. Id. at 6. As a result of these alleged constitutional violations, Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief and monetary damages. Id.
III. Plaintiff's Claims
A. Due Process Claims
Plaintiff first suggests that Defendants violated his due process rights by placing him in segregation without any sort of a hearing. It is well-settled that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects against deprivations of “life, liberty, or property without the due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV. In order to establish a procedural due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that a person acting under color of state law deprived him of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest without constitutionally adequate process. See, e.g., Foxy Lady, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 347 F.3d 1232, 1236 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
In this case, Plaintiff appears to allege that prison officials deprived him of “liberty” within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. “Whether an inmate has a protected liberty interest that would entitle him to due process protections ‘is often a difficult determination in the context of a prison, because prisoners have already been deprived of their liberty in the ordinary sense of the term.'” Jacoby v. Baldwin Cnty., 835 F.3d 1338, 1346 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Bass v. Perrin, 170 F.3d 1312, 1318 (11th Cir. 1999) (emphasis in original)). The Supreme Court, however, “has made clear that there are two circumstances in which a prisoner can be further deprived of his liberty such that due process is required.” Bass, 170 F.3d at 1318. First, a prisoner is entitled to due process “when an increased restraint ‘exceed[s] [his] sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force.” Jacoby, 835 F.3d at 1346 (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (alterations in original)). Second, a prisoner is entitled to due process if a change in the prisoner's conditions of confinement “‘imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.'” Id.
In this case, Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to show that he was entitled to due process protections with respect to his temporary confinement in segregation. Plaintiff's allegations are devoid of any facts suggesting that Defendants took any sort of action that unexpectedly altered the terms of his imprisonment, such as revocation of good time credit. See, e.g., Smith v. Deemer, 641 Fed.Appx. 866, 867 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (“A hallmark example of action that unexpectedly alters an inmate's term of imprisonment is the revocation of good-time credit.”). Nor has Plaintiff alleged any facts suggesting that the conditions of his confinement in segregation imposed an atypical and significant hardship upon him. Plaintiff alleges that he was confined to segregation for only a few weeks, and he has not alleged any facts describing the conditions in segregation. Thus, Plaintiff has not shown that this restriction “present[s] a dramatic departure from the basic conditions of [Plaintiff's] indeterminate sentence.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485-86. The Eleventh Circuit has held that even a significantly longer period in segregation does not constitute an “atypical and significant hardship” that warrants due process protections where there is no appreciable difference between the conditions in segregation and the conditions in general population. Compare Al-Amin v. Donald, 165 Fed.Appx. 733, 739 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (confinement in administrative segregation for three years was not an “atypical and significant hardship” where there was “substantial similarity between the privileges and conditions of life in the general population . . . in comparison to conditions in administrative segregation”) with Wallace v. Hamrick, 229 Fed.Appx. 827, 830-31 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (placement in administrative segregation for 28 days without hot water, adequate ventilation, or opportunity to exercise while awaiting disciplinary hearing supported due process claim because conditions may have constituted “an atypical and significant hardship ‘in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life'”). Plaintiff has therefore failed to state a cognizable procedural due process claim concerning his placement in segregation, and these claims should be dismissed as to all Defendants.
B. Medical Treatment Claims Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants violated his constitutional rights because they failed to provide him with any medical treatment after he tested positive for COVID-19. Allegations that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to a prisoner's serious medical needs can give rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003). “To show that a prison official acted with deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, a plaintiff must satisfy both an objective and a subjective inquiry.” Farrow, 320 F.3d at 1243. A plaintiff must first “set forth evidence of an objectively serious medical need” and must also “prove that the prison official acted with an attitude of ‘deliberate indifference' to that serious medical need.” Id. In other words, prison officials must both “know of and then disregard an excessive risk to the prisoner.” Dunn v. Martin, 178 Fed.Appx. 876, 877 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). For purposes of this analysis, a “serious medical need” is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Farrow, 320 F.3d at 1243 (internal quotation marks omitted). A “serious medical need” may also exist when “a delay in treating the need worsens the condition.” Mann v. Taser Int'l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1307 (11th Cir. 2009).
Plaintiff has not pleaded any facts suggesting that he had a serious medical need for which Defendants failed to provide him treatment. Simply testing positive for a virus does not automatically constitute a serious medical need, particularly for a virus like COVID-19 where it is possible to have an asymptomatic case. Indeed, Plaintiff does not allege that he suffered any symptoms at all. Without any allegations indicating that Plaintiff suffered from a serious medical need that Defendants failed to treat, he has failed to state an actionable Eighth Amendment claim. Plaintiff's medical deliberate indifference claims should therefore also be dismissed as to all Defendants.
IV. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's Recast Complaint be DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written objections to these recommendations with the Honorable Marc T. Treadwell, Chief United States District Judge, WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy of this Recommendation. The parties may seek an extension of time in which to file written objections, provided a request for an extension is filed prior to the deadline for filing written objections. Failure to object in accordance with the provisions of § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district judge's order based on factual and legal conclusions to which no objection was timely made. See 11th Cir. R. 3-1.
SO RECOMMENDED.