Lasseter v. Fenn

2 Citing cases

  1. Erfani v. Bishop

    251 Ga. App. 20 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 10 times

    When a former tenant re-enters the abandoned tenant-premises after the term has expired, such entry is not in the legal relationship as landlord-tenant, which ceased upon the expiration of the term. Lasseter v. Fenn, 66 Ga. App. 173, 175 ( 17 S.E.2d 303) (1941). Thus, Mr. Enfani's entry into the property of the defendant on May 1 was not as a tenant holding over, but as a trespasser, because he had abandoned the premises and the defendant had accepted the surrender by installing the locks to keep him and anyone else out without her express permission for entry.

  2. Goodman v. Friedman

    161 S.E.2d 71 (Ga. Ct. App. 1968)   Cited 2 times

    On this phase of the case plaintiffs' argument is apparently due to misunderstanding of one of the Supreme Court's holdings at 222 Ga. 613. The pertinent holding of that court was simply that after a tenant had surrendered possession of the premises the estoppel of Code ยง 61-107, prior to the 1967 amendment, was no longer applicable. This court has so held. Lasseter v. Fenn, 66 Ga. App. 173 ( 17 S.E.2d 303). The Supreme Court did not hold that "possession," as the term was used in the Code, means actual manual occupancy of the premises or that actual manual occupancy is prerequisite to the estoppel of the Code provision. We assume, without deciding, that the 1967 amendment would have been applicable on the motion for summary judgment if the defendants attempted to assert the deficiency in the lessors' title during the continuance of any one of the temporal conditions stated in the amendment.