Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 20-813-BAJ-RLB
2021-08-02
Keith LAUTER v. SZR SECOND BATON ROUGE ASSISTED LIVING, LLC, et al.
Douglas K. Foster, Gordon McKernan Injury Attorneys, Gonzales, LA, Harry Stafford Johnson, Gordon McKernan Injury Attorneys, LLC, Shreveport, LA, for Keith Lauter.
Douglas K. Foster, Gordon McKernan Injury Attorneys, Gonzales, LA, Harry Stafford Johnson, Gordon McKernan Injury Attorneys, LLC, Shreveport, LA, for Keith Lauter.
ORDER
RICHARD L. BOURGEOIS, JR., UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Leave of Court to File First Amended and Supplemental Petition. (R. Doc. 21). The motion is opposed. (R. Doc. 22).
I. Background
On or about October 5, 2020, Keith Lauter, individually and on behalf of the Estate of his mother Mattie Lauter, ("Plaintiff") initiated this action in State Court naming as the defendant SZR Second Baton Rouge Assisted Living, L.L.C., d/b/a Sunrise Senior Living ("SZR") and an unidentified employee of Defendant. (R. Doc. 1-1 at 3-6). Plaintiff alleges that Ms. Lauter and her family had contracted with SZR "for various assisted living services, including the providing of safe transportation to and from doctor appointments." (R. Doc. 1-1 at 3). Plaintiff further alleges that on October 8, 2019, the deceased was "leaving a doctor's appointment at Baton Rouge General under the supervision, custody, and care" of one of SZR's employees when she was left unattended, fell, and ultimately died as a result of her injuries from the fall. (R. Doc. 1-1 at 4-5). SZR removed the action on December 2, 2020, asserting that the Court can exercise diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (R. Doc. 1).
It is unclear where the fall took place. The Petition suggests that the fall took place at Baton Rouge General. The instant motion, however, states that the fall occurred at "Sunrise Senior Living." (R. Doc. 21-2 at 1). SZR states that Ms. Lauter was being cared for at the "Sunrise at Siegen facility." (R. Doc. 22 at 1).
On February 11, 2021, the Court issued a Scheduling Order setting the deadline to amend the pleadings on March 11, 2021. (R. Doc. 9).
On July 19, 2021, SZR moved for summary judgment on the basis that it is the wrong entity identified as the defendant. (R. Doc. 20). This motion remains pending before the district judge.
On July 26, 2021, Plaintiff filed the instant motion, which seeks leave to file a First Amended and Supplemental Petition for Damages to name Sunrise Senior Living Management Inc. as an additional defendant. (R. Doc. 21). SZR opposes the motion on the bases that it is untimely, unjustified, and ultimately futile. (R. Doc. 22).
II. Law and Analysis
A. Legal Standards
After a scheduling order is in place, amendments to pleadings beyond the date set by the scheduling order are governed by Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a showing of "good cause" for modifying the deadline set by the scheduling order. See S & W Enter., LLC v. SouthTrust Bank of Alabama , 315 F.3d 533, 536 (5th Cir. 2003). In order to show "good cause" the party seeking modification must show the deadlines could not "reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party needing the extension." Id. at 545 (citation omitted). The Court considers four factors for determining whether "good cause" exists to grant an untimely motion to amend a pleading: "(1) the explanation for the failure to timely move for leave to amend; (2) the importance of the amendment; (3) potential prejudice in allowing the amendment; and (4) the availability of a continuance to cure such prejudice." See id. (citing Reliance Ins. Co. v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co. , 110 F.3d 253, 257 (5th Cir. 1997) ). "Only upon the movant's demonstration of good cause to modify the scheduling order will the more liberal standard of Rule 15(a) apply to the district court's decision to grant or deny leave." S & W Enter. , 315 F.3d at 536.
