Opinion
2:19-CV-01095-DSC
12-16-2020
SHAWN LAVEING, Plaintiff, v. NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Defendant,
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Cynthia Reed Eddy Chief United States Magistrate Judge
Presently before the court is Plaintiff Shawn Laveing's Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement (ECF No. 45). This case stems from an alleged violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. (“FMLA”) for terminating Plaintiff's employment due to absences from work. The parties formally mediated the case and were not successful in resolving it. Thereafter, counsel for parties continued to negotiate settlement and arrived at a monetary amount for settlement. Thereafter, Defendant Norfolk Southern Railway Company (“Norfolk Southern”) provided Plaintiff with a proposed settlement agreement that included a provision that Plaintiff agreed to release future, unknown personal injury claims under the Federal Employers Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51, et seq. (“FELA”).
Plaintiff seeks enforcement of settlement terms discussed via counsel through verbal communications and requests that the court enforce the settlement agreement with the monetary amount agreed to by the parties and to void a paragraph related to the release of future claims against Norfolk Southern. Norfolk Southern counters that the parties never reached an agreement on at least one critical term, i.e., the scope of the release Plaintiff seeks to void, and therefore there is no agreement to enforce.
Plaintiff's motion to enforce settlement agreement is governed by Pennsylvania law, which provides “the test for enforceability of an agreement is whether both parties have manifested an intention to be bound by its terms and whether the terms are sufficiently definite to be specifically enforced.” Channel Home Centers, Div. of Grace Retail Corp. v. Grossman, 795 F.2d 291, 29899 (3d Cir. 1986) (citations omitted). Simply “engaging in negotiations, drafting preliminary documents, or agreeing ‘to enter into a binding contract in the future' does not create an enforceable contract ‘because the parties themselves have not come to an agreement on the essential terms of the bargain and therefore there is nothing for the court to enforce.” Shell's Disposal & Recycling, Inc. v. City of Lancaster, 504 Fed.Appx. 194, 201 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Am. Eagle Outfitters v. Lyle & Scott Ltd., 584 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir.2009).
Here, it is undisputed that the parties have not reached an agreement on the essential terms of their bargain because they have not agreed on the scope of the release. See Veritext/PA Reporting Co. L.L.C. v. E-Reporting Stenographic Affiliates of Pennsylvania Inc., No. CIV.A. 036533, 2006 WL 3524375, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 5, 2006). Likewise, Plaintiff's argument that certain claims cannot be released under the FELA is misplaced. While Plaintiff is correct that the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that claims that related to “unknown risks” cannot be waived under Section 5 of the FELA, it would be premature to make a determination as to whether a provision propounded by Norfolk Southern during the course of settlement negotiations in an unexecuted settlement agreement is void under the FELA. Wicker v. Consol. Rail Corp., 142 F.3d 690, 701 (3d Cir. 1998) (making such a determination after employees signed a release and sought to bring suit for future injuries sustained); Babbitt v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 104 F.3d 89 (6th Cir. 1997) (same). It is undisputed that Plaintiff has not executed any settlement agreement containing the release provision he seeks to void, and he has suffered no injury that Norfolk Southern claims he is barred from recovering from because of the release provision.
Accordingly, because the parties have not reached an agreement on the essential terms of the settlement agreement and because it would be premature to declare the FELA release provision void, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff's motion to enforce settlement agreement (ECF No. 45) be DENIED.
Therefore, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, and the Local Rules for Magistrates, the parties have until December 23, 2020 to file objections to this report and recommendation. Unless Ordered otherwise by the District Judge, responses to objections are due December 30, 2020. Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of any appellate rights. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011).