Nearly all the allegations in Lassonde's complaint formed the basis for a state court lawsuit that Lassonde brought against the Debtors in Coos County Superior Court, which was already litigated to judgment and appealed to the New Hampshire Supreme Court. See Lassonde v. Stanton, 157 N.H. 582 (2008). Here, the Court only discusses the undisputed summary judgment facts from the record necessary to decide the Motion.
Under New Hampshire law, "[a] breach of contract occurs when there is a failure without legal excuse to perform any promise which forms the whole or part of a contract." Lassonde v. Stanton, 157 N.H. 582, 588, 956 A.2d 332 (2008) (quotation and brackets omitted). Pursuant to the release agreements here, the sibling defendants agreed to several terms relating to any current or future claims they may have against the Pro-Cut entities — they agreed to "fully, finally and forever release[ ], discharge[ ], quit claim[ ] and covenant[ ] not to sue and otherwise agree[ ] not to enforce any claim" relating to the sibling defendants' ownership interests against the Pro-Cut entities and its respective officers, directors, managers, members, employees, agents, representatives, successors, and assigns.
Lassonde v. Stanton, 956 A.2d 332, 341 (N.H. 2008).
Lassonde v. Stanton, 956 A.2d 332, 341 (N.H. 2008).
The first step of the limited purpose public figure analysis is to isolate the public controversy. Lassonde v. Stanton, 157 N.H. 582, 590, 956 A.2d 332 (2008). "Identification of the implicated public controversy is not a mere formality because the scope of the controversy in which the plaintiff involves himself defines the bounds of his public presence." Id.
To state a claim for breach of contract under New Hampshire law, a plaintiff must allege (1) that a valid, binding contract existed between the parties, and (2) that the defendant breached the terms of that contract. Wilcox Indus. Corp. v. Hansen, 870 F. Supp. 2d 296, 311 (D.N.H. 2012) (citing Lassonde v. Stanton, 157 N.H. 582, 588, 956 A.2d 332 (2008) ). "A breach of contract occurs when there is a failure without legal excuse to perform any promise which forms the whole or part of a contract."
A statement that is defamatory per se is defamatory on its face; therefore, a plaintiff can "recover as general damages all damages which would normally result from such a defamation, such as harm to his reputation," without needing to "prove these damages specifically." Lassonde v. Stanton, 157 N.H. 582, 593, 956 A.2d 332 (2008) (quotation omitted). Defendants argue that the court must dismiss this claim because Martin's complaint does not plausibly allege that the statement in the Memo is false.
In order to state a breach of contract claim under New Hampshire law, Wilcox must allege sufficient facts to show (1) that a valid, binding contract existed between the parties, and (2) that Hansen breached the terms of the contract. See Lassonde v. Stanton, 157 N.H. 582, 588, 956 A.2d 332 (2008); Bronstein v. GZA GeoEnvironmental, Inc., 140 N.H. 253, 255, 665 A.2d 369 (1995). “A breach of contract occurs when there is a failure without legal excuse to perform any promise which forms the whole or part of a contract.”
Under New Hampshire law, "[a] breach of contract occurs when there is a failure without legal excuse to perform any promise which forms the whole or part of a contract." Lassonde v. Stanton, 157 N.H. 582, 956 A.2d 332, 338 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). If a party to a contract "voluntarily puts it out of his power to perform," that action constitutes breach of the contract.
It is well established in New Hampshire that no proof of specific damages is required "[w]hen ... the jury could find that the defamatory publication charged the plaintiff with a crime or with activities which would tend to injure him in his trade or business, commonly called libel per se." Chagnon v. Union Leader Co., 103 N.H. 426, 441, 174 A.2d 825 (1961) ; see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 570 (1977) (stating that "[o]ne who publishes matter defamatory to another in such a manner as to make the publication a slander is subject to liability to the other although no special harm results if the publication imputes to the other ... a criminal offense ..., or ... matter incompatible with his business, trade, profession, or office"); see also Lassonde v. Stanton, 157 N.H. 582, 592-93, 956 A.2d 332 (2008). Instead, the plaintiff "can recover as general damages all damages which would normally result from such a defamation, such as harm to his reputation."