Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-4027-13T4
06-17-2015
LAUREL CHASE GROUP, LLC, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ROBERT COYLE, JR., Defendant-Appellant.
Alan L. Frank Law Associates, P.C., attorneys for appellant (Alan L. Frank, on the brief). Jarve Kaplan Granato Starr, LLC, attorneys for respondent (Anthony Granato, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Koblitz and Higbee. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County, Docket No. L-0162-12. Alan L. Frank Law Associates, P.C., attorneys for appellant (Alan L. Frank, on the brief). Jarve Kaplan Granato Starr, LLC, attorneys for respondent (Anthony Granato, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant, Robert Coyle, Jr., appeals from an April 4, 2014 order entering judgement against him individually in the amount of $142,298.29. The judgment was entered by Judge Charles A. Little after a bench trial held on February 4 and February 7, 2014. After a review of the applicable facts and law, we affirm.
Coyle was in the real estate business. He invested in real estate, but was not a licensed realtor. Coyle's friend, Edward Jackson, was a union carpenter. Coyle's family and Jackson's family were friends for many years before Coyle and Jackson agreed to enter into a financial venture. Co-defendant, Brownstone Property Group, LLC (Brownstone LLC), was one of several business entities owned by Coyle and his wife. Brownstone LLC owned no real estate and no assets.
Coyle's wife set up a company known as Laurel Chase Group, LLC (Laurel LLC) for the Jacksons. Judge Little found that the understanding between Jackson and Coyle was that Coyle would teach Jackson "how to make money with his money." The Jacksons took a second mortgage on their home and loaned the money through Laurel LLC to Coyle, by way of Brownstone LLC. A promissory note was signed to secure the loan.
Laurel LLC filed suit when the loan went into default, naming Coyle individually, as well as Brownstone LLC as defendants. An amended complaint was filed on May 23, 2012, adding a count of fraud against Coyle. Default judgment was entered against Brownstone LLC on August 28, 2013. The remaining parties agreed to waive a jury, and a bench trial was held, resulting in a judgment against Coyle individually for $142,298.29.
The key issue at trial was whether Coyle was personally responsible for the repayment of the note. The note named Laurel LLC as the lender, and Brownstone LLC as the borrower on the front page. On the last page, the note listed Robert Coyle, Jr. as the borrower. Additionally, the note was signed by Coyle individually and there was nothing in the promissory note stating that Coyle was signing as a representative of Brownstone LLC. The note was extended twice, and in the last extension, only Brownstone LLC and not Coyle was named as a borrower. The note stated that Pennsylvania law would govern the transaction and thus, Judge Little applied Pennsylvania law in his decision.
Judge Little found that "the testimony of the Jacksons was much more credible than that of the Coyles." This is significant because the Jacksons testified that the loan was always intended to be between Jackson and Coyle personally, and that Coyle and his wife always made it clear that Coyle would repay the money. The Jacksons asserted that they were told the use of an LLC was just for convenience and to protect them. They contended that the loan was arranged between friends at their homes, and was never a deal between two businesses.
Both Edward Jackson and his wife, Vicky Jackson, testified at the bench trial, as did Robert Coyle Jr. and his wife, Virginia Coyle.
On an appeal from a bench trial, we afford a highly deferential standard of review to the factual findings of the trial court. Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 483-84 (1974). The findings will not be disturbed unless they are so "'manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice[.]'" Id. at 484 (quoting Fagliarone v. Twp. of N. Bergen, 78 N.J. Super. 154, 155 (App. Div. 1963)). On the other hand, our review of the trial court's legal determinations is plenary. D'Agostino v. Maldonado, 216 N.J. 168, 182 (2013); Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).
If the trial court's judgment was "based on the application of legal principles" to established facts, we review the trial court's decision de novo. Washington Commons, LLC v. City of Jersey City, 416 N.J. Super. 555, 560 (App. Div. 2010), certif. denied, 205 N.J. 318 (2011).
Under Pennsylvania law, when the individual parties to an instrument contest whether a signature was affixed as an individual or as a representative of a business entity, parole evidence is admissible to show the facts and circumstances attending the instrument's execution. Trenton Trust Co. v. Klausman, 222 Pa. Super. 400, 403 (1972) (citing Dormont Sav. and Trust Co., 338 Pa. 548, 553 (1940)). Parole evidence should be allowed in order to resolve the intentions of the parties at the time the contract was executed. Trenton, supra, 222 Pa. Super. at 403, 405. In Trenton, the court held that a fact-finder should analyze not only the words and the signatures, but also the arrangement of the entire writing and the circumstances under which the instrument was created. Id. at 403
Accepting the credibility assessment of the trial judge in this case, and reviewing the documents themselves, we conclude that Pennsylvania law requires a finding that Coyle was individually responsible for the repayment of the debt, and judgment was properly entered against him. The court did not make a specific finding that defendant committed fraud as it was not necessary to reach that issue.
With respect to Coyle's argument that the trial court improperly allowed cross-examination about statements he made on behalf of Brownstone LLC in federal litigation settled prior to this trial, we disagree. Coyle claims surprise because documents relating to prior federal litigation were not listed in the pretrial memorandum. Coyle could hardly be surprised by his own statements. Judge Little properly exercised his discretion in allowing limited use of documents to impeach the credibility of Coyle and his wife. See Brenman v. Demello, 191 N.J. 18, 31 (2007) (holding a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion).
We have considered defendant's other contentions in light of the record and applicable legal principles, and conclude that they are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
We affirm. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION