Opinion
24-CA-129
12-30-2024
AMANDA MILLER LATAXES, ET AL. v. LOUISIANA HOME SPECIALISTS, LLC, ET AL.
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT, AMANDA MILLER LATAXES, WIFE OF/AND JESSIE WAYNE LATAXES, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF THEIR MINOR CHILDREN AARIE JAYNE LATAXES, AYVEN GRAY LATAXES AND LEVI TEMPLE LATAXES Antonio Le Mon. COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE, LOUISIANA HOME SPECIALISTS, LLC, BRETT PEARCE, AND CRUM FORSTER SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY Timothy W. Hassinger Kelsey L. Bonnaffons.
ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 808-793, DIVISION "P" HONORABLE LEE V. FAULKNER, JR., JUDGE PRESIDING AFFIRMED.
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT, AMANDA MILLER LATAXES, WIFE OF/AND JESSIE WAYNE LATAXES, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF THEIR MINOR CHILDREN AARIE JAYNE LATAXES, AYVEN GRAY LATAXES AND LEVI TEMPLE LATAXES Antonio Le Mon.
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE, LOUISIANA HOME SPECIALISTS, LLC, BRETT PEARCE, AND CRUM FORSTER SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY Timothy W. Hassinger Kelsey L. Bonnaffons.
Panel composed of Judges Susan M. Chehardy, Jude G. Gravois, and Marc E. Johnson.
MARC E. JOHNSON, JUDGE
MEJ
SMC
JGG
Plaintiffs/Appellants, Amanda Miller Lataxes and Jessie Wayne Lataxes, individually and on behalf of their minor children, Aarie Jayne Lataxes, Ayven Gray Lataxes, and Levi Temple Lataxes, appeal a directed verdict in favor of Defendants/Appellees, Louisiana Home Specialists, LLC (hereinafter referred to as "LHS"), Brett P. Pearce, and Crum &Forster Insurance Company, that dismissed their petition for damages with prejudice, which was rendered in the 24th Judicial District Court, Division, "P". For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The facts pertinent to this appeal are as follows.
In 2020, Jessie and Amanda Lataxes sought a proposal for installation of open-cell Spray Foam Insulation (hereinafter referred "SFI") in the attic areas of their home located at 39 Willow Drive in Gretna, Louisiana, for better insulation to the second floor living area and improvement in energy efficiency. In late February 2020, Jessie contacted LHS for a quote for the SFI installation and spoke with Brett P. Pearce, the owner of LHS. After a visit to the Lataxeses' home, Brett emailed Jessie a written proposal for the application of "[0].5lb open cell foam to roofline +/-5" at a cost of $5,244.00." The proposal was not signed by either party; however, arrangements were verbally made later through a phone conversation between Jessie and Brett for the SFI work to be performed at the Lataxeses' home.
LHS began the SFI installation at the Lataxeses' home on June 3, 2020. The installation in certain attic areas of the home was performed by three LHS employees: Richard "Ricky" Flores, Ariel Galliano, and Steven Revolta. None of the employees were certified by any SFI manufacturer. During the installation, Jessie monitored the work and inquired about the products being used. Throughout the same night, the Lataxeses noticed a strong, chemical smell inside of their home. The smell remained in the home throughout the SFI installation process, which was completed by the LHS employees on June 4, 2020. The Lataxeses stayed in their home on each night of the installation process.
Jessie complained to the LHS employees and Brett about the strong chemical smell in the home. In response, on June 6, 2020, LHS installed several air scrubber/purifying units in the Lataxeses' home. The units were later removed from the house on June 22, 2020. On June 6, 2020, the Lataxeses left their home due to the chemical smell and their physical reactions to it. They did not seek any medical treatment for their physical symptoms allegedly caused by the chemical smell.
On July 30, 2020, the Lataxeses filed a petition for damages against Brett, LHS, and Crum &Forster Insurance Company, LHS's general liability insurance provider. In their petition, the Lataxeses alleged that Brett represented to Jessie that the application of the SFI in the attic would result in an "air tight attic" that would create an enclosed space surrounding the second floor living areas and provide a decrease in their utility bill. They stated that Brett informed them there could be some lingering odors after the SFI was installed, but the odors would dissipate within one or two days. Brett also informed them they could stay in their homes each night during the installation process. The Lataxeses further alleged that Brett advised LHS would cover their furniture and property with Visqueen sheeting before commencing the SFI installation, and it was not necessary for them to move their furniture from the attic areas; however, the LHS employees did not comply with Brett's assertions.
