The legislature undoubtedly had these evils in mind when it adopted the optometry act in its present form. Reasonable statutory regulation of advertising involving professional services is proper where, in the absence of such legislation, great evils will follow. Laughney v. Maybury, 145 Wn. 146 ( 259 P. 17, 54 A.L.R. 393, and notes). Appellant further claims that 2 Comp. Laws 1929, 6788, subd. (h), results in an unreasonable classification and deprives appellant of property without due process of law.
While courts are not in accord concerning the validity of statutory regulations similar to those under consideration, in our opinion they have been sustained by the weight of authority and the better reasoned cases. Laughney v. Maybury, 145 Wn. 146 ( 259 P. 17, 54 A.L.R. 393), is in keeping with our views and strongly supports the constitutionality of the act. In that case the validity of a statutory provision (subd.
"* * * * * "* * * Laughney v. Maybury, 145 Wn. 146 ( 259 P. 17, 54 A.L.R. 393), is in keeping with our views * * *. In that case the validity of a statutory provision * * * of Washington was upheld prohibiting osteopathic physicians and surgeons from 'all advertising of any kind or character other than the carrying of a professional card, window, or street sign'.
The Legislature has the regulatory power because the profession, of dentistry, for example, intimately concerns the life, health, morals, and comfort and, therefore, the general welfare, of the members of the public, and, because of that relation, the state, under its inherent police power, has the right, and it is its duty, to impose such reasonable and just restrictions and regulations upon the practice of that vocation as are appropriate and necessary to protect and conserve the life, health, morals, comfort, and general welfare of the inhabitants of the state. 11 Am.Jur. p. 1044, § 284; 21 R.C.L. p. 363, § 10; Semler v. Oregon State Board, 148 Or. 50, 34 P.2d 311; Id., 294 U.S. 608, 55 S.Ct. 570, 79 L.Ed. 1086; Laughney v. Maybury, 145 Wn. 146, 259 P. 17, 54 A.L.R. 393; Thompson v. Van Lear, 77 Ark. 506, 92 S.W. 773, 5 L.R.A., N.S., 588, 7 Ann.Cas. 154; State Board v. McCrary, 95 Ark. 511, 130 S.W. 544, 30 L.R.A., N.S., 783, Ann.Cas. 1912A, 631; Butcher v. Maybury, D.C., 8 F.2d 155. And, as the power to regulate continues after the practitioner obtains his license from the state, the license may be revoked where the holder violates proper and reasonable regulations imposed upon the profession by the Legislature.
The power of a state to classify objects of legislation may be determined by degrees of evil or exercised in cases where detriment is specially experienced. Numerous cases of the United States supreme court and state courts so holding are cited in 12 Am. Jur. 163, Constitutional Law § 485, n. 17. Among them is Laughney v. Maybury, 145 Wn. 146, 259 P. 17, 54 A.L.R. 393. Was there in this case no reasonable ground of distinction between sellers of publicly-assisted housing and sellers who have not received such aid?
The right of a licensee to practice medicine, though subject to the regulation under the police power, is of the latter kind. Hughes v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 278 U.S. 562, 162 Ga. 246, 134 S.E. 42; Smith v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 140 Iowa 66, 117 N.W. 1116; Francisco v. Board of Dental Examiners, Tex. Civ. App. (1941), 149 S.W.2d 619; Craft v. Balderston, 58 Idaho 650, 78 P.2d 122; Craven v. Bierring, 222 Iowa 613, 269 N.W. 801; State ex rel. Munch v. Davis, 143 Fla. 236, 196 S. 491; Ramsey v. Shelton, 329 Ill. 432, 160 N.E. 769; State v. Hanson, 201 Iowa 579, 207 N.W. 769; Laughney v. Maybury, 145 Wn. 146, 259 P. 17; Garfield v. United States ex rel. Goldsby, 211 U.S. 249, 53 L.Ed. 168. The statute provides in general terms for notice and hearing, O.C.L.A., § 54-932, and the record shows that notice was given and hearing held.
" Laughney v. Maybury, 145 Wn. 146, 259 P. 17, 54 A.L.R. 393, was a proceeding by A.M. Laughney, a licensed and practicing osteopathic physician and surgeon, to enjoin the prosecuting attorney from prosecuting him for unprofessional conduct. We there said:
Reasonable statutory regulation of advertising involving professional services is proper where, in tile absence of such legislation, great evils will follow. Laughney v. Maybury, 145 Wn. 146, 259 P. 17, 54 A. L. R. 393, and notes. The following excerpt is taken from Commonwealth v. Ferris, 305 Mass. 233, 25 N.E.2d 378: "A familiar ground of the regulation or restriction of contracts or of advertising in a commercial business is the prevention of fraud and mistake.
The Maryland Legislature determined that physicians of mediocre ability are likely to make up for lack of genuine merit by knowledge of mass psychology and skill in appealing to the emotions and hopes of the uninformed and credulous. Under the traditional method of professional advancement as a result of the recommendations of satisfied patients, the progress of a practitioner may be slow, but it bears more relation to merit; whereas mediocre practitioners who advertise extensively can obtain new patients by clever publicity as fast as the discovery of their mediocrity causes the loss of patients. It is well established that the State may lawfully forbid any advertising by medical practitioners that solicit patronage for the advertisers. Laughney v. Maybury, 145 Wn. 146, 259 P. 17, 54 A.L.R. 393. In Commonwealth v. Brown, 302 Mass. 523, 20 N.E.2d 478, appeal dismissed, 308 U.S. 504, 60 S.Ct. 96, 84 L.Ed. 432, the Court said that it is entirely possible that practitioners of unusual merit will eventually succeed without any advertising at all, but in the meantime thousands of people might receive inferior service in the belief, induced by skillful advertising, that it was superior.
The Chenoweth case, supra, in a four to three decision, likewise declared a statute relative to advertising to be unconstitutional because of its indefiniteness. However, in Laughney v. Maybury, 145 Wn. 146, 259 P. 17, 54 A.L.R. 393, this court, after discussing that case, expressly declined to follow the majority opinion therein. Whatever may be the weight of those authorities upon this question, we need go no further than consult our own decisions in order to uphold the constitutionality of the statute under consideration.