Opinion
8023-86
03-09-2023
PARVIZ & MADELINE LAVI, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
ORDER
Mary Ann Cohen, Judge.
The petition in this case was filed almost thirty-seven years ago, on March 26, 1986, and challenged deficiencies for 1979 and 1980. After the first trial setting was continued, disputes arose concerning discovery. On October 6, 1992, a Stipulation of Settlement was filed. On July 7, 1995, a second Stipulation of Settlement was filed. After further discovery, disputes and amended pleadings occurred, the case proceeded to trial on October 22, 23, and 24, 1996. Petitioner was represented by counsel. A bench opinion was rendered on October 24, 1996. The opinion ordered that computations for decision would be entered pursuant to Rule 155, Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. On December 23, 1996, petitioner filed a Motion to Reconsider the Opinion; that motion was denied on December 30, 1996.
On December 18, 1997, new counsel entered an appearance for petitioner. On March 13, 1997, respondent's Rule 155 computations were filed. Petitioner objected to respondent's computations and submitted alternative computations. The dispute was described and discussed in T.C. Memo. 1998-103, filed March 16, 1998. The Court held that Stipulations of Settlement filed in 1992 and 1995 precluded new issues that petitioner attempted to raise in the Rule 155 process. Decision was entered March 16, 1998. Petitioner filed a Motion to Vacate the Decision on April 13, 1998, and that Motion was denied April 17, 1998. Petitioner appealed, and the Decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit on November 23, 1999.
The above history is shown on the docket sheet for the case. It is an understatement to say that petitioner has had his day in Court.
Almost twenty-three years after the Court of Appeals mandate, new counsel entered an appearance on November 18, 2022, and filed a Motion to Vacate the 1998 decision on December 2, 2022, again complaining about the Rule 155 proceedings. Petitioner asserts fraud on the Court and equitable estoppel, but he has not shown the elements of either. Moreover, petitioner has cited no authority that equitable estoppel is a ground for setting aside a final decision, and it appears that there is none.
Petitioner's Rule 155 objections were thoroughly considered and rejected by the Court twenty-five years ago. Petitioner's was represented by counsel, so his alleged arrest and later incarceration are not reasonable grounds for decades of delay. He has not raised any new arguments that would justify a different result. His argument is that the Court was wrong, not that it was misled. His remedy was by the appeal, which was unsuccessful.
To justify setting aside a decision for fraud, petitioner must show more than the conduct of counsel during settlement negotiations or proceedings on the record of the Court. Cases permitting setting aside a final judgment involved misrepresentations that directly affected the judgment. Petitioner's situation is indistinguishable from cases denying motions to vacate and unlike those granting such relief. See Drobny v. Commissioner, 113 F.3d 670 (7th Cir. 1997), aff 'g T.C. Memo. 1995-209; Kupferman v. Consolidated Research and Mfg., 459 F.2d 1072, 1078 (2d. Cir. 1972).
Upon due consideration and for cause, it is hereby ORDERED that petitioner's Motion to Vacate filed December 2, 2022, is denied.