The plaintiff, Town of Islip, commenced this action for a judgment declaring that catering events and driver's education courses for nonmatriculating students at the defendant, Dowling College, are nonpermitted uses under its zoning code. Educational institutions enjoy special treatment with respect to residential zoning ordinances because these institutions presumptively serve the public's welfare and morals (see, Cornell Univ. v. Bagnardi, 68 N.Y.2d 583; Matter of Lawrence School Corp. v. Lewis, 174 A.D.2d 42). Educational institutions are generally permitted to engage in activities and locate on their property facilities for such social, recreational, athletic, and other accessory uses as are reasonably associated with their educational purpose (see generally, Matter of Brown v. Board of Trustees, 303 N.Y. 484; Matter of Lawrence School Corp. v. Lewis, 174 A.D.2d 42). The activities at issue in this case are permitted educational uses of the subject property and the restrictions which the plaintiff seeks to place on these activities would be impermissible (see generally, Matter of Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd. of Town of Brighton, 1 N.Y.2d 508; Matter of New York Inst. of Technology v. LeBoutillier, 33 N.Y.2d 125; Matter of Summit School v. Neugent, 82 A.D.2d 463).
Because the ZBA failed to make a reasonable effort to accommodate WDS's education and religious use through the imposition of conditions, its decision was arbitrary and capricious under New York law. See, e.g., Apostolic Holiness Church, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 324 (affirming, subject to reasonable conditions to be imposed by zoning board, decision annulling denial of variance held to be arbitrary and capricious because, inter alia, "generally, problems of traffic and congestion can be adequately addressed with the imposition of conditions"); Genesis Assembly of God, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 203 (denial of building permit arbitrary and capricious where building department did not appear to consider possibility of approving application capping attendance); Lawrence Sch. Corp. v. Lewis, 174 A.D.2d 42, 47, 578 N.Y.S.2d 627, 630 (2d Dep't 1992) (denial of variance arbitrary and capricious where "reasonable conditions" would have addressed board's concerns); St. Thomas Malankara Orthodox Church, 804 N.Y.S.2d at 802 (denial of variance arbitrary and capricious where board "made no effort to suggest . . . measures" mitigating impacts of requested parking waiver). E. Summary
Because the ZBA failed to make a reasonable effort to accommodate WDS's education and religious use through the imposition of conditions, its decision was arbitrary and capricious under New York law. See, e.g., Apostolic Holiness Church, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 324 (affirming, subject to reasonable conditions to be imposed by zoning board, decision annulling denial of variance held to be arbitrary and capricious because, inter alia, "generally, problems of traffic and congestion can be adequately addressed with the imposition of conditions"); Genesis Assembly of God, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 203 (denial of building permit arbitrary and capricious where building department did not appear to consider possibility of approving application capping attendance); Lawrence Sch. Corp. v. Lewis, 174 A.D.2d 42, 47, 578 N.Y.S.2d 627, 630 (2d Dep't 1992) (denial of variance arbitrary and capricious where "reasonable conditions" would have addressed board's concerns); St. Thomas Malankara Orthodox Church, 804 N.Y.S.2d at 802 (denial of variance arbitrary and capricious where board "made no effort to suggest . . . measures" mitigating impacts of requested parking waiver). E. Summary
Further, no evidence was presented to demonstrate that the staff employed by the camp are qualified to instruct in subjects which are part of a regular school curriculum. Accordingly, the ZBA's determination has a rational basis in the record and the Supreme Court properly declined to disturb the determination (see Rorie v Woodmere Academy, 52 NY2d 200, 205; cf. Matter of Lawrence School Corp. v Lewis, 174 AD2d 42, 44-45).
The more specific zoning principles pertaining to schools and churches, as discussed in Cornell Univ. v. Bagnardi (supra ) and related cases, are applicable here. Indeed, cases involving schools seeking variances do not reference the balancing test urged by petitioner and instead rely on the premise that "[g]reater flexibility than would attach to applications for variances made by commercial institutions is required and the controlling consideration must always be the over-all impact on the public's welfare" (Matter of Lawrence School Corp. v. Lewis, 174 A.D.2d 42, 46, 578 N.Y.S.2d 627 [1992] [internal quotation marks, ellipsis and citation omitted] ). Because petitioner was not immune from and was, therefore, subject to the Town's zoning ordinances, we must address whether the ZBA properly denied petitioner's application for a variance.
Here, the parking lot is a qualified accessory use to the student residences and instructional facilities to be constructed as part of petitioner's renovation of its campus ( see Matter of Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd. of Town of Brighton, 1 NY2d 508, 525-526, supra). Further, since petitioner was not required to demonstrate a special need for the parking lot ( see Cornell Univ. v. Bagnardi, 68 NY2d 583, 597), respondents lacked the power to find that the need for the lot at the planned campus location was not proven to their satisfaction ( see id. at 596-597; Matter of Lawrence School Corp. v. Lewis, 174 AD2d 42, 46-47).
In this case, the Zoning Board made findings against the Church with respect to each of these factors, but that by no means ends our inquiry. The law is well-settled that religious and educational institutions "enjoy special treatment with respect to residential zoning ordinances because these institutions presumptively serve the public's welfare and morals" (Matter of Lawrence School Corp. v. Lewis, 174 A.D.2d 42, 46; see, Cornell Univ. v. Bognardi, 68 N.Y.2d 583; Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue v. Incorporated Vil. of Roslyn Harbor, 38 N.Y.2d 283, cert denied 426 U.S. 950; Matter of Westchester Reform Temple v. Brown, 22 N.Y.2d 488, 493; Matter of Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd., 1 N.Y.2d 508; Matter of Holy Spirit Assn. for Unification of World Christianity v. Rosenfeld, 91 A.D.2d 190, 197). The "total exclusion" of such institutions from an area zoned for residential use is improper (Cornell Univ. v. Bognardi, supra, at 594; see, Matter of Westchester Reform Temple v. Brown, 22 N.Y.2d 488, 496-497, supra; Matter of Diocese of Rochester v Planning Bd., supra).
The principal function of a Church is worship, yet the accessory use can and should include not only spiritual development but the physical health and welfare of the congregation as well as social services associated with the Church. See, Lawrence School Corp. V. Lewis, 174 AD2d 42, 578 NYS2d 627 (2nd Dept. 1992). A religious institution's social programs, including those programs directed at the physical health of the congregation, as in this case with the erecting of a building housing a gymnasium, are accessory uses in that they are customarily incidental to the principal use.
Here, the determination by the Building Inspector and the subsequent affirmance of that determination by the Zoning Board of Appeals were supported by substantial evidence and were neither arbitrary nor capricious. Educational institutions are generally permitted to engage in activities and locate on their property facilities for such social, recreational, athletic, and other accessory uses as are reasonably associated with their educational purpose (see Town ofIslip v Dowling College, 275 AD2d 366, 712 NYS2d 160 [2d Dept 2000], citing Matter of Brown v Board of Trustees, 303 NY 484; Matter of Lawrence School Corp. v Lewis, 174 AD2d 42). Practices at other local schools support the conclusion that recreational facilities, such as playing fields and tennis courts, are customary and incidental to the educational use of a school, and the use of the facilities after school hours does not deter from their primary use by students. By restricting the public use of the tennis facilities to hours when school is not in session, the Building Inspector and the Zoning Board of Appeals underscored the reasoning that such use of the athletic facilities is an accessory use to the principal educational use.