Lavan v. New York City Dept. of Sanitation

Full title: ALBERTA LAVAN, Petitioner, v. NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF SANITATION…

Court: Supreme Court of the State of New York, New York County

Date published: Dec 24, 2010

2010 N.Y. Slip Op. 33615 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010)

Opinion

401931/10.

December 24, 2010.

DECISION/ORDER

HON. CYNTHIA S. KERN, J.S.C.

Recitation, as required by CPLR 2219(a), of the papers considered in the review of this motion for:

1 2 3

Papers Numbered Notice of Motion and Affidavits Annexed........... Notice of Cross Motion and Answering Affidavits... Affirmations in Opposition to the Cross-Motion.... Replying Affidavits............................... Exhibits..........................................

Petitioner commenced the instant petition for leave to file a late Notice of Claim on an action for alleged damages to her car caused by a Department of Sanitation mechanical sweeper on February 8, 2010. For the reasons set forth below, petitioner's motion is granted.

The relevant facts are as follows. On February 8, 2010, petitioner's car was parked on 129^th Street between Adam Clayton Powell Boulevard and Frederick Douglass Boulevard when it was struck by a Department of Sanitation ("DOS") vehicle driven by Damon Denis. On the day of the accident, Mr. Denis's supervisor, Patricia Elliott, arrived at the scene to investigate and take an accident report. In the accident report, Mr. Denis states that he clipped the bumper of petitioner's car while turning to sweep garbage near a fire hydrant. Petitioner filed a Notice of Claim for her vehicular property damage on May 13, 2010, five days after the expiration of the statutory time period to file a timely Notice of Claim for her action. Petitioner states in her verified petition that she was late because she was waiting for Ms. Elliott to provide her with correct information identifying the vehicle that struck her car and the diagram of the incident that she drew that day. She also states in her affidavit that during the 90 day statutory period, she was physically incapable of preparing the Notice of Claim because of her medical condition.

Prospective plaintiffs must serve a Notice of Claim against a municipal entity within ninety days after the claim arises. See Gen. Municipal Law § 50-e(l)(a). However, courts have broad discretion to grant leave to serve a late Notice of Claim pursuant to G.M.L. § 50-e(5). In determining whether to grant leave, the court must consider whether the petitioner had a reasonable excuse for his delay, whether the delay prejudiced the municipality's defense and whether the municipality acquired "actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim" within ninety days after the claim arose or within a reasonable time thereafter. See Gen. Mun. Law § 50-(e)(5); Strauss v New York City Transit Authority, 195 AD2d 322 (1^st Dept 1993). It is petitioner's burden to prove each of these elements, including lack of prejudice to the respondents. See Delgado v City of New York, 39 A.D.3d 387 (l^st Dept 2007); Ocasio v New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation, 14 A.D.3d 361 (1^st Dept 2005). Although no one factor is dispositive, the court must give particular consideration to whether the respondents acquired actual knowledge of the claim within the 90-day statutory period or shortly thereafter. See Justiniano v New York City Housing Authority Police, 191 A.D.2d 252 (1^st Dept 1993). The lack of a reasonable excuse alone is not fatal. See Velasquez v City of New York Health and Hospitals Corp., 69 A.D.3d 441 (1^st Dept 2010).

Considering all the above factors together, petitioner's motion to serve a late Notice of Claim is granted. Petitioner does not have a reasonable excuse for her failure to file a timely notice of claim. A petitioner claiming medical incapacity as an excuse for failing a timely Notice of Claim must provide medical documentation of his or her inability to file. Rivera v New York City Housing Authority, 26 A.D.3d 297 (1^st Dept 2006). While petitioner has provided evidence that she was being treated for a medical condition during the statutory time period for her claim, her evidence does not show that the condition precluded her from timely filing a Notice of Claim. Moreover, the tardiness of DOS staff in providing petitioner with documentary evidence for her Notice of Claim also does not constitute a reasonable excuse because petitioner could have filed a timely Notice of Claim that included only her personal knowledge. However, the lack of a reasonable excuse is not by itself fatal to an application for leave to file a late Notice of Claim. See Velasquez v City of New York Health and Hospitals Corp., 69 A.D.3d 441 (1^st Dept 2010).

Moreover, while it is true that the City did not acquire actual knowledge of the claim within the statutory period, the City did acquire actual knowledge when petitioner sought leave to file a late Notice of Claim within 5 days of the end of the statutory period, which is a reasonable time thereafter. See GML § 50-(e)(5). Finally, the fact that petitioner moved for leave to file a late Notice of Claim only 5 days late and that the accident was thoroughly documented by DOS in records that are still in existence makes it unlikely that respondent was prejudiced by the delay. See Silva v City of New York, 246 A.D.465 (1^st Dept 1998).

Accordingly, petitioner's motion to serve a late Notice of Claim is granted. This constitutes the decision and order of the court.