Moore v. Skiles has been followed in cases subsequently decided by this court and the Colorado Court of Appeals. See Lasnetske v. Parres, 148 Colo. 71, 365 P.2d 250 (1961); Hover v. Clamp, 40 Colo. App. 410, 579 P.2d 1181 (1978) ( Moore v. Skiles not changed by advent of comparative negligence); Romero v. Denver Rio Grande Western Railway, 30 Colo. App. 516, 497 P.2d 704 (1972), rev'd on other grounds, 183 Colo. 32, 514 P.2d 626 (1973). In Lasnetske v. Parres, we elaborated on the right of the passenger-owner or co-owner to control the driver — the right that underpins the imputation of negligence of the driver to the passenger:

Rather, if the evidence is disputed, or if reasonable men may well differ as to the inferences to be drawn from undisputed facts, the issues of negligence, contributory negligence and proximate cause are questions of fact to be resolved by the trier of the facts. Chicago, R.I. P.R.R. v. Williams, 148 Colo. 594, 367 P.2d 342 and Lasnetske v. Parres, 148 Colo. 71, 365 P.2d 250. "Without burdening this opinion with unnecessary detail, suffice it to say that our examination of the record has amply convinced us that this is but another instance where the issues of negligence, contributory negligence and proximate causation present questions of fact, and not of law.

In a co-owner situation, such as existed between Richard and Ellen Stroh, the passenger, at most, enjoys a non-exclusive, mutual authority to control the vehicle's operation, and consequently, application of the doctrine of imputed negligence is simply inapt. The above cases represent a fair sampling from courts rejecting imputation of negligence in the co-owner scenario; their sound reasoning persuades us. On the other hand, the language of the Supreme Court of Colorado in Lasnetske v. Parres, 148 Colo. 71, 365 P.2d 250 (1961) (in part quoting Moore v. Skiles, 130 Colo. 191, 274 P.2d 311 (1954)), typifies the rationale supporting the imputed negligence doctrine in such cases: "We recognize that the authorities are divided on the question of imputability of negligence of the driver to a non-driving passenger in the automobile.

The evaluation of this evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom were certainly for the jury under proper instructions of the court. Lasnetske v. Parres, 148 Colo. 71, 365 P.2d 250. [2] The evidence tending to negate any contributory negligence of plaintiff was disputed, but, when viewed in the light most favorable to her, it would indicate that she was driving with due regard and caution for the conditions then existing on the roadway.

[7] A verdict should be directed only when the evidence has such quality and weight as to point strongly and overwhelmingly to the fact that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary verdict. Pioneer Construction Co. v. Richardson, 176 Colo. 254, 490 P.2d 71 (1971); Lasnetske v. Parres, 148 Colo. 71, 365 P.2d 250 (1961); Powell v. City of Ouray, 32 Colo. App. 44, 507 P.2d 1101 (1973). Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the court of appeals with directions to remand to the district court for new trial in accordance with the views expressed in this opinion.

Laurinat v. Giery, 157 Neb. 681, 61 N.W.2d 251. The rule is applied generally to motorists entering the intersection on a left turn signal. Sibley v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co., 163 So.2d 464 (La. App.); Potts v. United States Fidelity Guaranty Co., 135 So.2d 77 (La. App.); Lasnetske v. Parres, 148 Colo. 71, 365 P.2d 250. The right-of-way of the left turning motorist over through traffic entering on the green signal, however, exists only if the motorist making the left turn entered the intersection on favorable signal and the turning movement is continuous. In this case the defendant testified that after the green arrow came on he followed two or three cars into the intersection but stopped because the green arrow was off and through traffic had entered the intersection.

[2,3] It is the often repeated rule in this state that the issue of negligence is a matter generally resolved by the trier of fact; it is only in those cases where the evidence is undisputed and where reasonable men could reach but one conclusion from that evidence, that the court is justified in usurping the function of the jury and directing a verdict for either party. Richardson v. Pioneer Construction Co., supra; Lasnetske v. Parres, 148 Colo. 71, 365 P.2d 250; Yockey Trucking Company, Inc. v. Handy, 128 Colo. 404, 262 P.2d 930; W. Prosser, Torts, (3d ed.) Ch. 6, § 36. [4] A careful analysis of the record before us reveals that there was a great deal of testimony introduced by both sides on the issues of negligence and causation.

However, for the purposes of this opinion we will identify the driver as Chargingcrowe. It is the plaintiff's position that it made a strong prima facie case of negligence on part of Chargingcrowe and that under the rationale of Lasnetske v. Parres, 148 Colo. 71, 365 P.2d 250 and Moore v. Skiles, 130 Colo. 191, 274 P.2d 311 it also made at lease a prima facie showing that at the time of the accident Chargingcrowe was acting as an agent for House. In such case, argues the plaintiff Chargingcrowe's negligence would be imputed to House and hence it was error for the trial court to dismiss the complaint.

From our review of the testimony and the exhibits we conclude that there was conflicting evidence relating to contributory negligence on the part of the deceased child, to such an extent that it cannot be said that reasonable minds could reach no other conclusion that that the decedent was not negligent as a matter of law. Under such circumstances it would have constituted reversible error for the trial court to have directed a verdict for the plaintiffs. Jones v. Jefferson County School District, 154 Colo. 590, 392 P.2d 165; Rine v. Isham, 152 Colo. 411, 382 P.2d 535; Lasnetske v. Parres, 148 Colo. 71, 365 P.2d 250; Nettrour v. J. C. Penney Co., 146 Colo. 150, 360 P.2d 964. II.

It is by now almost trite, but nonetheless still quite true, that it is only in the clearest of cases, where not only the facts are undisputed but reasonable minds could draw but one conclusion from them, that the question of just what constitutes reasonable care is ever one of law to be decided by the court. Lasnetske v. Parres, 148 Colo. 71, 365 P.2d 250. Certainly reasonable minds could differ as to whether Miller under the circumstances which have been briefly summarized above was or was not guilty of negligence. The instant case is readily distinguishable from Moseley v. Lamirato, 149 Colo. 440, 370 P.2d 450, relied on heavily by counsel for Gomez, and the facts and circumstances leading up to the particular collision with which we are here concerned are really more comparable to those in Rice v. Groat, 167 Colo. 554, 449 P.2d 355.