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Lauer v. Zoning Commission

220 Conn. 455 (Conn. 1991)
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Lauer v. Zoning Commission

180 Citing cases

  1. Lime Rock Park, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n of Town of Salisbury

    335 Conn. 606 (Conn. 2020)   Cited 4 times

    Because it implicates the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction, we first address the commission's claim that the plaintiff lacks standing to challenge the special permit provisions on the ground that they bar other persons from seeking to amend the regulations. In support of this claim, the commission cites Lauer v. Zoning Commission , 220 Conn. 455, 465, 600 A.2d 310 (1991). In Lauer , the defendant, John Angeloni, applied for and obtained a special permit to operate a horse riding academy on his property.

  2. McNee v. Town of Newtown Cons. Comm.

    2000 Ct. Sup. 14567 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2000)

    Notice to the clerk of an adjoining town is notice to a specific recipient and is therefore "akin to a personal notice statute." Lauer v. Zoning Commission, 220 Conn. 455, 461 (1991). Even if the city was not given notice or given improper notice, "failure to give personal notice to a specific individual is not a jurisdictional defect. . .and lack of personal notice may be waived by the party entitled to it."

  3. Mazzone v. Connecticut Transit Company

    240 Conn. 788 (Conn. 1997)   Cited 58 times
    Ordering review board to "remand to the commissioner for further proceedings"

    "Ordinarily, [when the record is unclear] the appellant has the responsibility to seek an articulation by the [commissioner] in order to furnish an adequate appellate record." Lauer v. Zoning Commission, 220 Conn. 455, 471 n. 16, 600 A.2d 310 (1991); see also Practice Book § 4007 (burden on appellant to provide adequate record for review). We decline, however, to dispose of this appeal on the basis of the claimant's failure to request such an articulation.

  4. Connecticut National Bank v. Giacomi

    233 Conn. 304 (Conn. 1995)   Cited 43 times
    Affirming that there is no cause of action for aider and abettor liability under the provision of the Connecticut Uniform Securities Act modeled on § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and pointing out alternatively that common law aider and abettor liability is available under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 if the elements for such a cause of action are satisfied

    " (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lauer v. Zoning Commission, 220 Conn. 455, 460, 600 A.2d 310 (1991); accord Civardi v. Norwich, 231 Conn. 287, 295, 649 A.2d 523 (1994). We consider first the express language of the statute.

  5. Ambroise v. William Raveis Real Estate, Inc.

    226 Conn. 757 (Conn. 1993)   Cited 245 times
    In Ambroise v. William Raveis Real Estate, Inc., 226 Conn. 757 (1993), Justice Berdon, dissenting, cited Connecticut precedent indicating the "antecedent to the statutory attachment procedure, in Connecticut, was the common law."

    " (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lauer v. Zoning Commission, 220 Conn. 455, 459-60, 600 A.2d 310 (1991). "The issue presented, therefore, is whether the legislature intended to make [ 52-278l (b)] notice an additional requirement for [appellate] subject matter jurisdiction."

  6. State v. McVeigh

    224 Conn. 593 (Conn. 1993)   Cited 28 times
    Holding that § 54-41a of the State Wiretap Act, which requires that applicable telephone equipment be "furnished or operated by . . . a common carrier," should not be construed so narrowly as to excluded telephone equipment purchased from other vendors

    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lauer v. Zoning Commission, 220 Conn. 455, 460, 600 A.2d 310 (1991). We turn first to the language of the statute.

  7. North Haven v. Planning Zoning Commission

    600 A.2d 1004 (Conn. 1991)   Cited 29 times
    Applying plenary review to question of law

    We have recently held that the notice required by 8-3h is not a prerequisite for a zoning commission's subject matter jurisdiction. See Lauer v. Zoning Commission, 220 Conn. 455, 460, 600 A.2d 310 (1991). Since we conclude that the proposed amendments did not concern a project within the meaning of General Statutes 8-3h, we need not consider the defendants' other claims.

  8. Jago-Ford v. Planning and Zoning Commission

    642 A.2d 14 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994)   Cited 7 times
    In Jago-Ford v. Planning And Zoning Commission of Madison, the record reflected that the member sufficiently familiarized himself with the issues raised and the evidence presented at the prior proceedings.

    Holy Trinity Church of God in Christ v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co., 214 Conn. 216, 223, 571 A.2d 107 (1990)." Lauer v. Zoning Commission, 220 Conn. 455, 470, 600 A.2d 310 (1991). We cannot retry the facts or pass on the credibility of the witnesses.

  9. Delfino v. Planning Zoning Commission

    620 A.2d 836 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993)   Cited 15 times
    In Delfino, the appellate court held that the defendant commission's failure to file a map of the proposed zone change with the city clerk was a jurisdictional defect because it failed to give the public adequate notice of the proposed change.

    I In Edelson v. Zoning Commission, 2 Conn. App. 595, 481 A.2d 421 (1984), this court held that the failure to give notice to the regional planning agency as required by General Statutes § 8-3b; see footnote 2, supra; constitutes a jurisdictional defect that renders the actions of the commission null and void. Subsequently in Lauer v. Zoning Commission, 220 Conn. 455, 459-65, 600 A.2d 310 (1991), our Supreme Court held that failure to give notice to an adjoining municipality as required by General Statutes § 8-3h; see footnote 4, supra; does not implicate a commission's subject matter jurisdiction, involves only personal jurisdiction, may be waived, and may be raised only by the one to whom notice must be sent. Lauer drew the distinction between statutorily required published notice to the general public and statutorily required personal notice to specific entities or individuals. "The purpose of a personal notice statute is to give actual notice to [the person entitled to notice]. . . . Therefore, if a person has actual notice of a hearing, the failure to give mailed notice does not frustrate the purpose of the notice provision. . . . The purpose of publishing notice to the general public, however, is to notify by means of legal advertisements, as much of the population as possible of contemplated zoning actions. . . .

  10. Koskoff v. Planning Zoning Commission

    27 Conn. App. 443 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992)   Cited 39 times
    In Koskoff v. Planning Zoning Commission, 27 Conn. App. 443, (1992), the issue was whether publication of a notice on November 24 for a hearing on December 4, satisfied Connecticut General Statutes Section 8-26 which provides in pertinent part that notice shall be given "not more than fifteen days nor less than ten days" prior to the date of such hearing, language that is identical to the language at issue here.

    (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lauer v. Zoning Commission, 220 Conn. 455, 460, 600 A.2d 310 (1991), quoting Caserta v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 219 Conn. 352, 358, 593 A.2d 118 (1991). Whether failure to give notice affects subject matter jurisdiction depends on who is to be notified.