Opinion
No. CV-07-5003676 S
April 8, 2008
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The plaintiff, Lawrence Memorial Healthcare Workers Union, Local 5123, AFT-CT, AFL-CIO, filed an application to vacate an arbitration award rendered on May 14, 2007, against it and in favor of the defendant, Lawrence Memorial Hospital. The plaintiff claims that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by ignoring the plain language of the collective bargaining agreement ("the agreement") between it and the defendant by inserting into the agreement provisions which are not contained therein which go beyond the clear understanding of the parties and the provisions of Article 7, Section 4 of the agreement. Article 7, Section 4 states:
The Arbitrator shall have the authority only to interpret the terms and provisions of this Agreement and shall be without power to alter, amend, add to or subtract from the language of the Agreement or to hold ex parte hearings. The decision of the arbitrator within the scope of his authority shall be final and binding upon the parties.
The facts in this matter are not disputed. Article XVIII of the agreement states, in relevant part, as follows:
Section 18.1a Participation. The employees will be covered under the Hospital-wide health, dental, life and other insurance benefit plans in effect for all Hospital employees. As of this date, that includes Blue Cross Comprehensive (for employees currently enrolled; this plan will be closed to new participants), Blue Cross PPO and PHS. The hospital will pay in full or contribute towards the individual or family premium on the same basis as it does for all Hospital employees. The hospital retains the right to change the insurance program or its sharing of the premiums provided that any changes are uniform Hospital-wide and that the Union is notified and given reasonable opportunity to meet and discuss any proposed changes prior to their implementation.
. . .
b. Notwithstanding Section 18.1(a):
. . .
(2) The Hospital will maintain coverage under its Blue Cross PPO medical insurance plan or a plan providing substantially equivalent coverage. It is understood that changes in the plan made by the insurance coverage shall not constitute a violation of its provision.
The defendant proposed a change to the Blue Cross PPO medical insurance plan in October 2005. Specifically, the defendant sought to initiate a $400.00 co-pay for high-end diagnostic procedures performed outside the defendant's hospital. The plaintiff did not agree to this change. The change was implemented shortly thereafter. A timely grievance was filed by the plaintiff on November 4, 2005, claiming that the intended change violated Article 18.1.b(2). The grievance was denied and the plaintiff filed a demand for arbitration on December 19, 2005.
An arbitrator was appointed and, after holding a hearing, he issued an award on May 14, 2007, finding that the defendant did not violate the agreement when it introduced a $400.00 co-pay for high-end diagnostic procedures outside the hospital. Connecticut's public policy in favor of arbitrating disputes is well established:
We begin by noting that Connecticut has adopted a clear public policy in favor of arbitrating disputes. The policy is expressed in General Statutes § 52-408, which provides in relevant part: "An agreement in any written contract, or in a separate writing executed by the parties to any written contract, to settle by arbitration any controversy thereafter arising out of such contract, or out of the failure or refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof . . . shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable, except when there exists sufficient cause at law or in equity for the avoidance of written contracts generally."
Nussbaum v. Kimberly Timbers, Ltd., 271 Conn. 65, 71 (2004).
Under Connecticut law arbitration awards are given a deferential standard of review by the courts:
[T]he law in this state takes a strongly affirmative view of consensual arbitration . . . As a consequence of our approval of arbitral proceedings, our courts generally have deferred to the award that the arbitrator found to be appropriate . . . The scope of review for arbitration awards is exceedingly narrow . . . Additionally, every reasonable inference is to be made in favor of the arbitral award and of the arbitrator's decisions . . .
Courts allow and encourage broad discretion for arbitrators. Awards resulting from erroneous interpretations of the agreement or the law generally will not be vacated where the submissions are unrestricted. With unrestricted submissions . . . arbitrators are not required to resolve the issues presented according to the law, and courts may not review the evidence that the arbitrators used as the basis for their awards.
