These cases, Daniel, Mack, and Salmon, were effectively overruled by Dyer and Freiborg. Following Freiborg and Dyer, this Court, in Lasiewicki v Tusco Products Co, 372 Mich. 125, 131; 125 N.W.2d 479 (1963), examined a case in which an employee slipped and fell when she was leaving for lunch while she was walking on the unpaved portion of a public right of way, which was used by employees for parking cars near the plant worksite. This Court applied the going-and-coming provision under 1948 CL 412.1, the predecessor of subsections 301(1), (3), and explained that an employee need not strictly be on the employer's "premises" in order to be presumed to be in the course of his employment:

Dyer v Sears, Roebuck Co, supra, pp 95-96.Lasiewicki v Tusco Products Co, 372 Mich. 125; 125 N.W.2d 479 (1963). It would not be inappropriate, therefore, to extend principles developed, independently of the amendment, in the construction of "out of and in the course of", when or if it is concluded that those principles cannot be logically or reasonably limited to on-premises injuries.

Cases allowing compensation for employees injured while going to work involved travel from a parking area owned, leased, or maintained by the employer. Lasiewicki v Tusco Products Co, 372 Mich. 125; 125 N.W.2d 479 (1963) (employer-maintained parking area); Smith v Greenville Products Co, 185 Mich. App. 512; 462 N.W.2d 789 (1990) (employer-provided parking); Upton v General Motors Corp, 124 Mich. App. 61; 333 N.W.2d 384 (1983) (driveway of employer's plant); Jean v Chrysler Corp, 2 Mich. App. 564; 140 N.W.2d 756 (1966) (employer leased a designated parking area). Compensation has been denied, however, when the injury occurred off the employer's premises, including private parking areas, in Benenetau v Detroit Free Press, 117 Mich. App. 253; 323 N.W.2d 498 (1982); Denny v Kostadinovski, 117 Mich. App. 517; 342 N.W.2d 19 (1981); Tedford v Stouffer's Northland Inn, 106 Mich. App. 493; 308 N.W.2d 254 (1981).

When plaintiff's accident occurred, he was within the zone, environments and hazards of his labor and, therefore, was presumed to be in the course of his employment under the coming-and-going provision at issue, MCL 418.301(3); MSA 17.237(301)(3). In discussing a coming-and-going provision virtually identical to the one at issue in this case, our Supreme Court in Lasiewicki v Tusco Products Co, 372 Mich. 125, 131; 125 N.W.2d 479 (1963), quoted a pertinent "important principle" from Hills v Blair, 182 Mich. 20, 27; 148 N.W. 243 (1914), an early case in which the Court construed the language "arising out of and in the course of employment" relative to place of injury: "In applying the general rule that the period of going to and returning from work is not covered by the act, it is held that the employment is not limited by the exact time when the workman reaches the scene of his labor and begins it, nor when he ceases, but includes a reasonable time, space, and opportunity before and after, while he is at or near his place of employment.

However, the meaning of the word "premises" as a limitation has been gradually eroded by case law. In Lasiewicki v Tusco Products Co, 372 Mich. 125; 125 N.W.2d 479 (1963), the employee was injured when she slipped and fell in a parking lot while walking to work. The parking lot was located near the employer's building and was maintained by the employer.

However, the definition of the word "premises" has been expanded by case law. In Lasiewicki v Tusco Products Co, 372 Mich. 15; 125 N.W.2d 479 (1963), a portion of city-owned property used and maintained by the employer as a parking lot for its employees was determined to be part of its premises. In Jean v Chrysler Corp, 2 Mich. App. 564; 140 N.W.2d 756 (1966), compensation was awarded to an employee who was injured on a public roadway lying between the employer leased parking area and the employer's place of business.

See, also, Adair v Metropolitan Building Co, 38 Mich. App. 393; 196 N.W.2d 335 (1972). Likewise, in Lasiewicki v Tusco Products Co, 372 Mich. 125; 125 N.W.2d 479 (1963), a compensation award was affirmed where the employee was injured in a slip and fall in an employee parking area. Although the area was publicly owned, lying between the street and the employer's building, it was maintained by the employer and, therefore, was considered to be within the statutory term "premises".

However, the meaning of the work "premises" as a limitation has gradually been eroded by case law. In interpreting the coming-and-going rule below, the WCAB relied on Lasiewicki v Tusco Products Co, 372 Mich. 125; 125 N.W.2d 479 (1963), and Fischer vLincoln Tool Die Co, 37 Mich. App. 198; 194 N.W.2d 476 (1971). In Lasiewicki, the plaintiff was injured after slipping and falling on ice in a parking area used by employees.

It should be noted that the plaintiff in Panagos was also entitled to her remedy under the Workmen's Compensation Act since the injury clearly arose out of and in the course of her employment. See Dyer v Sears, Roebuck and Co, 350 Mich. 92; 85 N.W.2d 152 (1957), and Lasiewicki v Tusco Products Co, 372 Mich. 125; 125 N.W.2d 479 (1963). Thus, where an employer is acting in several different and unrelated capacities, an injured employee may very well have, depending on the circumstances, two separate and distinct remedies.

The referee found that plaintiff's injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment and awarded compensation. The appeal board affirmed, partially relying upon Lasiewicki v. Tusco Products Co, 372 Mich. 125 (1963), and its own interpretation of recent appellate decisions in this area. In affirming the referee, the appeal board found that plaintiff was upon a public sidewalk at the time of his injury.