In their allegations concerning the negligent installation of the SFI, the Lataxeses averred that, when LHS applied the varying SFI products in their home, the ambient air conditions, coupled with the moisture content of the wood substrate, exceeded the manufacturer's specifications for proper installation. They stated they were never warned that mixing and applying SFI products made by different manufacturers could potentially cause problems and/or damages. The Lataxeses alleged that the odors and toxic environment caused by the SFI installation in their home and the various breaches of contract by Defendants rendered their home uninhabitable and caused the following: damage to their property, loss of income for Jessie and Amanda, additional living expenses, pain and suffering from personal injuries and/or illnesses, and any other losses that could be proven at trial. In their answer to the Lataxeses' petition, Defendants denied the Lataxeses' allegations and pleaded all defenses available under the Louisiana Products Liability Act.
In anticipation of trial, Defendants filed motions in limine to exclude and/or limit the testimony of: 1) Doug Hoffman, the Lataxeses' purported sampling technician and indoor air quality measurements expert; 2) Paul LaGrange, the Lataxeses' purported general construction, installation of Open Cell SFI, building sciences, and HVAC expert; and 3) Raymond Gonzales, the Lataxeses' purported general construction, construction estimating, and damage assessment expert. They contended Mr. Hoffman had no scientific degrees or qualifications, and he simply collected spray foam and air quality samples for lab testing. They argued Mr. Hoffman was unqualified to render the opinions in his report, and his anticipated testimony would be based upon knowledge and unreliable information obtained from others, requiring his exclusion from trial. Defendants averred that Mr. LaGrange's opinion, that the temperature, humidity, and moisture content of the wood in the Lataxeses' home caused an SFI "off-ratio" and resulting "offgassing," was unreliable because he simply conducted a visual review of the attic and spray foam and relied solely on historical weather information from a commercial website, with seemingly no methodology. They further averred that Mr. LaGrange's opinions as to the ambient conditions in the attic and moisture content of the wood in the attic at the time SFI was applied were based on pure speculation, were unreliable, and should be excluded. Additionally, Defendants averred Mr. Gonzales did not personally observe or assess the alleged damages himself, but rather, solely relied upon a bid packet obtained from the Lataxeses' attorney and measurements of the home for his opinion that the spray foam in the attic caused damage that would require over $400,000 of labor and materials to repair.
A hearing on the motions in limine was held on October 16, 2023. Mr. LaGrange was the only person to testify at the hearing. The trial court ultimately limited Mr. LaGrange's testimony to the opinions expressed in his report. It concluded that Mr. Gonzales's testimony would be allowed, assuming he met the basic requirements to be an expert during trial examination. The trial court also concluded that Mr. Hoffman did not qualify as an expert, and his testimony that he collected the samples from the Lataxeses' home would not be of any assistance to the trier of fact. The matter proceeded to trial on October 31, 2023.
Mr. LaGrange's inspection report opined that the spray foam was not installed per the manufacturer's instructions or the International Residential Code.
At the trial, the Lataxeses presented the lay testimony of Amanda, Jessie, Kenneth Lataxes (Jessie's father), Richard Flores, and James Stephens. Those witnesses testified as to the smell emanating throughout the home and the Lataxeses' alleged damages. The Lataxeses also presented the expert testimonies of Mr. LaGrange, Mr. Gonzalez, and Dr. Alice Delia, the Lab Director at Prism Analytical Technologies and an expert in the fields of chemistry, laboratory testing, and laboratory test reporting. Dr. Delia testified as to the procedure used for testing air quality samples. However, because Mr. Hoffman was not called to testify as to the procedure he used to collect the samples or the chain of custody, the trial court found that no proper foundation had been laid, and thus, Dr. Delia's testimony regarding the results of the air quality samples collected by Mr. Hoffman was limited to the opinions expressed in her report.
Mr. Stephens read portions of Ariel Galliano's deposition into the record.
Once the Lataxeses rested their case, Defendants moved for a directed verdict. They argued that the Lataxeses failed to provide any evidence to establish a causative link between the SFI in the home and the damages claimed. In response, the Lataxeses asserted they had shown proof of LHS's negligence through the improper installation of the SFI. The trial court stated that no expert testimony was presented that showed the off-gassing claimed caused the Lataxeses' three-year displacement from their home or any of their other alleged damages. The court then orally granted Defendants' motion for a directed verdict. The Lataxeses proffered Mr. Hoffman's photographs and the Prism Analytical Technologies lab results from Mr. Hoffman's samples. In its written judgment, the trial court granted Defendants' motion and dismissed the Lataxeses' claims with prejudice. The instant appeal followed.
