Opinion
03-CV-0120A(Sr).
June 25, 2004
DECISION AND ORDER
This matter was referred to the undersigned by the Hon. Richard J. Arcara, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), for all pretrial matters and to hear and report upon dispositive motions. Dkt. #8. Currently before the Court is the motion of defendant Labor Ready Northeast, Inc. ("Labor Ready"), to compel arbitration and to stay this action until the arbitration is concluded. Dkt. #15. For the following reasons, the defendant's motion to stay this action and compel arbitration is granted.
A motion to stay an action and compel arbitration is not a motion for dispositive relief as set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), and can, therefore, be resolved by Decision and Order. See Tuskey v. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc., 2001 WL 873204 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2001); Herko v. Metro. Life Ins., 978 F. Supp. 149, 150 (W.D.N.Y. 1997).
BACKGROUND
The plaintiff completed a single-page application for employment with Labor Ready, a temporary employment agency, on May 9, 2000. Dkt. #15, Exh. A. The application contains the following language:POLICY REGARDING DISPATCH PROCEDURES, EMPLOYMENT AND ARBITRATION
* * *
I agree that any disputes arising out of my employment, including any claims of discrimination, harassment or wrongful termination that I believe I have against Labor Ready and all other employment related issues (excluding only claims arising under the National Labor Relations act [sic] or otherwise within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board) will be resolved by arbitration as my sole remedy. The arbitration shall be conducted by the American Arbitration Association under its Commercial Arbitration Rules and the decision of the arbitrator shall be final and binding. I understand that Labor Ready also agrees to arbitrate in the same manner any claims which the company believes it has against me.
I HAVE READ AND AGREE TO THE ABOVE STATEMENTS
s/ Mark Latulas 5-9-00 EMPLOYEE SIGNATURE DATE
Dkt. #15, Exh. A.
On or about August 14, 2000, the plaintiff filed a verified complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights ("NYSDHR"), alleging that Labor Ready engaged in a pattern and practice of sending white employees on temporary assignments before black employees and that Labor Ready suspended him after he complained about this practice. Dkt. #15, Exh. B. On November 13, 2002, the NYSDHR issued a Determination and Order After Investigation in which it determined that there was no probable cause to believe that the defendant engaged in unlawful discrimination. Dkt. #15, Exh. C. The EEOC adopted the findings of the NYSDHR and issued a Right to Sue Letter on December 17, 2002. Dkt. #4.
The plaintiff filed his complaint, pro se, on February 18, 2003. Dkt. #1. The defendant acknowledged receipt of the complaint on June 9, 2003. Dkt. #6. By letter dated July 9, 2003, the defendant advised plaintiff of the arbitration agreement and requested that plaintiff voluntarily discontinue this lawsuit and instead file his claim with the American Arbitration Association. Dkt. #15, Exh. C.
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
The defendant argues that plaintiff agreed to arbitration as the sole remedy for resolving this dispute. Dkt. #16. The plaintiff responds that he signed the employment agreement "without thinking at the time what I was signing." Dkt. #17. He claims that he cannot afford arbitration and does not wish the defendant to pay for arbitration because "spending their money is like feeding myself to the [lions]." Dkt. #17.
Employment contracts, except for those covering workers engaged in transportation which are generally covered by other statutory arbitration provisions, are covered by the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 289 (2002). The FAA was enacted to "ensure judicial enforcement of privately made agreements to arbitrate" by placing an arbitration agreement "upon the same footing as other contracts." Dean Witter Reynold, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985) (internal quotation omitted). Section 2 of the FAA provides, in pertinent part, that "an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2. Section 3 of the FAA provides that
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.9 U.S.C. § 3.
"By its terms, the [FAA] leaves no place for the exercise of discretion by a district court, but instead mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been signed." Dean Witter Reynolds, 470 U.S. at 218. Thus, the role of the Court is limited to the determination of the following four issues: (1) whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate; (2) whether the dispute presented is within the scope of that agreement; (3) whether Congress intended the claims to be nonarbitrable; and (4) whether any nonarbitrable claims should be stayed pending resolution of the arbitrable claims. See Oldroyd v. Elmira Savings Bank, FSB, 134 F.3d 72, 75-76 (2d Cir. 1998); Genesco, Inc. v. T. Kakiuchi Co., 815 F.2d 840, 844 (2d Cir. 1987).
In the instant case, plaintiff signed a one-page application for employment which explicitly provides for arbitration of "any disputes arising out of my employment, including any claims of discrimination, harassment or wrongful termination." Dkt. #15, Exh. A. "In New York, the case law provides that parties are bound by the contracts they sign whether or not the party has read the contract so long as there is no fraud, duress or some other wrongful act of the other party." Sinnett v. Friendly Ice Cream Corp., ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2004 WL 1179296 (S.D.N.Y. March 29, 2004) (internal quotation omitted). Mere inequality in bargaining power is insufficient to render agreements to arbitrate employment disputes unenforceable. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane, 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991). In addition, an offer of employment is sufficient consideration to support an employee's promise to arbitrate. See Moorning-Brown v. Bear, Stearns Co., Inc., 1999 WL 1063233 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 1999). Accordingly, the agreement to arbitrate is valid and clearly encompasses plaintiff's complaints of discrimination and wrongful termination.
Title VII claims of discrimination and wrongful discrimination are not exempted from arbitration by statute. Desiderio v. National Ass'n of Securities Dealers, Inc., 191 F.3d 198, 204-05 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1069 (2001). In fact, the Supreme Court of the United States "has been quite specific in holding that arbitration agreements can be enforced under the FAA without contravening the policies of congressional enactments giving employees specific protection against discrimination prohibited by federal law." Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001) (internal quotation omitted). "By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum." Id.; see also Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30-33 (addressing challenges to the adequacy of arbitration procedures).
With respect to the fourth issue, there are no nonarbitrable claims for the Court to address since all of plaintiff's claims against Labor Ready are encompassed by the arbitration agreement. As a result, this entire action must be stayed pending arbitration, after which the parties may ask the Court to confirm, vacate, modify or correct the arbitrator's decision. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-11.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion to compel arbitration and to stay this action until the arbitration is concluded (Dkt. #15), is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.