Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. J05-00706
Pollak, J.
Lavonna H., the mother of three-year-old DeMarcus M., seeks writ review of an order terminating reunification services and setting a permanency planning hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. She contends that the record does not support the trial court’s finding that reasonable reunification services had been provided. Specifically, Lavonna argues that she was not referred in a timely manner to an appropriate mental health provider to complete a court-ordered psychological assessment. We conclude that there is ample evidence to support the court’s implied finding that reasonable services were provided and, accordingly, deny the petition on the merits.
The trial court made the order in question at the conclusion of a contested 18-month permanency review hearing. Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.22, subdivision (a), applicable at the 18-month review hearing, provides in relevant part: “The court shall order the return of the child to the physical custody of his or her parent or guardian unless the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the return of the child to his or her parent or guardian would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child. The social worker shall have the burden of establishing that detriment. . . . The failure of the parent or legal guardian to participate regularly and make substantive progress in court-ordered treatment programs shall be prima facie evidence that return would be detrimental.” The trial court is also required to “determine whether reasonable services have been offered or provided to the parent or legal guardian.” (Ibid.) We review the trial court’s order to determine if it is supported by substantial evidence. (In re Shaundra L. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 303, 316.)
DeMarcus was initially removed from his mother’s care in April 2005, based on allegations that she struck DeMarcus, causing injuries, and that she and DeMarcus’s father have a history of domestic violence. Shortly thereafter Lavonna stipulated to jurisdiction. Under the case plan adopted by the court, Lavonna was to submit to drug testing, attend therapy and parenting classes, complete a domestic violence prevention program, and undergo psychiatric/psychological evaluations.
At the six-month review hearing in December 2005, the social worker reported that Lavonna had “started taking parenting classes, domestic violence classes, counseling, and [was] drug testing.” Lavonna also completed a psychiatric evaluation in November 2005. The court found that reasonable services had been provided and continued reunification services for an additional six months. At the 12-month review hearing in June 2006, the social worker again recommended that the court continue services for an additional six months. The social worker reported that she had “[r]eferred mother to services needed for her case plan: parenting classes, domestic violence classes, individual counseling, psychiatric evaluation providers, substance abuse testing, substance abuse treatment program.” The report explains that while mother had been working hard to complete her case plan goal, she had been terminated from counseling in May 2006 due to excessive absences. Again the court found that reasonable reunification services had been provided and extended the provision of services for six more months. Lavonna did not file an appeal or otherwise challenge either of the trial court’s prior findings that reasonable services had been provided.
In September 2006, the social worker submitted a report in advance of the 18-month review hearing recommending that services be terminated and a permanency planning hearing scheduled. The social worker explained that Lavonna “ha[d] not been participating in services adequately since approximately June 2006 . . . .” The report indicates that Lavonna did not resume counseling after her sessions were terminated in May, she was discharged from her drug treatment program in August due to poor attendance, and she had failed to drug test reliably throughout the summer. The report acknowledges that Lavonna had agreed to undergo a psychological evaluation as part of her case plan but that the bureau “had difficulty locating a provider in Alameda County.” Appointments for a complete six-visit assessment, however, were scheduled to begin September 26.
Although the contested review hearing originally was scheduled for October 2006, it was continued several times and was not completed until April 6, 2007, six months beyond the expiration of what is supposed to be the maximum 18 months before proceeding with a permanency planning hearing. A supplemental report submitted to the court in January 2007 indicates that Lavonna had completed the psychological evaluation and that on December 26, 2006, the social worker “provided [Lavonna] with referrals to the Family Stress Center for either individual or group counseling to address some of the anger issues mentioned in her psychological assessment.” The social worker also noted that she had made an additional referral to the Regional Center of the East Bay for life skills classes based on the psychological assessment, but that Lavonna had refused those services because the program was voluntary.
At the April 2007 hearing, the social worker testified that Lavonna had “not learned the coping skills necessary to deal with her frustration levels” and that she was concerned “for the two-year-old child who might not be able to handle his regular child development behaviors of getting on mom’s nerves and her not being able to calm herself down enough before reacting.” She testified that Lavonna was supposed to have addressed her lack of control and acquisition of anger management techniques in her therapy sessions, but that the sessions were cancelled in May 2006 due to excessive absences. The social worker acknowledged that the referral for the psychological assessment had not been made until September 2006 and the resulting referral for anger management counseling with the Family Stress Center had not been made until the end of December. She confirmed, however, that anger management counseling had always been included in Lavonna’s case plan and that Lavonna had received services aimed at helping her control her temper in the form of individual counseling from the start of the reunification period until the sessions were terminated in May. She also testified that in the three months since Lavonna had been given the referral for additional anger management counseling, she had not attended any counseling sessions.
The court found that the return of the child to Lavonna’s custody “would create a substantial risk of detriment to the child[’s] safety, protection or physical or emotional well-being.” The court explained that Lavonna had demonstrated lack of impulse control, anger, and threats of violence, supporting the concern that she would repeat her prior mistreatment of DeMarcus if she did not learn better coping skills. Further, “Mother’s been out of therapy for a year. There is no proof she has completed anger management.” Substantial evidence supports the court’s implied finding that she was provided reasonable reunification services. The record demonstrates that the Contra Costa County Children and Family Services Bureau identified Lavonna’s anger management and impulse control problems as leading to the loss of custody in this case and provided services designed to remedy those problems at the beginning of the reunification period. (Armando L. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 549, 554-555 [“ ‘[T]he record should show that the supervising agency identified the problems leading to the loss of custody [and] offered services designed to remedy those problems . . .’ ”].) Specifically and in addition to other services, Lavonna was provided a referral for individual counseling, which included the necessary anger management services. Her early termination from individual counseling due to excessive absences is sufficient to support the court’s finding that DeMarcus’s return to his mother’s custody would create a substantial risk of harm. Contrary to Lavonna’s argument, the delayed psychological assessment and her failure to pursue the additional anger management services to which she was referred after completion of the assessment was not determinative. As the trial court noted, “[T]he fact that she didn’t attend Family Stress, it’s not . . . that determinative[.] . . . [I]t’s not a positive thing, though it’s not that negative.”
In short, the record contains substantial evidence that after two years, returning DeMarcus to his mother would continue to present a substantial risk to the well-being of the minor. Despite the fact that Lavonna made some progress in treatment during a portion of that period, after more than the statutory maximum time period of 18 months she had not overcome the problems that required the child’s removal from her home. The trial court was justified in finding that reasonable services to assist her to overcome those problems had been provided, despite the delay in providing a referral for the psychological assessment. Despite the progress that Lavonna did make, she is not yet capable of caring for her child. The Legislature has determined that the interests of DeMarcus demand that a permanent plan for his placement be delayed no longer. (In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 420 [“the Legislature . . . recognizes the child’s interest in a stable, permanent home [citation], and has provided that the juvenile court should avoid delay and ‘give substantial weight to a minor’s need for prompt resolution of his or her custody status, the need to provide children with stable environments, and the damage to a minor of prolonged temporary placements.’ [Citation.] The current statutory scheme makes it clear that the turning point at which the child’s interest may outweigh that of the parent is reached no later than 18 months after the child has been removed from the parental home, because the maximum length of time that reunification services are provided to the parent is 18 months”].) The court did not err in setting the permanency planning hearing.
Disposition
The petition for extraordinary relief is denied on the merits. (See Cal. Const., art. VI, § 14; Knowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 894.) Because the permanency planning hearing is set for July 24 2007, our decision is immediately final as to this court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.264(b).)
We concur: McGuiness, P. J., Siggins, J.