The trial court rendered two amended judgments in this matter, pursuant to orders from this Court regarding the decretal language. The latest judgment was rendered on September 18, 2024.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
On appeal, the Lataxeses allege the trial court committed reversible error by granting a directed verdict in favor of Defendants because: 1) it limited the testimony of their experts at trial to the opinions expressed within the four corners of the experts' reports or by applying La. C.C.P. art. 1425(B) to the reports; and 2) sufficient evidence of causation and damages was admitted into evidence by them for the jury to deliberate and render a verdict.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Exclusion of Expert Testimony
The Lataxeses allege that the trial court erred in granting the directed verdict in favor of Defendants due to erroneous evidentiary rulings. They argue the trial court improperly applied exclusions without any forewarning, which unreasonably restricted the testimonies of their experts. The Lataxeses further argue that the trial court issued several evidentiary rulings prohibiting them from introducing expert testimony on causation and/or damages because the opinions would have fallen outside of the four corners of those experts' reports. They maintain that the failure of the trial court to forewarn them that their experts would be limited to testify solely as to the opinions expressed in their respective reports unfairly prejudiced the presentation of their evidence.
Defendants aver that the trial court properly excluded purported expert testimony because the Lataxeses failed to comply with the established pre-trial discovery deadlines. They contend that allowing the Lataxeses' experts to testify outside of the opinions expressed in their reports would have allowed the Lataxeses to blindside Defendants in a trial by ambush with undisclosed testimony or opinions. They further contend that Doug Hoffman, the Lataxeses' proposed air quality expert, was properly excluded because he had never been deposed as a proposed expert and had never testified as an expert in any court.
A trial judge has great discretion concerning the admissibility and relevancy of evidence, and he has wide latitude to determine whether an expert has the competence, background, and experience to qualify. Williams v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 20-248 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/17/21), 314 So.3d 1010, 1018, writ denied, 21-402 (La. 5/11/21), 315 So.3d 871. A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (1) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (2) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (3) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (4) the expert has reliably applied the principle and methods to the facts of the case. Id. at 1019, citing La. C.E. art. 702. The trial court performs the important gatekeeping role of ensuring "that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable." Id., quoting Blair v. Coney, 19-795 (La. 4/3/20), 340 So.3d 775. A trial court's ruling to qualify an expert to testify at trial will not be disturbed on appeal, absent a clear abuse of discretion. Id. at 1018.
Doug Hoffman
In this matter, the trial court excluded Mr. Hoffman as an expert witness. Mr. Hoffman was offered by the Lataxeses as an indoor air quality measurements expert, who collected the air quality and physical samples used for the Prism Analytical Technologies' reports. The court reasoned that Mr. Hoffman's testimony would not be of any assistance to the trier of fact. At the hearing, the Lataxeses' attorney conceded to the ruling, stating Mr. Hoffman would not be called as an expert and would not be asked questions about any of his opinions.
After review, we find the Lataxeses failed to present any evidence to show that Mr. Hoffman was qualified to render any opinions on the results of the samples. His testimony regarding the collection of the samples would not have aided the jury in determining the causation of the Lataxeses' damages.
Accordingly, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Mr. Hoffman as an expert witness.
Paul LaGrange
The trial court allowed Mr. LaGrange to testify as an expert; however, it limited the scope of Mr. LaGrange's testimony to the opinions expressed in his report. Mr. LaGrange's report outlined negligent techniques used by LHS in applying the SFI to the attic areas of the Lataxeses' home. The Lataxeses did not timely provide the trial court with an updated report that specifically expressed a causal link between the SFI application and the Lataxeses' alleged damages. Given the wide discretion in determining whether expert testimony should be admitted, we find no abuse of the trial court's limitation on the scope of Mr. LaGrange's testimony to the opinions expressed in his report.
Dr. Alice Delia
At trial, Dr. Delia was accepted as an expert in the fields of chemistry, laboratory testing, and laboratory test reporting. The trial court allowed her to testify as to the requirement for collecting indoor air quality samples. However, her testimony discussing the samples collected by Mr. Hoffman was limited because there was no evidence concerning the chain of custody of those samples. The Lataxeses did not call Mr. Hoffman as a lay witness to testify as to his sample collection. Because there was no evidence establishing the chain of custody of the samples, we find no abuse of the trial court's discretion and find the trial court properly limited Dr. Delia's expert testimony.
