Opinion
No. C3-96-10.
Filed June 25, 1996.
Appeal from the District Court, Douglas County, File No. C995778.
Robert M. Christensen, (for Appellant)
Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General, Jeffrey S. Bilcik, Assistant Attorney General, (for Respondent)
Considered and decided by Parker, Presiding Judge, Randall, Judge, and Schumacher, Judge.
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994)
Unpublished Opinion
Appellant Darrin Alcuin Laumeyer challenges his implied consent driver's license revocation on the ground that the police officer did not have reasonable articulable suspicion to stop his automobile. We affirm.
Facts
On August 12, 1995, an Alexandria police officer observed Laumeyer sitting in the driver's seat of a parked car with a "blank" or "vacant" stare. Laumeyer pulled his vehicle away from the curb and accelerated rapidly away from the officer, who followed him. Laumeyer reached the end of the block, turned north, and accelerated rapidly to the next intersection. Laumeyer reached the end of the next intersection, turned east, and accelerated rapidly to the next intersection. Likewise, when he reached the next intersection, Laumeyer turned north, and accelerated rapidly. The officer estimated Laumeyer's speed between intersections to be between 30 and 35 miles per hour. The speed limit was 30 miles per hour. Based on these observations, the officer stopped Laumeyer's automobile and administered a breath test that indicated an alcohol concentration of .18. The district court concluded the officer had reasonable articulable suspicion to stop Laumeyer's vehicle based solely on his blank or vacant stare.
Decision
When this court reviews a stop based on given facts, the test is not whether the trial court's decision is clearly erroneous, but whether, as a matter of law, the basis for the stop was adequate. Berge v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 374 N.W.2d 730, 732 (Minn. 1985). An officer must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585 (1989). An officer can legally stop a vehicle based on facts that support a reasonable suspicion that the driver has violated a law. State v. Petrick, 527 N.W.2d 87, 89 (Minn.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 2008 (1995). If a driver's conduct is such that a reasonable officer would infer that the driver is deliberately trying to evade the officer, and if, as a result, a reasonable officer would suspect the driver of criminal activity, the officer may stop the driver. State v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 824, 827 (Minn. 1989). A trained police officer is entitled to draw inferences on the basis of all the circumstances and deductions that "'might well elude an untrained person."' Id. at 826 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695 (1981)).
Here, the officer articulated his suspicion for stopping Laumeyer by describing Laumeyer's blank or vacant stare and the manner in which Laumeyer accelerated rapidly away from the officer when the officer started to follow Laumeyer. The officer was entitled to infer from Laumeyer's excessive accelerations and speed between intersections that Laumeyer was attempting to evade the officer and that Laumeyer was violating the law. We conclude Laumeyer's blank stare alone was insufficient to comprise reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify the officer's stop. Laumeyer's stare, together with his apparently evasive conduct and speed, however, provided the officer with the requisite suspicion to justify the stop.