Opinion
No. 39367.
March 28, 1955.
1. Contracts — suit for prize money — stock car race — evidence — complainant — complied with rules — entitled to prize money.
In suit for prize money alleged to be due complainant for winning stock car race, promoted and staged by defendant corporation, with automobile which racing judges disqualified on ground of violation of corporation's rules, evidence supported finding of Chancellor that complainant had complied with corporation's rules, and was entitled to prize money.
2. Appeal — jurisdiction — equity or common-law — Supreme Court will not reverse.
Supreme Court will not reverse a judgment or decree in civil cause for want of jurisdiction to render it because of any error or mistake as to whether cause which it was rendered was of equity or common-law jurisdiction. Sec. 147, Constitution 1890.
3. Appeal — Chancellor's findings — review.
A Chancellor's finding of facts will not be disturbed on appeal, unless manifestly wrong.
Headnotes as approved by Arrington, J.
APPEAL from the Chancery Court of Jones County; ROY P. NOBLE, Chancellor.
Pershing B. Sullivan, Laurel, for appellant.
I. The Lower Court erred in overruling the defendant's motion, at the close of complainant's case in chief, to dismiss the bill and enter a decree for the defendant.
II. The common-law form of action by one who enters and performs the conditions of a prize-winning contest against a sponsor of a prize contest, who fails to carry out his undertaking, is assumpsit or possibly debt. 24 Am. Jur., Gaming Prize Contests, Sec. 103; Anno. 67 A.L.R. 427.
III. The bill in this cause was, of course, filed in the Chancery Court, and jurisdiction was sought to be invoked by seeking various injunctive remedies, and by alleging that the complainant was without an adequate remedy at law. In truth and fact, of course, had this suit been tried in a court of law, and resulted in a verdict of $180 in favor of the plaintiff, this would have been the same result as was sought through the bill in equity. It would have constituted a finding by the jury that the plaintiff had won the races, earned the prize money, and vindicated himself in retaining in his possession the trophy which he had been awarded.
IV. The courts of chancery in this State are courts of limited jurisdiction, a fact too well known to require authority. Griffith's Miss. Chancery Practice (2d ed.), Sec. 24.
V. In the absence of allegations of fraud, a Court will not take jurisdiction of an action wherein a competitor in a sporting contest seeks to reverse the decision of the judges based on the rules governing the contest, especially where the questions of qualification are highly technical. Minton v. F.G. Smith Piano Co., 36 App. D.C. 137, L.R.A. (N.S.) 305; Smith v. American Auto Assn., 125 N.Y. Supp. 804, 69 Misc. 60; Trego v. Penn Academy, 2 Sadler (Pa.) 313, 18 W.N.C. 98, 3 A. 819; Wellington v. Monroe Trotting Park Co., 90 Maine 495, 38 A. 543; 24 Am. Jur., Gaming Prize Contests, Sec. 102; Anno. 67 A.L.R. 423.
VI. The Lower Court erred in ignoring the release from liability from any cause whatsoever which the complainant had executed.
VII. The decree of the Lower Court errs in holding the defendant liable for a prize offered and paid by third parties not in the litigation.
Dudley W. Conner, Hattiesburg, for appellee.
I. The relief sought in the equity court was for the specific performance of a contract created by the operation of law (the offer of a prize and premium for those entering the race, to be conducted under specific rules and regulations, and the acceptance of that offer), and to prevent a disqualification when the contest had fairly been won and the forfeiture of a record established, and to enforce such remedy as only equity could afford by injunctive relief. Griffith's Miss. Chancery Practice, Sec. 510; Vol. I, Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence (5th ed.), pp. 237-8.
II. A judge in a contest of this kind by prejudice or any other motive will not be permitted to render a decision obviously untrue and unfair and be supported by the Court on the theory that a rule makes the decision of the judge final without regard to right and honesty of purpose. Choctaw Cotton Oil Co. v. Williams, 66 Okla. 245, 168 P. 792; Cribbins v. Markwood (Va.), 67 Am. Dec. 775; Holt v. King, 54 W. Va. 441, 47 S.E. 362; Johnson v. McDonald, 170 Okla. 117, 39 P.2d 150; Perry v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 137 N.C. 402, 49 S.E. 889; Anno. 67 A.L.R. 423.
III. A court of equity will refuse to interpret a release given the appellant from personal injuries and property damage which might occur in the hazardous sport of automobile racing as a prerequisite to entering the race as a release from the duty to award, and liability for, prizes and premiums offered to the winner.
IV. Contention is made that, inasmuch as the $150 offered for breaking the race track record did not come out of the treasury of the defendant or from the gate receipts on the evening in question, but was paid by three different concerns in the sum of $50 each in order that their names could be used in advertising over the loud-speaker on the evening in question, the prize was not offered by the defendant. It is also contended that the $50 each paid by the three advertisers was paid direct to the winner as announced by the defendant, and not through the defendant to the winner. I cannot agree with this contention. In effect, the advertisers paid the defendant for the advertising of the three concerns over the loud-speaker system operated by the defendant to the fifteen hundred or more people who were present at the races that evening; and the defendant used the $150 paid by the advertisers for the prize money. This is true, even though the defendant never handled the money. The defendant earned the money by advertising the three concerns over the loud-speaker system. It was then the money of the defendant.
This suit was filed by the appellee, J.W.C. Jones, in the Chancery Court of the Second Judicial District of Jones County, averring that appellant, Laurel Racing Company, Inc., promoted and staged stock car races and offered prize money to the winning participants; that the appellee entered such races on July 5, 1952, and that his automobile, described as No. 666, won $180.00 in prize money, but was wrongfully disqualified by the racing judges employed by appellant, and that the $180.00 was due appellee by appellant.
It is admitted that appellee's racing car, No. 666, won the racing contest on the night of July 5, 1952, and was entitled to the prize money in the sum of $180.00, if car No. 666 complied with the rules of the appellant as to the type of car that might participate in the races.
Numerous and detailed rules in regard to the definition of a "stock car" were adopted by the appellant. These rules limited the amount of mechanical improvements that might be made on an automobile as delivered from the manufacturer for the purpose of increasing its speed. Appellant contends that car No. 666 was constructed in violation of Rules 31 and 32. Rule 31 provides that "any motor, same make as car, regardless of model," could be used in the racing car. Rule 32 provides that "engines may be relieved but not ported, if stock."
(Hn 1) Appellant's objections to the construction of car No. 666 are limited to three particulars embraced in the two rules above: First, that the motor of car No. 666 was improper in that the block of the engine in the car was a Mercury block of the type manufactured from 1942 to 1948 inclusive; while the crankshaft was a Mercury product of the type used in the 1949 model engine, with a one-fourth inch longer stroke than the stroke originally found in the 1942 to 1948 Mercury engine. The engine thus created and used in car No. 666 was an engine made up entirely of Mercury parts manufactured by the Ford Motor Company, but of different years, and was known as a "hybrid" engine. No facts are in dispute in regard to this aspect of car No. 666's construction, but only an interpretation of Rule 31. This rule provides that any motor of the same make as the car may be used regardless of the year model. The appellee used in car No. 666 a Mercury motor, 1942 to 1948 vintage. All of the parts in the engine were of Mercury make, thus the engine was a Mercury engine and conformed to the requirements of Rule 31, which did not prohibit the use of a "hybrid" engine.
Second, appellant contends that the engine of car No. 666 was "relieved" and "ported" in violation of Rule 32. The determination of these issues evolves jointly upon a definition of the two aforesaid terms, and the application of the facts as they existed in regard to the engine of car No. 666 on the night in question. The learned chancellor found that the engine of the said car was not "relieved" by the appellee, and was not "ported."
Appellee offered the testimony of three mechanics of many years' experience, who testified that they were thoroughly familiar with the engine of car No. 666, having examined said engine both prior to and after the races on the night in question. That while the engine had been "relieved," that is, the block had been cut down around the valves to let the gas flow into the cylinders prior to combustion and the exhaust gases flow out easier, the engine had been factory "relieved" and was thus in conformity with Rule 31. Their testimony was also that fifty percent of the engines manufactured by Mercury from 1942 to 1948 were "relieved" at the factory, whereas the other fifty percent were not "relieved."
Appellant offered the testimony of one expert mechanic in this regard, who testified that while the block of the engine of car No. 666 was factory "relieved," the factory "relief" job had been subsequently improved upon, thus presenting an issue of fact for the chancellor's decision.
Rule 32 clearly prohibits the "porting" of an engine. The witnesses of both appellee and appellant agree that the ports of the engine of car No. 666 had been cleaned and polished and some small amount of metal removed in the process. However, appellee's proof was that an engine was not "ported" unless a considerable amount of metal was removed from the walls of the ports, that is, the intake and exhaust ports were enlarged to permit a freer flow of gas to and from the cylinders. In the opinion of one mechanic, one-sixteenth of an inch of metal would have to be removed from the walls of the ports before it could be said that the engine was "ported." Appellant offered the testimony of two experts on this issue who testified that the removal of any amount of metal, however small, from the ports would constitute "porting" the engine. No more authoritative evidence than the opinions of the various mechanics was offered. Thus it was clearly a question of fact for the chancellor to determine what constituted the "porting" of an engine.
(Hn 2) Appellant contends that the chancery court had no jurisdiction to try the cause below, and that it should have been tried in the circuit court. Section 147, Mississippi Constitution of 1890, provides that "no judgment or decree in any chancery or circuit court rendered in a civil cause shall be reversed or annulled on the ground of want of jurisdiction to render such judgment or decree, from any error or mistake as to whether the cause in which it was rendered was of equity or common law jurisdiction." Whitney v. Hanover Bank, 71 Miss. 1009, 15 So. 33; Wood, etc. v. Meyer, 76 Miss. 586, 25 So. 297; Goyer v. Wilberger, 71 Miss. 483, 15 So. 235; White, et al v. Willis, 111 Miss. 417, 71 So. 737.
(Hn 3) We find no merit in the other assignments of error. It has long been the rule in Mississippi that the chancellor's finding on the facts will not be disturbed on appeal unless manifestly wrong. Griffith, Mississippi Chancery Practice, 2d Ed. 1950, Sec. 674. The facts in this case were conflicting, and we are unable to say that the chancellor was in error in his decision.
Affirmed.
Roberds, P.J., and Lee, Ethridge and Gillespie, JJ., concur.