Opinion
No. 12–P–920.
2013-08-9
Sohail LASHGARI v. ZOLL MEDICAL & another.
Where, as here, King is an official of ZOLL Medical (specifically, a vice president), the plaintiff has the added burden of showing that “actual malice”—which is defined as a “spiteful, malignant purpose, unrelated to the legitimate corporate interest”—was the controlling factor in the interference. Id. at 261, quoting from Wright v. Shriners Hosp. for Crippled Children, 412 Mass. 469, 476 (1992). The judge concluded that the facts alleged in the complaint failed to show that King had actual malice. We agree.
By the Court (TRAINOR, MEADE & FECTEAU, JJ.).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The plaintiff appeals from the dismissal of his complaint pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974). He makes three arguments on appeal: (1) that the judge erred in construing G.L. c. 151B to exclude standing for associational handicap discrimination; (2) that the judge improperly dismissed his claim of interference with advantageous business relations; and (3) that the judge improperly dismissed his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. We affirm.
Standard of review. “We review the allowance of a motion to dismiss de novo. We accept as true the allegations in the complaint and draw every reasonable inference in favor of the plaintiff.” Curtis v. Herb Chambers I–95, Inc., 458 Mass. 674, 676 (2011) (citation omitted). “We consider whether the factual allegations in the complaint are sufficient, as a matter of law, to state a recognized cause of action or claim, and whether such allegations plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” Dartmouth v. Greater New Bedford Regional Vocational Technical High Sch. Dist., 461 Mass. 366, 374 (2012). Discussion. 1. Handicap discrimination based on associational standing. First, the plaintiff argues that his claim against ZOLL Medical for associational handicap discrimination was improperly dismissed. The Supreme Judicial Court recently adopted associational handicap discrimination under G.L. c. 151B, § 4(16), in a case where the employee was terminated in order to reduce the company's health insurance costs that would be incurred by the employee's disabled wife. Flagg v. AliMed, Inc., 466 Mass. 23, 37 (2013). We need not decide whether associational handicap discrimination should be extended beyond that context, see id. at 43–44 (Gants, J., concurring), because we agree with the judge below that the plaintiff's complaint, as alleged, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be based.
According to the complaint, in or about February of 2010, the plaintiff explained to his supervisor, Shawn Price, that he could not work additional hours because his autistic son required constant care. The vice president of ZOLL Medical, Clifford King, then demoted the plaintiff from his lead role on a project and placed him on a performance improvement plan.
This, in turn, led to severe emotional distress for the plaintiff and, ultimately, to what he considered to be his constructive discharge.
The plaintiff claims the timing of the demotion was suspect because he had just completed an important project.
These factual allegations simply do not “plausibly suggest[ ] ... an entitlement to relief.” Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008), quoting from Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007). To establish a prima facie case for associational handicap discrimination, the employee must show that “he was fired because of his association with his handicapped [son].” Flagg, supra. Nothing in the complaint demonstrates or even alleges a connection between the plaintiff's conversation about his son's autism with Price and the subsequent adverse employment actions imposed by King. Nor can the plaintiff rectify these causal deficiencies by merely casting the timing of the demotion as suspect or illogical. Such conclusory and speculative allegations are not enough to survive the pleading stage under Iannacchino. The judge correctly dismissed count I.
2. Intentional interference with advantageous business relations. The test for intentional interference with advantageous business relations is set forth in Blackstone v. Cashman, 448 Mass. 255, 260 (2007):
“To make a successful claim for intentional interference with advantageous relations, a plaintiff must prove that (1) he had an advantageous relationship with a third party (e.g., a present or prospective contract or employment relationship); (2) the defendant knowingly induced a breaking of the relationship; (3) the defendant's interference with the relationship, in addition to being intentional, was improper in motive or means; and (4) the plaintiff was harmed by the defendant's actions.”
Where, as here, King is an official of ZOLL Medical (specifically, a vice president), the plaintiff has the added burden of showing that “actual malice”—which is defined as a “spiteful, malignant purpose, unrelated to the legitimate corporate interest”—was the controlling factor in the interference. Id. at 261, quoting from Wright v. Shriners Hosp. for Crippled Children, 412 Mass. 469, 476 (1992). The judge concluded that the facts alleged in the complaint failed to show that King had actual malice. We agree.
As alleged by the plaintiff, King pressured him to work more hours, demoted him from his lead role, and placed him on a performance improvement plan. Those acts are clearly in furtherance of a “legitimate corporate interest” to increase productivity. Ibid., quoting from Wright, supra. That the plaintiff alleges that “King engaged in the aforementioned conduct with spiteful and malignant intent” is of no consequence. Such a statement, unsupported by any alleged facts or any reasonable inferences to draw, is conclusory and speculative and, as such, is insufficient to support the plaintiff's claim. Iannacchino, 451 Mass. at 636.
The plaintiff maintains that his complaint satisfies Iannacchino because discriminatory animus “constitutes an improper means or motive for purposes of an interference claim, and constitutes actual malice.” Bray v. Community Newspaper Co., 67 Mass.App.Ct. 42, 48 (2006). Noticeably absent from his complaint, however, is any allegation that King had knowledge, either actual or implied, of the plaintiff's autistic son. The plaintiff contends that Price's knowledge of the plaintiff's son's condition should be imputed to King. That argument, however, would undermine the heightened requirement that the interference be “motivated by actual, and not merely implied, malice.” Blackstone, supra. Because there are no facts, or even reasonable inferences to draw, to support the plaintiff's contention that King had knowledge of the plaintiff's autistic son, the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted. The judge correctly dismissed count II.
3. Intentional infliction of emotional distress. Finally, the plaintiff argues that his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) should not have been dismissed. We disagree, for two reasons.
First, the workers' compensation act “provides the exclusive remedy against coemployees who engage in tortious conduct within the course of their employment and in furtherance of the employer's interest.” Brown v. Nutter, McClennen & Fish, 45 Mass.App.Ct. 212, 216 (1998). Whether conduct is within the course of employment requires a “fact-intensive analysis,” id. at 217, but the facts alleged in the complaint leave little doubt that King acted within the course of his employment and in furtherance of ZOLL Medical's interest. The conduct alleged against King—pressuring the plaintiff to work additional hours, demoting him, and placing him on a performance improvement plan—is unquestionably “related wholly to his position as [the plaintiff]'s supervisor.” Anzalone v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Authy., 403 Mass. 119, 125 (1988). The plaintiff's claim, therefore, is covered exclusively by workers' compensation. See Brown, supra.
Second, as an element of his IIED claim, the plaintiff must show that King's conduct was “extreme and outrageous,” “beyond all possible bounds of decency,” and “utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 145 (1976). This the plaintiff has not done. After reiterating King's employment-related conduct, which was discussed supra, the plaintiff states in a conclusory manner that “King's actions were beyond all bounds of decency.” Even under the most indulgent reading of the complaint, these alleged facts rise nowhere near the level of outrageousness required for a successful IIED claim. Contrast O'Connell v. Chasdi, 400 Mass. 686, 687–688, 691 (1987) (continual sexual advances and harassment on business trip); Brown, supra at 213–214, 219 (forcing legal secretary to falsely notarize documents under attorney's threat of suicide and display of tears sufficient to survive motion to dismiss). Count III was correctly dismissed.
Judgment affirmed.