Causation and Damages
The Lataxeses allege the trial court erred in granting Defendants' motion for a directed verdict. They argue that they presented more than sufficient evidence was admitted by the trial court on the issues of causation and damages to submit the evidence to the jury for a verdict. They contend that not presenting an expert to directly testify on causation did not detract from the fact there was sufficient evidence, at the very least circumstantially, to conclude the SFI was negligently installed. The Lataxeses maintain that LHS's chemical installer, Richard Flores, admitted that he had no formal training in the installation of the SFI chemical or knowledge of the manufacturer's use and installation guidelines. They claim this admission logically leads to the conclusion that it was likely the installer negligently installed the chemical and caused the hazardous condition that rendered their residence uninhabitable for over three years. They further maintain that the professional publication admitted into evidence supported their theory of negligence. As for damages, the Lataxeses insist that the uncontradicted trial testimonies of Amanda Lataxes, Jessie Lataxes, and Kenneth Lataxes established, at the very least, that the strong chemical order created quite unpleasant conditions within the residence; and, evidence was admitted into the record showing estimations of personal property losses and the losses of property caused by the chemicals to warrant the award of damages.
To the contrary, Defendants maintain that the Lataxeses did not carry their burden of establishing causation under the duty-risk analysis; thus, the trial court properly granted their motion for a directed verdict. Defendants aver that, even when considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the Lataxeses, the Lataxeses failed to produce expert testimony or analyses showing that the residence was damaged in any fashion; the work performed by LHS caused the alleged damage to the property; or, it was necessary for the Lataxeses to move out of their residence due to the alleged damage. They assert the Lataxeses failed to provide the jury with any basis from an expert to link the spray foam insulation to their damage claims.
A motion for a directed verdict is a procedural device available in trials by jury with an eye toward judicial economy. Dorsey v. Don's Seafood Hut of Metairie, 21-633 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/25/22), 341 So.3d 1265, 1267. The motion is appropriately made at the close of the evidence offered by the opposing party and should be granted when, after considering all of the evidence in the light and with all reasonable inferences most favorable to the movant's opponent, it is clear that the facts and inferences point so overwhelmingly in favor of granting the verdict, that reasonable jurors could not arrive at a contrary result. Id. However, if there is evidence produced in opposition to the motion that has such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded people, exercising impartial judgment, might reach different conclusions, then the motion should be denied and the case should be submitted to the jury. Id. The trial court has much discretion in determining whether a motion for a directed verdict should be granted. Id. The standard of review for the appellate court is whether, viewing the evidence submitted, reasonable people could not reach a contrary result. Id. at 1267-68. The propriety of a directed verdict must be evaluated in light of the substantive law related to the claims. Id. at 1268. In this matter, the Lataxeses' allegations of negligence against Defendants involve toxic tort claims.
In any personal injury suit, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving a causal relationship between the injury sustained and the accident which caused the injury. Aaron v. McGowan Working Partners, 16-696 (La.App. 5 Cir. 6/15/17), 223 So.3d 714, 735. In toxic tort cases, proof of causation has two components: general and specific. Id. "General causation" refers to whether a substance is capable of causing a particular injury or condition in the general population, while "specific causation" refers to whether a substance caused a particular individual's injury. Id. A plaintiff cannot sustain his or his burden of proof with general causation proof alone; the plaintiff must also establish specific causation. Id.
At the trial, the Lataxeses presented evidence that LHS improperly installed the SFI, and the possible effects "off-gassing" could cause. There was also evidence presented that the Lataxeses experienced reactions to the chemical smell emanating in their home after the SFI installation. However, neither Amanda nor Jessie testified that the family sought any medical treatment for their alleged physical reactions. Additionally, there was no evidence presented that directly linked the alleged improper installation of the SFI to the damages alleged by the Lataxeses. The trial judge specifically questioned the Lataxeses' attorney about the causal link between the alleged off-gassing and the damages sought, to which the attorney admitted there was no expert to testify to that causal link. Thus, based upon the evidence presented, the Lataxeses failed to meet their burden of proving the specific causation of their damages in this toxic tort case. Therefore, we find that the trial court properly granted Defendants' motion for a directed verdict.
DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment that granted the directed verdict in favor Defendants and dismissed the Lataxeses' claims with prejudice.
AFFIRMED.