Opinion
Civil Action 1:23-CV-01242
01-18-2024
JOSE NEMESIO LAULOPEZ ESTATE, Plaintiff, v. TRANSUNION CONSUMER SERVICES, LLC, et al., Defendants.
(MEHALCHICK, M.J.)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
(CONNER, J.)
This action brought by pro se Plaintiff Jose Nemesio Laulopez Estate (“Laulopez”), was commenced by the filing of a complaint on July 27, 2023, against Defendants Transunion Consumer Services, LLC, Equifax, and Experian (collectively, “Defendants”). (Doc. 1). Laulopez asserts claims against Defendants pursuant to the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., the False Claims Act (“FCA”), and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”), 15 U.S.C. § 6801 et seq.. (Doc. 1). Concurrently filed with the complaint, Laulopez filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, which was granted on October 30, 2023. (Doc. 2; Doc. 6).
Having conducted the statutorily-mandated screening of Laulopez's complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), on October 30, 2023, the Court found Laulopez's complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Doc. 8). The Court granted Laulopez leave to file an amended complaint on or before November 27, 2023. (Doc. 8). At the time of this Order, Laulopez has failed to file an amended complaint.
Laulopez's failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with this Court's Orders “makes adjudication of the case impossible.” See Azubuko v. Bell Nat'l Org., 243 Fed.Appx. 728, 729 (3d Cir. 2007); see also Pruden v. SCI Camp Hill, 252 Fed.Appx. 436, 438 (3d Cir. 2007) (upholding the dismissal of a pro se plaintiff's complaint with prejudice for failure to amend his complaint). Further, a balance of the six factors enumerated in Poulis v. State FarmFire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984) dictates dismissal of this action. The six factors include:
(1) the extent of the party's personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party ... was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense.Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868 (emphasis omitted).
Specifically, the first, fifth, and sixth Poulis factors weigh heavily in favor of dismissal. The first factor, the extent of the party's personal responsibility, shows that the delays in this case are entirely attributable to Laulopez. Because Laulopez is a pro se litigant, he is solely responsible for prosecuting his claim. SeeHoxworth v. Blinder Robinson & Co., 980 F.2d 912, 920 (3d Cir. 1992);Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868. “As a general rule, a pro se litigant is responsible for his failure to comply with court orders.” Lopez v. Cousins, 435 Fed.Appx. 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2011) (not precedential); see alsoEmerson, 296 F.3d at 191; Winston v. Lindsey, Civ. No. 09224, 2011 WL 6000991, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2011) (concluding that a pro se litigant “bears all of the responsibility for any failure to prosecute his claims”). Laulopez has failed to abide by court orders and neglected to litigate this case. Specifically, Laulopez failed to file an amended complaint despite being directed to do so by the Court. (Doc. 8). The fifth factor, the effectiveness of alternative sanctions, also weighs in favor of dismissal. Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868 . Generally, “sanctions less than dismissal [are] ineffective when a litigant, such as [Laulopez], is proceeding pro se.” SeeLopez, 435 F. App' x at 116; Emerson, 296 F.3d at 191 (per curium); Nowland v. Lucas, No. 1:10-CV-1863, 2012 WL 10559, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 2012) (“This case presents such a situation where the plaintiff's status as a pro se litigant severely limits the ability of the court to utilize lesser sanctions to ensure that this litigation progresses in an orderly fashion.”). Additionally, no viable alternative to dismissal exists given the absence of an operative pleading in this matter. Finally, the sixth factor, the meritoriousness of Laulopez's claims, also weighs towards dismissal, as the initial complaint was dismissed by the Court. (Doc. 7; Doc. 8); Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868 .
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Clerk be directed to close this case.
NOTICE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned has entered the foregoing Report and Recommendation dated January 18, 2024. Any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.