Under Rule 15(a)(2), after the period for amending as a matter of course elapses, "a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave" and a "court should freely give leave when justice so requires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The rule "evinces a bias in favor of granting leave to amend." Martin's Herend Imports, Inc. v. Diamond & Gem Trading U.S.A. Co. , 195 F.3d 765, 770 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp. , 660 F.2d 594, 597 (5th Cir. 1981) ). Although leave to amend should not be automatically granted, "[a] district court must possess a substantial reason to deny a request for leave to amend[.]" Jones v. Robinson Prop. Grp., L.P. , 427 F.3d 987, 994 (5th Cir. 2005) (quotations omitted). The Court may consider several factors when determining whether to grant leave to amend, including "undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of the amendment...." See Rhodes v. Amarillo Hosp. Dist. , 654 F.2d 1148, 1153 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting Foman v. Davis , 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962) ).
"It is within the district court's discretion to deny a motion to amend if it is futile." Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., LLC , 234 F.3d 863, 872-73 (5th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). The "futility" of amendments to a complaint is measured by whether "the amended complaint would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted" under "the same standard of legal sufficiency as applies under Rule 12(b)(6)." Id. at 873 (citations omitted).
B. Analysis
Having considered the record, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not established good cause under Rule 16(b)(4) to allow the sought untimely amendment. The Court will, however, provide Plaintiff with leave to refile his motion to amend to establish good cause for amendment and complete diversity of the parties.
Plaintiff did not submit a memorandum establishing good cause for allowing amendment over five months after the deadline to amend. The proposed pleading states that Ms. Lauter and her family had contracted with the proposed defendant, Sunrise Senior Living Management, Inc., "for various assisted living services including the providing of safe transportation to and from doctor appointments." (R. Doc. 21-2 at 2). It is unclear when Plaintiff determined that a contract existed with Sunrise Senior Living Management, Inc. and whether Plaintiff is still asserting a contractual relationship with the current defendant. Furthermore, Plaintiff does not provide the citizenship particulars with respect to the proposed defendant.
The citizenship of a corporation is determined by its state of incorporation and principal place of business. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) ; Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Co. v. Pargas, Inc. , 706 F.2d 633, 637 (5th Cir. 1983). Plaintiff does not identify the state of incorporation or principal place of business of the proposed defendant.
In opposing the motion, SZR represents that "Plaintiff has known for months that he has not sued the proper parties" and that its counsel has requested Plaintiff's counsel to name the proper parties. (R. Doc. 22 at 1; see R. Docs. 22-1, 22-2). SZR states that the "Residency Agreement" for Ms. Lauter identifies "HCRI SUN TWO BATON ROUGE LA SENIOR LIVING, LLC" and "Sunrise Senior Living Management Inc." as parties, further asserting that "SZR does not own, operate, or manage either of these entities, nor is it owned, operate, or managed by either of them." (R. Doc. 22 at 2). Plaintiff has asserted the existence of a single business enterprise in the context of a settlement demand, but denied in discovery responses that any allegation of a single business enterprise has been asserted in the pleadings. (R. Doc. 22 at 2-3; see R. Docs. 22-3, 22-4 at 8).
The Court agrees with SZR that Plaintiff has not established good cause to amend the pleadings in light of the instant filing. As stated above, Plaintiff has not explained his delay in seeking to name Sunrise Senior Living Management Inc. as a defendant. That said, it appears that amendment is important as it seeks to name a proper defendant (which SZR does not deny). It is also unclear what prejudice would be caused to SZR if amendment was allowed, particularly given that discovery is not closed, trial is set for July 18, 2022, and SZR asserts that it does not have any liability in light of the proposed defendant's actions (which SZR claims it does not own, operate, or manage). Finally, while SZR asserts that any claim against Sunrise Senior Living Management Inc. would be prescribed (and therefore futile), it does not provide any analysis of Rule 15(c), which governs whether an amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading.
Given the record, the Court will deny the instant motion, but provide Plaintiff leave to reassert his motion for leave to amend to name Sunrise Senior Living Management, Inc. as a defendant. Any future motion must address the standards of Rule 16 and Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as provide the citizenship particulars for the proposed defendant.
III. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Leave of Court to File First Amended and Supplemental Petition (R. Doc. 21) is DENIED. Any renewed motion must be accompanied with a memorandum addressing the standards of Rule 16 and Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and include a proposed pleading providing the citizenship particulars for the proposed defendant.