Opinion
9852
07-11-2019
Charles A. Williams, Jr., appellant pro se.
Charles A. Williams, Jr., appellant pro se.
Friedman, J.P., Richter, Tom, Oing, Moulton, JJ.
As Family Court is vested by the State Constitution and the Family Court Act with exclusive original jurisdiction to adjudicate proceedings for paternity and support of a spouse or a child (see N.Y. Const., art. VI, § 13 [b]; Family Court Act §§ 115[a][ii] ; 411; 511), the Support Magistrate properly heard and determined all matters in the proceeding between these unmarried parties, including issuing an order of filiation and a final child support order. The fact that the parties appeared to be embroiled in various legal actions, including a Housing Court case, petitions for custody, and a family offense petition, did not deprive the support magistrate of jurisdiction to hear and determine paternity and ultimately the child support matter (see Family Court Act §§ 439[a], [b] ; 532[a] ).
Contrary to respondent's arguments, the court providently exercised its discretion in denying his request for an adjournment (see Matter of Alexis T. v. Vanessa C.-L. , 101 A.D.3d 436, 437, 955 N.Y.S.2d 325 [1st Dept. 2012] ). Two earlier requests for adjournment had been granted because of the unavailability of respondent's counsel. The court properly concluded that another continuance would have been prejudicial to the child, who was not receiving support. Moreover, respondent failed to exercise his right to challenge the court's order directing him to submit to a DNA test.
Contrary to his contention, there is nothing in the record that suggests that respondent has been a custodial parent at any time since the commencement of the paternity action and is therefore entitled to receive child support from petitioner mother (see Creem v. Creem, 121 A.D.2d 676, 504 N.Y.S.2d 444 [2d Dept. 1986] ).
We have considered respondent's remaining contentions and find them unavailing.