Despite the wide berth given to arbitrators and their powers of dispute resolution, courts recognize three grounds for vacating arbitration awards . . . As a routine matter, courts review de novo the question of whether any of those exceptions apply to a given award . . . The first ground for vacating an award is when the arbitrator has ruled on the constitutionality of a statute . . . The second acknowledged ground is when the award violates clear public policy . . .
CT Page 5637
The third recognized ground for vacating an arbitration award is that the award contravenes one or more of the statutory proscriptions of [General Statutes] § 52-418.
(Quotation marks omitted.) International Brotherhood of Police Officers, Local 361 v. New Milford, 81 Conn.App. 726, 729-30 (2004).
The plaintiff states in its brief that the gravamen of its objection to the arbitrator's decision is that the "Arbitrator went beyond his powers by relying on language of two Collective Bargaining Agreements between the Hospital and AFT Unions 5049 and 5051." The latter two unions represent other employee groups in the defendant's hospital and were not parties to the arbitration in issue. The plaintiff relies on the statement in the arbitrator's decision that "[b]efore we consider the health insurance provision of the Local 5123 contract, we should consider the health insurance provisions of the pre-existing contracts with Local 5049 and 5051."
The arbitrator considered the negotiating history and practice, including language similar to Article 18.1.a contained in the other two collective bargaining agreements, and stated that since they "do not help to clarify the ambiguity, we must rely upon the language of the two arguably conflicting clauses, including the overall context in which it appears." The arbitrator did not base his decision on the other bargaining agreements, concluding his decision as follows:
Where then does this leave us in our attempt to resolve the contractual ambiguity? The language does not provide any overwhelmingly clear indication as to which interpretation is correct. Nor is either interpretation inherently illogical or implausible. As a result, I am left in a position where no definitive conclusion may be reached. However, in the present context, that very indefiniteness effectively provides the answer to our question. In view of the clear language of the initial "right to change" clause, as well as the fact that it has the burden of proving that the contract was violated, the Union had the obligation of establishing that the "right of change" clause was not applicable to the instant change in the co-pays for the PPO.
Insofar as the evidence on that point is not definitive, the Union may not prevail. The Union has not met its burden of proving that the contract required the Hospital to provide a version of the Blue Cross PPO which lacked a co-pay for high-end diagnostic procedures performed outside the Hospital. Thus, the Union has not established that the imposition of such a $400 co-pay violated the contract.
It was the plaintiff's failure to meet its burden and not language of the other collective bargaining agreements which determined the arbitrator's decision.
To further support its position, the plaintiff relies on two cases which, however, do not do so. In United States Steel Workers of American v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corporation, 363 U.S. 593 (1960), the United States Supreme Court, in upholding an arbitrator's award, stated:
(An arbitrator) may of course look for guidance from many sources, yet his reward is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement.
. . .
The opinion of the arbitrator in this case, as it bears upon the award of back pay beyond the date of the agreement's expiration and reinstatement, is ambiguous. It may be read as based solely upon the arbitrator's view of the requirements of enacted legislation, which would mean that he exceeded the scope of the submission. Or it may be read as embodying a construction of the agreement itself, perhaps with the arbitrator looking to "the law" for help in determining the sense of the agreement. A mere ambiguity in the opinion accompanying an award, which permits the inference that the arbitrator may have exceeded his authority, is not a reason for refusing to enforce the award.
Supra, 597-98.
The arbitrator here looked for guidance to two other collective bargaining agreements with language similar to that in the agreement, but his award was clearly based on the agreement and not on the other collective bargaining agreements.
In Board of Education v. AFSCME, 195 Conn. 266 (1985), our Supreme Court held that an arbitration award ordering reinstatement of a terminated employee should have been vacated by the trial court. The arbitration board had marked as an exhibit a stipulated award which related to an entirely different grievance, which grievance was the sole basis for the arbitration board's decision. The court said, at page 273:
Here, the arbitration panel exceeded its authority by considering and basing its award on a document which was not a part of the parties' agreement. This court has no choice but to refuse enforcement of the award.
In this case, the arbitrator did not rely on any such improper document as the sole basis for his award.
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, the application to vacate filed by the plaintiff is hereby denied.