Opinion
Civil Action No. 01-11699-PBS
July 30, 2002
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Jacqueline Lassiter, an African-American former employee of the defendant Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority ("MBTA"), alleges that the MBTA discriminated against her by paying her less than her male coworkers and permitting a racially hostile work environment. She asserts violations of: the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (Count I); the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count II); Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Count III); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4 (Count IV); the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (Count V); and breach of contract (Count VI). Defendant has moved to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and (6) on the ground that the claims are time-barred. After hearing, the motion to dismiss is ALLOWED for Count III, but DENIED with respect to the other counts.
In passing, plaintiff asserts a violation of Title VI but does not assert a separate count under that title. Accordingly, the Court does not address the claim, which one court has rejected in similar circumstances. See Robinson v. MBTA, Mem. of Decision (D.Mass. June 20, 2000) (unpublished).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
With all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the plaintiff, the complaint alleges the following facts, many of which are disputed by the MBTA:
The complaint is difficult to follow because many of the alleged incidents occur on unspecified dates in unspecified locations.
For example, the MBTA contended at the MCAD proceeding that the two male co-workers received a higher rate of pay because they had previously worked for the MBTA before they were laid off, and therefore had more seniority.
Lassiter, a black female, worked at the MBTA as a Third Class Machinist from May 1996 until September 11, 1998. She performed the duties of a fueller, for which she was trained at the Charlestown Garage.
At some point, Lassiter complained to a supervisor that her white male coworkers, on several occasions, "sat in the lounge, played cards, chatted and idled" while Lassiter worked. After Lassiter made this complaint, she was "subjected to ostracism and harsh language" by co-workers. (Par. 21)
While employed at the MBTA's Lynn Garage, Lassiter was subjected to acts of "racial harassment and intimidation." (Par. 26) On at least three occasions, Lassiter saw her name written on the Bulletin Board, with the word "bitch" placed next to it. Lassiter complained in vain to the supervisor about this harassment. Then, on February 4, 1997, Lassiter was operating a bus through the bus wash at the Lynn Garage when a white male coworker, Michael Hayward, intentionally drove another bus into the rear of the bus which she was operating. The impact of the collision was so severe as to cause her injuries, which required her to seek medical attention. Incapacitated from the performance of her duties, Lassiter was forced to take time off from work and to seek worker's compensation. Lassiter complained to a supervisor about this incident. Lassiter now alleges that Hayward was racially motivated in ramming the bus into the rear of the bus that she was driving.
When Lassiter returned to the Lynn Garage after her work-related injuries on August 8, 1997, she discovered that her uniforms, which had been placed in her locker in the women's locker room, had been cut up and destroyed. Lassiter reported this incident to a supervisor, Mike Walsh. Because the workplace had become oppressive and hostile as a result of this racial harassment, Lassiter requested a transfer to protect herself from further physical harm and emotional injuries.
Lassiter was then transferred to the MBTA's Charlestown Garage. At the Charlestown Garage, Lassiter was subjected to "racial ostracism" by her white co-workers. A white male coworker who had worked with her at the Lynn Garage and who had transferred to Charlestown, verbally harassed her and taunted her by saying she was "dumb" and that no one liked her. According to Lassiter, the MBTA refused to adequately and promptly investigate the reported incidents of racial assault and intimidation.
Throughout her period of employment, Lassiter asserts she was paid a discriminatory wage rate. The MBTA paid the white male coworkers at a rate of $12 per hour, but paid her a rate of $8 per hour for the same work. Lassiter performed duties as a fueller which were identical to those performed by at least two white male coworkers, who earned the higher rates of pay. She attributes the pay disparity to her race and/or gender.
Lassiter also alleges that the MBTA discriminated against her in its contributions to the employee pension plan. The MBTA's contributions to that plan are based on an employee's wage rate.
Convinced that the MBTA would continue to pay her at the discriminatory wage rate, ignore acts of racial harassment and intimidation, tolerate a workplace that was "permeated with racial indignities" and that would jeopardize her physical safety and emotional well-being, Lassiter felt forced to quit. Her involuntary separation took place on September 11, 1998.
On September 4, 1997, plaintiff filed a charge with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging violations of the Equal Pay Act and a hostile work environment.
The MCAD issued its dismissal on August 11, 1998. The EEOC issued its dismissal on November 4, 1998. Her complaint was filed with this Court on September 6, 2001.
II. Standards
The standard for dismissal of claims under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 25 (1st Cir. 1987) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). Although the court must take the factual averments of the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, see Coyne v. City of Somerville, 972 F.2d 440, 442-43 (1st Cir. 1992), it is not required to accept every allegation made by the complainant no matter how conclusory or generalized, see United States v. AVX Corp., 962 F.2d 108, 115 (1st Cir. 1992).
III. Discussion Count I — Equal Pay Act ("EPA")
A cause of action under the EPA "may be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrued, and every such action shall be forever barred unless commenced within two years after the cause of action accrued, except that a cause of action arising out of a willful violation may be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrued." 29 U.S.C. § 255(a); Cheng v. IDEAssociates, Inc., No. 96-11718-PBS, 2000 WL 1029219, at *7 (D.Mass. Jul. 6, 2000). In determining when an EPA cause of action accrued, the First Circuit has held that "a decision to hire an individual at a discriminatory low salary can, upon payment of each subsequent paycheck, continue to violate the employee's rights." EEOC v. McCarthy, 768 F.2d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 1985); accord, Jenkins v. Home Ins. Co., 635 F.2d 310, 312 (4th Cir. 1980) (finding that continuing violation of the EPA ceased only at the end of the employee's employment).
Lassiter alleges that her discriminatory rate of pay continued through her separation from the MBTA on September 11, 1998. Her complaint was filed with this Court on September 6, 2001. Although the complaint does not specifically aver that the MBTA's behavior was willful, the facts in the complaint are sufficient to reasonably support such an inference. Since Lassiter's EPA claim is within the three-year statute of limitations for a cause of action arising out of a willful violation, the motion to dismiss is denied on this count. Count II — Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 Plaintiff asserts a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which covers employment contracts. See Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 304 (1994). Although the MBTA moved to dismiss the entire complaint, its brief did not address the cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. A claim under § 1981 is governed by the Massachusetts three-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims. See Johnson v. Rodriguez, 943 F.2d 104, 107 (1st Cir. 1991) (setting three-year statute of limitations for § 1981 claims); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 2A.
Lassiter alleges "involuntary separation" from the MBTA on September 11, 1998. Thus, her claim under § 1981 based on her alleged constructive discharge by the failure to prevent a racially hostile environment in violation of her employment contract appears to be timely filed.
Count III — Title VII
A Title VII claim of employment discrimination requires an employee to file an administrative charge as a prerequisite to commencing a civil action. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f); see also Lattimore v. Polaroid Corp., 99 F.3d 456, 464 (1st Cir. 1996).
After receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, the recipient (aggrieved party) has 90 days in which to bring suit against the party charged with violating Title VII. See § 2000e-5(f); see also Chico-Velez v. Roche Prods., Inc., 139 F.3d 56, 58 (1st Cir. 1998).
On Nov. 4, 1998, the EEOC issued a dismissal letter to Lassiter saying the EEOC has adopted the findings of the state fair employment practices agency that had investigated the charge filed by Lassiter. (Ex. C of Mot. to Dismiss). The same EEOC dismissal letter contains a right-to-sue notice, saying, "This will be the only notice of dismissal and of your right to sue that we will send you. You may file a lawsuit against the respondent(s) under federal law based on this charge in federal or state court. Your lawsuit must be filed WITHIN 90 DAYS of your receipt of this Notice; otherwise, your right to sue based on this charge will be lost."
Lassiter did not file suit until September 6, 2001, well past the 90-day limitations period in which to file suit. Accordingly, her Title VII claim is dismissed.
Count IV — Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4 ("Ch. 151B")
A person claiming employment discrimination pursuant to Ch. 151B may bring a civil action only at the expiration of 90 days after the filing of a complaint with the MCAD, or sooner if a commissioner assents in writing, but not later than three years after the alleged unlawful practice occurred. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 9; see also Christo v. Edward G. Boyle Ins. Agency, Inc., 402 Mass. 815, 816, 525 N.E.2d 643, 644 (1988). Plaintiff did bring a timely MCAD complaint challenging the disparate pay rate and the racially hostile work environment. She also alleges that her racial ostracism and sexual harassment, as well as the alleged violations of the Equal Pay Act, were continuing violations until the date of her constructive termination. Accordingly, plaintiff's claim is timely. See Cuddyer v. Stop Shop Supermarket Co., 434 Mass. 521, 750 N.E.2d 928 (2001) (holding that an administrative claim of a hostile work environment was timely filed with the MCAD because one of the acts of discrimination occurred within six months of the filing).
Defendant contends that the claim is barred because plaintiff did not separately file a charge with the MCAD concerning her constructive termination. A civil complaint's scope under Chapter 151B is limited by the charge filed with the administrative agency and the investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of that charge. See Lattimore, 99 F.3d at 464-65 (dismissing certain of plaintiff's claims pursuant to Ch. 151B as beyond the scope of his administrative charge).
Although it is true she did not separately file a claim contesting the termination, such a claim would certainly have been futile as the MCAD had just rejected the very allegations she said caused the involuntary separation.
Count V — Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Plaintiff asserts violation of her right under the Fourteenth Amendment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute of limitations that applies to this claim is three years. See Street v. Vose, 936 F.2d 38, 39 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that state personal injury statute of limitations applies to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 2A. Because Lassiter's claim of racial discrimination is premised on her alleged involuntary separation on September 11, 1998, this count is timely. Indeed, the MBTA did not even brief the issue.
Count VI — Breach of Contract
A six-year statute of limitations applies in Massachusetts for breach of contract actions. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 2; see also Govan v. Trs. of Boston Univ., 66 F. Supp.2d 74, 82 (D.Mass. 1999). An action for breach of contract accrues at the time of breach. Govan, 66 F. Supp.2d at 82 (citing Saenger Org., Inc. v. Nationwide Ins. Licensing Assocs., 119 F.3d 55, 64). Under any theory, this claim is timely.
ORDER
For the reasons stated above, the Motion to Dismiss brought by Defendant MBTA is ALLOWED for Count III, but DENIED with respect to the other counts.